840.20/3–949: Telegram
The Ambassador in Portugal (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State
85. Following is translation of memorandum handed to me and British Ambassador last night by FonMin (mytel 10 and despatch 10, January 111).
“The Portuguese Government expresses its thanks for the information transmitted on the memoranda delivered on the 10 of January to the Minister for Foreign Affairs by the American Ambassador concerning the negotiation in connection with the North Atlantic Pact.2 From the explanations so kindly given by the Hon. Lincoln MacVeagh the Portuguese Government has been happy to note that the American Government is in general agreement with the observations contained in the memorandum delivered on December 31 by Dr. Caeiro da Matta to the British Ambassador.3 The Portuguese Government has taken [Page 180] note of the statement contained in the memorandum of the British Ambassador4 that the treaty does not contain provisions for the peacetime establishment of military or air bases in territories of special strategic significance for the defense of the Atlantic. They further take note of the view of the American Government expressed in the American Ambassador’s memorandum that none of the parties to the proposed pact can be compelled to grant facilities in their territories without their full consent. Although the text of the treaty has not as yet been drafted, the Portuguese Government considers that these declarations have absolute value, that is, they cannot be invalidated or attenuated by subsequent regulations or stipulations or by any formula in regard to procedure which may hereafter be adopted. This observation is made as it has not been possible to form an exact estimate of the scope of the expressions used in the relevant passages of the British Ambassador’s memorandum.
At his interview with the Minister of Foreign Affairs on January 10 the American Ambassador expressed the desire to be informed of the views of the Portuguese Government as to how and when an official invitation might be addressed to them to join as an original signatory in the preparation of the North Atlantic Pact and to participate in the final drafting of the proposed treaty.
In order that it may be able to express its views with entire knowledge of the facts and to be able to define at the opportune moment its position in relation to the over-all problem, the Portuguese Government would greatly appreciate being informed as precisely as possible on the following points:
1. Duration of the treaty.
There is no reference in any of the information transmitted to the Portuguese Government up to the present as to the contemplated duration of the proposed pact. A period of 20 years has been mentioned in the press but it is not known upon what this is based. This point, however, may be of fundamental importance and certainly is so for the Portuguese Government.
The purpose of the proposed pact is to re-enforce the defensive capacity of the parties the better to be able to guarantee the security of all against ‘an aggression from any quarter’. This position which appears to be correct with respect to the nations which already form part of the UN, cannot be so regarded by powers which do not belong to that organization. Such powers are subject to limitations which are, directly or indirectly, inherent in the pact and one of these in the final analysis is the duration of the treaty.
Portugal cannot fail to be interested in the defense and tranquillity of the Atlantic and it is also profoundly concerned, like many other powers, for the defence of western civilization. It is equally concerned, however, in not becoming involved in European conflicts since experience has shown that she has never derived from these conflicts advantages [Page 181] commensurate with the sacrifices they have cost her. From this springs the general line of an historical attitude which it is desired to maintain. It is understood that it would be difficult to draft the provisions of the treaty on the hypothesis of a Russian aggression against any of the countries involved. On the other hand, it is clear that within the next few years there is no probability of an attack from any other quarter in a manner such as would bring into operation the mechanism of the treaty. The logical connection between these considerations is apparent.
Over a longer period, however, the possibility cannot be entirely excluded of other conflicts in which one or more of the countries concerned in the pact may be directly involved. Thus if UN were to break down or be seriously weakened, a network of treaties might again spring up in Europe similar to that which existed before September 1939. In this event the mechanism of the North Atlantic Pact might be put into operation in consequence of an aggression not originating from Soviet Russia. In this case the Portuguese Government and perhaps other Government could not undertake to intervene. In addition to the reasons mentioned above, we fear that Spanish reaction will perhaps be different from what it would be in the case of aggression from that (i.e. Russia) quarter. For a country neighboring Spain, the attitude of the Spanish Government in such an eventuality cannot be a matter of indifference, quite apart from the obligations assumed by the Portuguese Government in the treaty of March 17, 1939 and the additional protocol of July 29, 1940, which were recently renewed.
It is therefore essential that the Portuguese Government should be more fully informed regarding the duration of the treaty before they can express an opinion on it.
2. Spain.
The Portuguese Government has noted with great pleasure that the various interested governments are agreed in principle regarding the necessity of including Spain in any plan for the defense of the west and of the North Atlantic. It is hoped that in the near future no objection will be seen to Spain’s being directly associated with the policy of collective security represented by the North Atlantic Pact. Although Spain is not for the time being participating in the pact, the Portuguese Government must nevertheless point out that the Iberian Peninsula constitutes a geographic and strategic unit. The possibility of an invasion from the East was undoubtedly the impelling factor which suggested to the various interested states, first the Pact of Brussels and then the Washington conversations. It seems to the Portuguese Government, in the eventuality of such an aggression, that a military understanding with Spain for the defense of the frontier of the Pyrenees would constitute an additional guarantee to the security of her own frontier. It would not be easy for the Portuguese Government to form a definite opinion regarding the Atlantic Pact unless they can be assured that any negotiations with the Spanish Government for that purpose would not be considered incompatible with the defensive aims inherent in the pact.
As Portugal has common boundaries with Spain over entire extent [Page 182] of her land frontiers, it has followed with particular attention the evolution of the Spanish problem in the field of international relations. Although happily the present position of the government of Madrid does not constitute a military or strategic problem for the governments represented in the Washington negotiations, the Portuguese Government cannot fail to draw the attention of the powers interested in the security of Western Europe to the fact that a major change in the present political situation in Spain would very soon mean the installation in that country of an extremist government with political and strategic consequences easy to foresee. In such an event these consequences would certainly have a bearing on the defense problems of the North Atlantic if Spain were not already bound by some international instrument to assume a line of conduct in harmony with the pact.
3. Situation of the colonies vis-à-vis the Atlantic Pact.
In the explanations orally given by the American Ambassador and contained in his memorandum of the 10 of January, it was stated that the proposed treaty would not be applicable to the colonial possessions of any of the parties except insofar as provision would be made for consultation in the event of a threat to such possessions.
This point is also of particular interest to the Portuguese Government the more so since the security of its overseas possessions outside of the Atlantic area might become affected as a consequence of its eventual adherence to the pact. The Portuguese Government would therefore be grateful to receive further information with respect to the state of the negotiations in Washington regarding consultations between the participating powers in the event of a threat of aggression against the colonial territories of one of the parties, and also in regard to the views of the American Government on this subject.
The memoranda of the British Embassy do not contain a os to [garble] consultation concerning questions of defense of colonial territories corresponding to that in the memorandum of the American Embassy. It is accordingly assumed that the British Government considers this question covered by the existing treaties of alliance between the two countries.
4. Guarantees.
The fact that the North Atlantic Pact provides for the adherence of states which are not part of the UN organization and consequently not protected by the security guarantees established in the charter, raises the further question whether there should not be included in the proposed pact, or in some manner connected with its signature, a guarantee of the territorial integrity of the adhering countries. Lisbon, March 8, 1949.”
- Neither printed.↩
- Ante, p. 19.↩
- Text quoted by MacVeagh in his telegram 7, January 6, to the Department of State, not printed.↩
- Aide-mémoire dated January 10, 1949, left with the Portuguese Foreign Minister by Sir Nigel Ronald, British Ambassador in Portugal. A copy was enclosed in MacVeagh’s despatch No. 10 from Lisbon, January 11, not printed. (840.20/1–1149)↩