811.2390F/11–1749: Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia ( Childs ) to the Secretary of State

top secret

668. 1. His Majesty came from Mecca to Hadda to receive me 15th. Audience lasted hour and a half.

2. After giving him highlights my visit US, HM inquired regarding plans military mission. I replied O’Keefe and officers in Jidda awaiting HM’s pleasure. Emphasized findings they had submitted mostly tentative. They wished have HM’s views in order these might be considered when report delivered NME. Would be considered by NME and State and decision would have to be reached how USG might assist SAG in implementing it.

3. His Majesty said he had not had time consider whole report but found general principles satisfactory. Program was long-range one not to be completed for five years. This very long time and while it might suit situation vis-à-vis Russia it did not take into account his immediate pressing problem.

4. HM then discussed at great length latter. He said in effect British had begun cold war against him endeavoring to put Syria under Hashemite jurisdiction in order to put pressure on Ruwali and Anaza tribes connected with him by blood. British purpose to sever those relations and use those tribes against HM. British had stirred up his traditional tribal friends and were inciting Jordan, Iraq and Syria against him as well as Shaikhdoms under British control Persian Gulf. In south they were doing likewise in Yemen. They were constantly alleging they had nothing to do with policies these states and principalities, but fact was these policies controlled by British. British had recently sent note to SAG stating if aggression committed against Jordan or Iraq British in treaty obligations assist those countries but implying if those countries attack another country British could do nothing about it. HM said he had been bringing this situation our attention long time, and it was now such he had to have some security.

5. I informed HM we fully alive this question, and said on recent visit US I had set it forth in almost words he had used. I reminded him assurances we had given Saud on his visit US1 that USG vitally interested in territorial integrity SA, and I had repeated these assurances in writing under instructions my government and had informed HM USG ready at any time he might request take up with British Government any situation causing apprehension to him. We had fulfilled this agreement on more than one occasion, and I did not know [Page 1619] any instance in which HM had appealed to us when we had not taken immediate action. When Greater Syrian question came up in recent months we had acted in Baghdad and Amman. While in US I was in Department when question Syrian-Iraq federation2 arose and I could assure HM this had given us deep concern and we had examined problem particularly in light HM’s reaction in connection general problem maintenance peace and security ME.

6. HM said this all very well, but these words. What he wanted, if USG interested in security this country, is they take some action will guarantee this. If USG not interested it should inform HM so he may take care of himself.

7. I endeavored at great length convince HM we were far from indifferent status SA, and I had been much gratified by great interest expressed to me at home by officials in this regard.

8. HM said he believed interests his country, US and world peace all connected together and any threat security his country prejudicial all these interests. HM therefore wished invite attention USG these facts and to fact that secret movements now being put in motion re federation S and I in which it is alleged such federation in accordance wishes these countries is directed against safety his country. HM therefore requested USG present to him its readiness extend assistance which will guarantee him against any serious threatening integrity his country and to notify its ally, Britain, in light of what is mentioned above USG will never approve any alteration present status Arab states and that every state should maintain its boundaries and integrity as is.

9. HM pointed out mere assurances such as we had given him, including readiness take up with GB matters affecting his security, of no avail if S and I permitted federate on grounds in accordance wishes people those countries. He was certain federation part British plan encirclement, and he knew from British sources it was ultimate aim Hashemites attack SA to recover Hejaz.

10. HM said USG might either authorize me give him assurances he desired, or if preferred, he could send someone Washington to discuss and obtain there.

11. HM said Prince Mansour promised in Britain certain arms, but with arrival O’Keefe British had done nothing fulfill this promise and it evident British endeavoring every way put pressure on SA account closer contacts developing between SAG and USG.

12. To sum up, HM wishes some concrete evidence our willingness and ability persuade British he holds as main culprits to cease policy encirclement SA.

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13. Upon conclusion audience, HM asked if I would stay to lunch and whether military mission would join us. This arranged and upon arrival O’Keefe and Clarty, HM expressed very warm thanks their accomplishments.

14. It was agreed foregoing, in view importance, would be reviewed by Prince Feisal and HM. When text submitted, paragraphs 6 and 8 read as follows:

“6. HM said this all very well but these words. What he wanted was, if possible, public declaration by US expressive interest territorial integrity SA which I stated we were so interested in.

8. HM said if we were so interested, he must have either (1) public declaration, or (2) some explicit assurances our readiness aid him.”

15. Reference to public declaration excised by Feisal on grounds this might arouse criticism other Arab states SA under USG tutelage. I sent word later Faisal request we guarantee status quo Arab world entirely impracticable. More to follow.

Sent Department 668, Department pass London 96. Pouched Dhahran.

Childs
  1. For documentation on Crown Prince Saud’s visit to the United States in 1947, see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. v, pp. 738 ff.
  2. For documentation concerning the proposed Syrian-Iraqi union, see pp. 180 ff.