Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Western Europe, Volume IV

840.20/3–749

Minutes of the Sixteenth Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, March 7, 1949, 3 p. m.

Washington, March 7, 1949, 3 p.m.

top secret

Mr. Acheson suggested for discussion three topics: first, Italian participation; secondly, the Preamble and the text; thirdly, procedures and timing. He thought the United States could now agree to join in an understanding that Italy should be invited to participate.

Mr. Hickerson, in reply to a question by Mr. Van Kleffens, said that he had been assured that the recent opposition of part of the Italian Socialist Party to participation was not significant.

Mr. Bonnet said he had the same information.

Mr. Acheson introduced two drafts of a preamble. One was on traditional lines and the other was more in the nature of a statement.

Mr. Van Kleffens had, on the whole, a personal preference for a preamble along the lines of the first draft. The second draft sounded more like a statement to the press and could perhaps be used for that purpose.

Mr. Bonnet was inclined toward the first draft. It said all the essential things and kept the traditional form of a preamble. Moreover, the second draft could be interpreted as a reply made in advance to certain criticisms that would probably be directed against the Pact.

Sir Oliver Franks expressed a slight personal preference for the second form.

Mr. Wrong also had a preference for the second form. One of his reasons was that it was very difficult to quote sensibly from a preamble drawn up in the traditional manner. If the first form was used he thought it should be shorter; it would then be possible to supplement the preamble by having a formal declaration issued at the time of signature. The Preamble had to be applicable throughout the life of the Treaty, whereas the special reasons bringing the Treaty into being could best be stated in a declaration.

Mr. Morgenstierne had no firm instructions from his Government but preferred the second form.

Mr. Taymans¹ expressed a slight preference for the first form.

Mr. Acheson noted that the committee was evenly divided and suggested that the objections to the first form might be overcome if it were turned into a series of sentences instead of being left as one long sentence full of participles. The substance of the first form was better and less ambiguous than the second form. He asked if the other representatives would be willing to modernize the traditional form of preamble by substituting sentences for participles, and the committee seemed to be generally in favor of this change.

The committee then proceeded to revise the draft in the first form and agreed on the following wording:

“The states parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

“They are determined to safeguard the freedom and the common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on democratic principles, on the rule of law between nations, and on fundamental freedoms for all within nations.

“They desire to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

“They are resolved to unite their efforts to preserve peace and security.

“They, therefore, agree to the following articles:”

Mr. Acheson said that before turning to the articles of the Treaty he would like to raise the question whether this Treaty fell within the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter, or, to put it another way, whether the provisions of Chapter VIII applies to the Treaty. He thought it was clear that Chapter VIII did apply to the Treaty, and that any attempt to say that it did not would lead to endless hair-splitting and utter confusion. As he understood the Charter, Article 51 said that nothing in the Charter should be construed to prohibit the exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense. That was a negative provision which did not prevent the conclusion of the Pact. Chapter VIII went on to mention regional arrangements. In Article 52 it was again made plain that nothing in the Charter should prohibit regional arrangements for purposes which were proper for regional arrangements. Obviously, one proper purpose was collective self-defense. Article 52, therefore, was a negative article. Article 53 went on to say that if states did enter into regional arrangements two rules applied: first, they would be required to use their regional arrangements as far as possible to settle any disputes they might have, before taking those disputes to the United Nations; secondly, if any regional arrangement was to be used for enforcement action, the approval of the Security Council must be obtained. It ended up by saying that any action so taken should be reported to the Security Council.

Mr. Acheson thought that no purpose would be served by trying to say that those provisions would not apply to the North Atlantic Treaty, whether it was called a regional arrangement or not. He thought that if there were any disputes among the parties to the Treaty they would do their best to solve them before taking them to the Security Council. Furthermore, the North Atlantic Treaty would not lead to enforcement action, which would be economic sanctions or some other type of action against a state, without going to the Security Council; that was not the purpose of the Treaty. The states parties to the Treaty would report an armed attack to the Security Council, would report what they were doing about it, and would ask the Security Council to take action. He, therefore, did not see that any drawback occurred from saying that the present articles of the Charter applied if, as, and when the situations outlined in the various paragraphs of the articles arose. If it was stated that the North Atlantic Treaty was not a regional arrangement there would be endless confusion. The Treaty referred throughout to the North Atlantic area and was, he thought, obviously a regional arrangement. Chapter VIII talked about arrangements which were less than universal; when a group of states smaller than the total membership of the United Nations undertook to do anything, that was called a regional arrangement. He thought the British Commonwealth and the Inter-American system were both regional arrangements. He thought that if anybody asked whether Chapter VIII applied, the reply should be that the whole Charter applied and that if anything occurred which would bring Chapter VIII into force, it applied to the North Atlantic Treaty automatically. If an attempt was made to say that the North Atlantic Treaty was not a regional arrangement, people would begin to search for hidden motives. He thought it very important that an agreed interpretation be reached on this point.

