Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume V

760H.61/8–2749: Telegram

The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Reams)¹ to the Secretary of State

secret
priority

Belgrade, August 27, 1949—8 p. m.

858. We have given close attention to views of our missions regarding situation which has arisen as result of two most recent USSR notes to Yugoslavia.² Have also seen several telegrams sent by British Embassy Washington to British Embassy here. Department’s preliminary views on this subject are reported in British telegrams.

We are still inclined to believe that our several telegrams on this subject (Embtels 827, August 22 and 842 August 24³) correctly reflect nature of this situation. Some general redefinition of situation created by recent events and possible consequences may however be useful.

We accept without question view that Russians are determined in one way or another to liquidate the Tito regime. Method of liquidation is of course known only to Russians and perhaps not even to them, but seems certain that they would prefer method ostensibly internal in origin rather than one based on overt use external force. Seems equally certain Russians had decided to attempt eliminate Tito by means of economic blockade plus such internal dissension, sabotage or worse as they could bring about through means open to them. We do not believe that Russians have as yet decided that economic and other means short of overt use of force will be ineffective. They may think they have another six to eight months before effective economic aid could come from West. May also count on Tito’s inability obtain arms from West and weaker strength Yugoslav armed forces at end this period than now.

Question remains whether two recent Soviet notes and rumored troop movements can be fitted into preceding pattern. We believe they can. They cannot only create some fear and confusion within Yugoslavia but tend to raise doubts in minds of West businessmen, bankers and possibly government leaders. If by such tactics Russians can slow down West aid or can induce West to believe that a tottering Tito can be forced into concessions they will have gained a major victory in their battle against him.

Although Embassy still firmly believes the foregoing to be true it goes without saying that we should take all possible proper precautions to guard against the possibility that Soviet logic may in this case differ even more widely than usual from Western, It is always possible that elimination of Tito is so important to Soviets that they may be prepared to take what they consider to be minimum risk. Such a risk might well be based on Soviet conviction that the West would not take firm stand against Soviet aggression aimed at Yugoslavia. There is of course only one really effective method of dealing with an assumption of this sort namely make it unmistakably clear to Soviet Union that US would not be prepared idly to stand by and see the sovereignty of any small country, Communist or non Communist, violated by the Soviet Union. Reference of matter to SC would not relieve US of this burden. If we are not prepared to take a really firm stand it would be better not to bring this matter before SC.

In this connection we believe that Department should also consider precisely how dispute to be referred to SC is to be defined. It would be futile or worse to bring before the Council the specific dispute regarding Yugoslav imprisonment of White guardists. The only dispute worth consideration by SC is basic issue of Soviet determination get rid of Tito regime and substitute one subservient to Kremlin. This difficult define in terms SC competence.

Reference of dispute to SC (London’s 3403, August 26⁴) even if satisfactory definition found raises several questions. One, is possible repercussions on Yugoslav public (Embtel 838, August 23⁵). Another is question of timing concerning which may be noted Yugoslavia awaiting Soviet reaction to offer to attempt settle all outstanding issues peacefully. Neither Yugoslavia nor any other in very good position refer case to SC before Soviets respond in words or action. If appropriate stage for reference SC reached, we believe Yugoslavia not any other should put case before SC or request item relating specifically to Yugoslavia be put on GA agenda.

Meanwhile a press conference statement by the Secretary to affect US and other peace-loving governments watching closely developments in Kremlin and satellite campaign against Yugoslavia might possibly have some good effects.

Sent Department, repeated London 59, Moscow 109, Paris 107, Rome 82 for Ambassador Cannon.

Reams

1. Ambassador Cannon visited Rome from August 25 to 31, leaving Counselor Reams in charge of the Embassy in Belgrade.
2. Regarding the Soviet notes under reference here, see footnotes 2 and 6 to telegram 2042, August 13, from Moscow, pp. 922 and 923, respectively.
3. In his telegram 827, August 22, from Belgrade, not printed, Ambassador Cannon suggested that either the Soviet leadership continued to be misinformed and stubbornly to misjudge the Yugoslav character and internal situation or Soviet agents had succeeded in building up a network in Yugoslavia of sufficient strength to justify a reasonable expectation of a successful revolt against Tito. Cannon found the second possibility highly alarming but unlikely (760H.61/8–2249). In his telegram 842, August 24, not printed, Cannon affirmed his view that the current Soviet and Cominform campaign against Yugoslavia was designed to raise internal confusion by frightening the Yugoslav citizenry and perhaps causing the Western powers to hesitate about investing in a “tottering” regime. He continued to find the Yugoslav leaders “dignified and unyielding” in their controversy with the Soviet Union (760H.61/8–2449).
4. Ante, p. 933.
5. Not printed; it reported that Yugoslav Deputy Foreign Minister Bebler had explained to British Ambassador Peake that the Yugoslav note of August 23 to the Soviet Government regarding the treatment of Soviet citizens in Yugoslavia (see footnote 6 to telegram 2042, August 13, from Moscow, p. 923) made no direct citation to the Charter of the United Nations in order not unduly to excite the Yugoslav public (760H.61/8–2349).