Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

501.BC Kashmir/12–2749: Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

secret

New York, December 27, 1949—1:29 p. m.

1472. Following is text of Indian letter containing written reply to McNaughton’s proposal, handed him last night by Bajpai, Rau and Abdullah. McNaughton said Bajpai and Rau appeared embarrassed and close to apologetic while feathers were sticking out of Abdullah’s mouth.

“Dear Gen. McNaughton,

The proposals regarding the settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute which you communicated to us on the mid-night of 23rd December were transmitted four hours later to the Government of India. Owing to the unfortunate delay in the transmission of an important part of our telegram, the reply of our government has been somewhat delayed. Their views on the proposals have, however, now been received and I hasten to communicate them to you.

2. My government recognize the care that you have devoted to the formulation of your proposals. After the fullest consideration, however, they have come to the conclusion that:

(a) The proposals fail to take account of the relative positions of India and Pakistan in this dispute, and

(b) In material respects, they do not preserve the agreements already reached under the auspices of the UN.

3. As you are aware, from your own initimate association with the discussion of the Kashmir dispute by the SC and our recent conversations, the position of the Government of India has always been that Pakistan is the aggressor and cannot, therefore, be regarded as being on a footing of equality with India. They have held and urged this opinion on the Council and its Commission, not in any spirit of narrow legalism but because of their conviction that, in the consideration of all disputes that may come before the Council, moral considerations should be paramount. The Government of India cannot help thinking that the new approach in the proposals to the problem of demilitarization as also the question of the northern areas does not recognize this fundamental difference between the positions of India and Pakistan. This is even truer of the respective positions of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir, whose sovereignty over the whole state has been recognized by the UNCIP, and the so-called Azad Kashmir Government which even the government of Pakistan has not recognized.

4. The specific points, which my government have made about the proposals are:

I. That the so-called Azad Kashmir forces should be disbanded and disarmed. This was repeatedly represented to the UNCIP, first in the course of the conversations that took place between the Prime Minister of India and Messrs. Lozano and Colban on the 20th and 22nd of Dec., 1948, respectively and later in the discussion and correspondence between the Government of India and the Commission in 1949 on the subject of the truce. In the latter connection I would invite your attention to paragraph 1 of Sir G. S. Bajpai’s letter No. 165–PASG/49, dated [10th March, 1949, to His Excellency Monsieur Carlos A. Leguizamon, then Chairman of the Commission, and to paragraph 2 of the memorandum forwarded under his letter No. 210–PASG/49, dated]¹ 28th March 1949, to His Excellency Monsieur Robert Van de Kher-chove who succeeded Mon Leguizamon as chairman. In the aides mémoires and the memorandum the dangers of not disbanding and disarming the so-called Azad Kashmir forces were fully explained. In the memorandum we made detailed proposals for the creation of a civil armed force to maintain law and order in the so-called Azad Kashmir territory. My government feel that this is all that is necessary for the maintenance of law and order and of internal security in this territory.

II. Paragraph 2(a) of the proposals provides for ‘the reduction by disbanding and disarming of local forces, including on the one side the armed forces and militia of the state of Kashmir, and on the other the Azad forces’. This puts the Government of Jammu and Kashmir and the so-called Azad Kashmir authorities on an equal level. Moreover, at no time previously has it been suggested that Kashmir state forces should be disbanded or disarmed.

III. My government wish to emphasize that the proposals put the northern area, administratively and militarily, in the same position as the so-called Azad Kashmir territory. It has been admitted all along that the sovereignty of the Jammu and Kashmir state should be accepted over the whole area of the state. If Pakistan irregular forces such as the Gilgit or the Baltistan scouts remain in the northern area, the sovereignty of the state will be violated militarily. Further, if as suggested, the administration of this area is to remain in the hands of the existing local authorities, which have been created by Pakistan and are aided by Pakistan officials, the sovereignty of the Jammu and Kashmir state in this area will be equally violated in the administrative field. There is no justification either for the retention of Pakistan irregular forces, such as the Gilgit and Baltistan scouts or for the continuance of the existing administrative authorities in this area. As requested in the Prime Minister’s letter of the 20th August on the subject of this area to the then chairman of the commission, Mr. Korbel, responsibility for the defence of this area should revert to the Government of India and for its administration to the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. The only reason that the majority of the commission have given for not complying with the Prime Minister’s request (which the commission itself had promised to consider at the time of the implementation of the resolution of the 15th August) is that the entry of Indian forces into this territory would lead to an extension of military activity. In the first place, if, as is proposed in the commission’s resolution of the 13th August, 1948, Pakistan troops are withdrawn from this area, there is no reason why the garrisoning of selected points in this area should involve an extension of military activity. Such military resistance as may be offered to Indian forces in this area could be offered only by forces which Pakistan has raised against the spirit of the assurance that Pakistan would not be allowed to consolidate any part of the territory of the state under its control to the disadvantage of the state. These forces must be withdrawn. No resistance need be expected from the local population which has never been hostile to the state.

IV. My government consider paragraph 6 of the proposals relating to the functions of the UN representative to be vague and liable to be interpreted as being restricted by matters contained in paragraph 4 of the proposals.

5. For the foregoing reasons my government have found themselves unable to accept the proposals. Yours sincerely, (signed) B. N. Rau.”

Gross

1. Bracketed portion supplied from another text.