Mr. Van Kleffens was of the opinion that if the Treaty was considered to be a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the Charter, Article 33 was applicable, too. Perhaps this was a reinforcement of Mr. Acheson’s argument.

Mr. Wrong did not feel comfortable about the words in Article 53: “But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state.…”.

Mr. Acheson thought that this would not create any difficulty. He thought there would not be any enforcement action taken without the authority of the Security Council; if such action were so taken it would violate the Charter.

Mr. Bonnet thought that the sentence in Article 53 quoted by Mr. Wrong should be read in conjunction with the preceding sentence: “The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority”. He thought the second sentence referred to cases where the Security Council had asked for action to be taken. If this were not the correct interpretation then there would be a conflict between Articles 51 and 53, the former of which said that nothing in the Charter was to impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense. The North Atlantic Treaty recognized that if participating states took some such action they would immediately refer it to the Security Council and, in consequence, was in conformity with Article 51.

Mr. Acheson thought there were two concepts which would have to be mutually exclusive, although it would be difficult to draw the line between them. One was collective self-defense—something that could be engaged in at any time without anybody’s approval in the event of an armed attack. The other concept was enforcement action, which was something done to somebody else not in self-defense. Perhaps there was some confusion inherent in the Charter but he did not; think that confusion was encountered by saying that all the articles apply. He thought trouble might be encountered by trying to prove that the Pact was not a regional organization.

Mr. Van Kleffens stressed the difference between “enforcement action” and “resistance against an armed attack”, the latter (and not the former) being the purpose of the Treaty.

Mr. Wrong said that in earlier meetings there had been a discussion about indirect aggression of a type which would not call Article 5 into force. It was contemplated that under Article 4 there should be consultation if the security of any Party was threatened. He was afraid that it could be alleged that if Article 53 applied to the Treaty such consultation, if it resulted in any decision to do anything, would be subject to a veto by the Security Council. He had assumed that the negotiations had been conducted under Article 51 hitherto and that “regional arrangement” was being used in the broad sense of the word rather than in the technical sense of Chapter VIII of the Charter. He would have to consult the Canadian legal advisers on the point.

Sir Oliver Franks read parts of two telegrams received from London. The first read as follows: “We realize that there has been thinking in the past by the Americans which might seek to bring in some allusion to Article 54 and other articles of Chapter VIII. The more we look into the possibility of mentioning any articles under Chapter VIII, the less we like it. Our answer to it and the general line we have been taking has been to make a distinction between regional organizations designed to fulfill regional functions of their own, i.e., to cope with disputes among members of the group, and associations based on Article 51, which are not really regional at all within the meaning of Chapter VIII since they are primarily designed to protect the members against external aggression in the event of the Security Council not being able to take suitable measures of protection in time. We realize that this thesis, although fairly watertight, might be attacked by supporters of the generalized Article 51 convention idea on the lines: if your Treaty is not regional then ought it not to be universal? The only valid reply seems to us to be if we try to get a universal Article 51 convention at present, we shall be hopelessly bogged down in negotiations and even if we succeed in getting such an instrument, the security provided in a practical way will be far less effective than that provided by a convention such as the Atlantic Pact.”

Sir Oliver said that the British Government saw serious objections to any reference in the Treaty or Preamble to Chap. VIII of the United Nations Charter or any of its articles. Even though there was no wish on the part of the Americans to make any such reference in the Treaty or Preamble, it was desirable, Sir Oliver thought, that all governments should say the same thing if asked about the relationship of the Pact to Chap. VIII. He explained the distinction which the British Government had been drawing between regional organizations under Chapter 8 designed to fulfill regional functions and settle regional disputes, and associations based on Article 51 designed primarily to protect members against external aggression in the absence of effective action by the Security Council. If it was said that Chap. VIII applied to the North Atlantic Pact, the argument might be used that action under the Pact would therefore have to be authorized by the Security Council.

