501.BC Kashmir/5–249: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India 1

secret
niact
urgent

325. Following reflects Dept thinking re current UNCIP efforts negotiate truce. Since Comm feels its final proposals reasonable and equitable as possible, personnel Embs Delhi Karachi shld avoid being drawn into discussion merits demerits specific Comm proposals. Important point is that truce agreement be reached so that part III Kashmir settlement can be implemented.

Both Embs shld therefore without formal approach GOIGOP utilize every suitable opportunity before May 5 deadline impress officials both Govts desirability and even necessity immediate conclusion truce agreement so that Govts may give effect oft-stated desire bring about early solution Kashmir problem. Shld stress truce agreement is but one intermediate step in series of actions under UN auspices directed toward equitable substantive settlement Kashmir dispute and acceptance proposals even though not completely satis either party will allow PlebAd begin work toward final settlement.

Possible unfavorable consequences rejection truce proposals one or both parties shld be stressed. Confronted rejection its proposals UNCIP may conclude reference matter SC only remaining alternative. Such action wld further delay settlement and largely negate prestige accruing two Govts from Jan 5 agreement. Moreover, further protracted delay might place Admiral Nimitz untenable position.

Believe possibility Nimitz acting as arbitrator or otherwise entering truce negotiations shld for present be minimized and even were Nimitz agreeable his services this capacity shld be reserved as possible last resort shld UNCIP negotiations finally collapse.2

Dept considers approach Embs Wash ineffective this time (Karachi’s 136 Apr 30; rptd Delhi as 193).

Be Delhi’s 481 Apr 29 and Dept’s Kascom 73 Dept believes informal approach suggested above will complement approach suggested to UK (Dept’s 1478 Apr 30 to London and London’s 1680 May 1 rptd Delhi 45 Karachi 21)4 and is not subject objections to formal approach Govts Delhi, Karachi outlined Delhi’s 481. Shld UK not approach two PriMins as suggested Dept believes still desirable Embs point out [Page 1706] to officials both Govts above possible consequences failure accept truce proposals.

Delhi pass Macatee.

Acheson
  1. Repeated to Karachi as 118 and to London as 1486.
  2. Notation on the file copy: “Portions this message relating to Adm. Nimitz discussed with him and approved by him.”
  3. Not printed.
  4. Telegrams Kascom 73, 1478, and 1680 not printed.