760H.61/8–2649
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director, Office of European Affairs (Achilles)
| Participants: | Mr. W. D. Allen, Counselor, British Embassy |
| Lord Jellicoe, Second Secretary, British Embassy | |
| Mr. Achilles, EUR1 | |
| Mr. Melbourne, SE2 |
Mr. Allen and Lord Jellicoe called to give us the views of the Foreign Office on the present situation between Yugoslavia and the USSR, which I had asked them two days ago to obtain with particular reference to the credit negotiations. Oil the latter point, the Foreign Office said merely that progress was being made and that further word would be sent in the very near future.
The Foreign Office message indicated a darker view of the situation than we have received from any of our missions. It stated that while [Page 935] there was as yet no reason to deduce from current reports of Soviet troop movements that overt military action in the near future was likely, there were a number of reasons why the Soviet Government might consider liquidation of the Tito regime increasingly urgent. These reasons could include: the feeling that continuation of the Tito heresy was becoming intolerable, the prospect that once the British and US Governments had extended substantial credit to Tito they would feel that they had to some extent acquired a vested interest in his survival and be more likely to extend further assistance, the fear that Tito and the West might overthrow the Albanian regime, the belief that military action against Yugoslavia in the near future would not involve war with the West, and the desire again to use Yugoslavia as a base of Greek guerrilla operations. The Foreign Office summed it up with the statement that the possibility of overt Soviet military action could no longer be left out of consideration.
With respect to early measures, the Foreign Office did not like either the suggestion that the British, French and ourselves directly query the Soviet Government on its intention or the suggestion that a country other than Yugoslavia raise the issue in the Security Council. For the present, the Foreign Office was merely instructing the British Ambassador in Belgrade to inquire whether the Yugoslavs themselves were contemplating taking the issue to the Security Council. It hoped that we would instruct Cannon to do likewise.
I stated that, while we agreed that the possibility of overt military action could not be ignored, none of our missions in the area considered it probable and that it looked as if someone in the Foreign Office had compiled a list of reasons why it might take place. A similar list of reasons why it was unlikely would not be hard to compile. I said that we were in agreement concerning early action and were instructing Cannon to sound out the Yugoslavs on their views with respect to raising the matter in the Security Council.3
- Theodore C. Achilles became Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs in April 1949. In October 1949, Achilles became Director of the Office of Western European Affairs.↩
- Roy M. Melbourne, Division of Southern European Affairs.↩
- See paragraph 3 of telegram 3102, August 29, to London, repeated to Belgrade as 493, p. 938.↩