Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

501.BC Kashmir/9–1949

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. F. D. Collins of the Division of South Asian Affairs

secret

[Washington,] September 19, 1949.

Participants:	Mr. M. E. Dening, Head of the Southeast Asian Dept., British Foreign Office
	Mr. C. M. Walker, First Secretary, British Embassy
	Mr. G. C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary, NEA
	Mr. E. G. Mathews and Mr. F. D. Collins, SOA
	Mr. W. Allen, UNP
	Mr. R. A. Hare, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA

Mr. Dening began the conversations by alluding to a recent gathering attended by Foreign Minister Schuman, Foreign Minister Bevin, Ambassador Franks, and Secretary of State Acheson and mentioned he believed Mr. Bevin and Sir Oliver Franks discussed privately the Kashmir problem with the Secretary of State.¹

Mr. Dening stated Mr. Bevin had sent a telegram to Prime Minister Attlee expressing regrets at the UK support of India for the SC and urging that the Prime Minister send a message to Nehru pointing out the difficulties which the UK would face in the support of India’s candidacy and that the UK would be free to determine its own attitude if the Kashmir case came up in the Security Council. Mr. Dening said that such a message would be an implied threat which might have the effect of India’s reconsidering her present position on the Kashmir issue. He added that he was not sure that Mr. Attlee would go along on this suggestion. (Department subsequently informed message not sent.)

Mr. McGhee inquired as to whether anything further could be done before the Kashmir case came up in the SC. Mr. Mathews mentioned that we were considering the possibility of the Secretary issuing a statement at his Press Conference in which he would express the United States’ disappointment at India’s rejection of UNCIP’s arbitration proposal. Mr. Dening mentioned that he had made a courtesy call this morning on the Pakistani Ambassador, Mr. Ispahani, who in the conversation brought up the Kashmir issue and indicated Pakistan’s disappointment in the delays which were being encountered.

The question was then raised as to the timing of the presentation of the Kashmir case before the SC, and the feeling prevailed that the sooner the case could be brought before the SC the better. It was agreed that it would be preferable for the Commission not to proceed to Geneva but to complete their report quickly in Srinagar and proceed to New York. Mr. Dening observed that the presentation of the case in the SC would probably coincide with the Nehru visit to the US and possibly Liaquat’s visit to Moscow.

Mr. Dening was queried as to whether the British felt that assuming the case came before the SC that the arbitration approach was still the best means to solve the Kashmir problem. Mr. Dening replied by saying that he felt that a condemnatory resolution by the SC would be of no use and that to attempt to impose a settlement would not succeed. He added that the SC might go as far as their resolution on Indonesia with the hope that India might reconsider her views. Mr. Dening went on to add that if you don’t try arbitration you have the problem of renegotiating resolutions embodying the principles upon which a settlement could be made and that Pakistan would not look with favor upon any such proposal.

Mr. Mathews mentioned that it was quite clear in view of the second reply of the GOI to the Commission that the former was opposed to arbitration. Mr. Dening quoted from a London telegram to the effect that the UK was now willing to focus their ideas on how the arbitration proposal might be dealt with once the case was referred to the SC and that question of the legality of Kashmir’s accession was still occupying the attention of the British. In reply to an observation that there would be no point in putting India in the position of refusing to carry out a SC directive, Mr. Dening replied that you could put India in the position that the Dutch were with respect to Indonesia, but they may not show the good sense which the Dutch finally demonstrated.

The question of how the Kashmir case would develop in the SC was raised, and it was indicated that India might wish to revert to her position when the case was first brought before the SC in which she asked the Council to label Pakistan as the aggressor and cited her legal position. In the event India approached the SC along these lines Pakistan might reply by questioning her legal position in view of Pakistan’s Stand-Still Agreement with Kashmir. A feeling prevailed that if India’s legal position was shaken she might reconsider and be in a more compromising mood. However, if the case were referred to the I.C.J. for a decision this would have the effect of delaying a settlement which would be very undesirable. It might be further complicated by I.C.J.’s decision in favor of India.

It was agreed that we would recommend: (1) That the Commission speed up the conclusion of its report. (2) That efforts be made when the case came before the SC to stress the procedural aspects and not have the Council engage in substantive talks. (3) That it would be desirable to keep the Kashmir issue apart from other issues such as the Punjab Water Rights and the Refugee Property Problems.

In reply to a question as to what the British felt the Russians might do when the case came before the SC, Mr. Dening expressed the opinion that the Russians would either abstain or take any action which would tend to complicate and delay the settlement of the problem. It was agreed that the UK and the US would continue to maintain close contact and to exchange views on the Kashmir issue.

1. The three Foreign Ministers and their staffs held several conversations in Washington in September on Germany and other questions, but no record of a separate discussion of the Kashmir problem has been found.