760H.61/8–2649: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State
priority
3403. Talbot1 showed us telegram just sent to British Embassy Washington giving Foreign Office views, which have been approved by Bevin, on Soviet-Tito dispute and action to be taken.2 According Talbot telegram, which was sent in answer Department’s request through British Embassy Washington for Foreign Office views, was repeated to British Ambassador Moscow, Paris, Belgrade who will doubtless inform their US colleagues.
Telegram sets out consideration for and against use of force by Soviets but concludes situation has reached point where all possibility some kind of military intervention cannot be ruled out or consideration of what steps can be taken to prevent it deferred. Telegram then raises question of taking dispute to Security Council along lines Embtel 3357, August 24 (repeated Moscow 104, Paris 651, Belgrade 66).3
Talbot said that Foreign Office has instructed Ambassador Peake, unless he perceives objection, to discreetly sound out Bebler at appropriate opportunity re Yugoslav Government’s view concerning reference dispute to Security Council either by Yugoslavia or some other country. Talbot also stated Foreign Office has requested Cadogan’s comments concerning reference dispute to SC by country other than Yugoslavia.
It is Foreign Office view that merits of reference of dispute to SC would be that such course would bring matter before world opinion and might not only deter Soviet action against Yugoslavia but would also be useful against Soviet peace offensive. In reply to our query Talbot said Foreign Office had not considered question of airing matter in General Assembly rather than SC. While Department undoubtedly will consider this point, it occurs to us that discussion in Assembly might be preferable. This course would give the same results as the Foreign Office has in mind while at the same time it would avoid certain possible disadvantages of reference to the SC: With the small SC membership and therefore few voices to be heard, our support or apparent support of the Yugoslavs position might be undesirably high-lighted. Also since any action would be impossible in the SC because of Soviet veto, at least as much and possibly more, [Page 934] depending upon developments, might be accomplished in the General Assembly.
We are in agreement with view expressed in Embassy Moscow’s 2133, August 23 to Department (repeated London 216, Paris 314, Belgrade 92)4 and by Foreign Office that Yugoslav attitude re reference dispute to UN is of paramount importance, and we strongly feel that if matter taken to UN it desirable that Yugoslavs do it. We also suggest that if Yugoslavs do not desire to refer dispute to UN themselves but wish some other country to take that action, (1) it should not be one of the great western powers, (2) the Yugoslav Government should make the arrangements for another country to raise the question in UN, and (3) Yugoslav Government should give firmest possible indication beforehand that it will fully cooperate while question is before UN. In latter connection British Ambassador Peake has expressed the thought to Foreign Office that Yugoslav Government’s decision, after ministerial consideration, not to refer directly in its note to Article 33 of Charter, may indicate that some high Yugoslav authorities are inclined to endeavor still to appease Soviet.
Sent Department, 3403; repeated Moscow 105; Paris 655; Belgrade 67.