711.90F/11–1749: Telegram
The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia ( Childs ) to the Secretary of State
669. Re Embtel 668 November 17, noon. HM sent for me again today and I was with him for hour and a half.
HM said he had decided in view great importance question send for Fuad Hamza to draft written request SAG which would contain in most precise terms possible what he desired from U.S. for his immediate security. He said he had spoken to me at Hadda out of fullness of his heart and not hiding his feeling or thoughts. He wished Fuad frame them in appropriate language.
HM then entered into extended account his relations with British. He said recent British survey mission1 had complained SAG had given everything to USG and nothing left for British. Complaint had also been made that even on Red Sea side SA Americans had been allowed by King and Foreign Minister to consolidate themselves at expense British so that whole country given over to U.S. HM recalled [Page 1621] his reception British Ambassador and me together while I was still Minister, and said British Government had reproached him and had asked if SAG desired have witness present to check on SAG–British relations. British alleged procedure such as had never been followed by any ruler previously in ME.
King said he wished me convey particularly my government his desire USG and SAG should be as one. He reviewed again at great length policy encirclement of him by Great Britain through Jordan, Iraq and Yemen and Persian Gulf Shaikhdoms. He read me from British note asserting British had no intention allow any diminution its influence in Persian Gulf and its retirement from India not to be construed as presaging any retirement from Gulf.
I endeavored again marshal every possible argument allay King’s insistent concern re his security position, pointing out presence US military survey mission SA evidence our interest and concern his security position. To all my arguments his answer was any action which may be taken against S–I federation will be in vain. When I am invaded in Hejaz, USG will refer matter to UN and they will be no more able to dislodge the attacker than UN has been able to obtain compliance by the Jews with UN decisions re Palestine.
HM said he had not been able to sleep after our audience at Hadda as he had been so worked up in discussing the precariousness of his position. He added “I am talking to you as I have not talked even with my own sons, Saud and Feisal. I consider you not only the US Ambassador but a member of my own family. I want you to act in that capacity for me. I will give you a plane to take you to US to present to USG the perilous state of affairs as I see them. I must have some protection or some assurance that USG will not stand idly by and allow British to encircle me. If Hejaz is attacked I will move with my family to west coast, leaving if necessary the eastern part of SA with its oil undefended in order to withstand with my resources and to die if need be in defense of Hejaz”.
In course audience remarked jocularly “I will be utterly frank with you. US does not care for Ibn Saud but only for oil in SA”. I said I obliged to take issue with HM. I could assure him we vitally interested house of Saud and he could be sure he enjoyed esteem of President and USG as one of world’s great statesmen. (Note this remark to me of King when I commented Jidda pier great monument to him: “Ruler who does not put interests his people above his own personal interest unworthy to rule.”)
I have never found the King under such deep emotion. I assured him that if I felt I could do any good by asking USG to call me home I would do so, but I had already made known his point of view to all officials whom I had seen in Washington and I was proceeding next [Page 1622] week Istanbul for meeting ME chiefs of mission2 where I would see Assistant Secretary McGhee and other responsible officials Department most directly concerned and interested in problem he was discussing, and would present his point there as effectively as I could.
HM said he had fullest confidence in me and in any course of action which I might take to meet the situation as he had described it. He was, he repeated, faced by a situation which called for action on our part and not mere words.3
Sent Department 669, pouched Dhahran. Department pass London 97.
- On June 16, London had been advised by the British Foreign Office that a three-man British reconnaissance party would be sent to Saudi Arabia to study Saudi Arabian defense needs (telegram 2379, June 20, from London, 890F.20/6–2049; not printed). The Department later informed Jidda that the mission would survey for the location of three tactical air force strips and necessary communication facilities (telegram 255, July 22, to Jidda, 890F.7962/7–2249; not printed).↩
- For documentation on the meeting, see pp. 165 ff.↩
- The Department agreed with Ambassador Childs’ approach in telegrams 668 and 669, and indicated that the problems he raised in the telegrams would be discussed with him at the Istanbul Conference (telegram 446, November 21, to Jidda, 711.90F/11–1749; not printed).↩