Mr. Acheson suggested that governments be consulted. He wished to make it plain that he was not suggesting any reference to Chapter VIII in the Treaty. He also thought that if it were argued that Chapter VIII did not apply there arose the dilemma that an organization could be primarily for both purposes: for collective self-defense and for the peaceful settlement of disputes. He thought that trouble would result if it was stated that a group might get together for enforcement action if its sole purpose was defensive, but might not get together and conduct enforcement action if it had the other purpose of dealing with trouble internally. The purpose of the Charter was to prevent any state from taking offensive action except in accordance with the Charter. He agreed that much hinged on the interpretation given to the words “enforcement action” in Article 53.

Mr. Bonnet thought Article 53 applied only if the Security Council asked signatories of the Atlantic Treaty to take enforcement action.

Mr. Wrong was not sure that the language of the second sentence of Article 53 was dependent on the first sentence. He was afraid that action taken to check the threat of aggression which had not yet reached the point of an armed attack could be construed as enforcement action and that the argument might be advanced that such action could not be undertaken without the approval of the Security Council. The Soviet member would then be in a position to veto any proposal to take any action.

Sir Oliver Franks asked whether the effect of Mr. Acheson’s views was that he felt the problem could be looked at in two different ways. The first approach involved saying under which Articles of the United Nations Charter the North Atlantic Pact was established. An alternative approach was to look at the North Atlantic Pact and show that it was consistent with the Charter at all points at which the Charter could be brought to bear upon it. Was Mr. Acheson saying that the second approach was the way out of the present difficulty?

Mr. Acheson said yes. He thought it was important to be able to say that the Security Council would be kept as fully informed of what was done under the North Atlantic Treaty as it was under the Rio Treaty. If there was an armed attack it would be reported together with the action proposed to be taken. No classified information would be given to the Security Council, however. If the question was asked, “Do you believe that this group could undertake enforcement action without the authority of the Security Council?”, it would be necessary to be able to reply in the negative. The action taken, if any, would be collective self-defense or collective defense. Such action must be possible at a moment’s notice and nobody’s consent would be necessary for that. The Treaty would be fully within the Charter and the provisions thereof limiting offensive action.

Mr. Bonnet proposed that the views of the United States be expressed in a statement which could be studied by the other governments.

Mr. Wrong suggested that the punctuation in Article 1 could be improved, but the general feeling was that it was best to leave the language of the Charter unchanged in order that there might be no speculation about the reasons for the changes.

It was agreed that this question should be referred to governments. The United States representatives agreed to give the other representatives copies of their legal opinions on the applicability of Chapter VIII. The meeting then turned to the consideration of the articles in the draft text dated March 5, 1949.²

[Here follows detailed discussion of the wording of various articles.]

The meeting then turned to consideration of the question of future procedure.

Mr. Acheson observed that there was now an agreed text which should be sent to the various governments for comment and approval. When that approval was given, the text could be made public for the purpose of discussion. Also, it was proposed to send copies of the text to the American Republics and possibly to the non-participating members of the British Commonwealth thirty-six hours or so before publication.

An attempt was made to arrive at a date for publication.

Sir Oliver Franks and Mr. Wrong explained that their constitutional procedures required that the Treaty be tabled in their respective Houses of Commons before the text appeared in the public press. Several representatives pointed out the necessity for holding cabinet meetings to discuss the draft text. It was agreed to try to publish the Treaty on Tuesday, March 15.

Mr. Hickerson asked what was to be done about Italy, Denmark, Portugal, and Iceland.

It was agreed that the text should not be transmitted to these four governments until it had been approved by the eight participating states. It was hoped, however, that the text could be transmitted to them before it was made public. It might then be possible, if any of the four approved the Treaty and were ready to act, that they be invited to join the next meeting.

Mr. Hickerson asked whether the Italian Government could be told that it would be invited to sign the Treaty.

Mr. Bonnet said that he was in a position to agree to Italian signature.

Sir Oliver Franks said that he was without instructions but he would report to his Government the general support which had been given at the meeting to the principle that the original seven, plus Norway, plus the other four, if they were ready to act in time, should sign the Treaty within the period during which it would remain open for signature. It might be possible to arrange for the signature to remain open for a short period by purely administrative means. He was agreeable to the publication of the Treaty on Tuesday, March 15, provided clearance was obtained at a meeting to be held on Friday, the 11th, or Saturday, the 12th. At that meeting it would be agreed to send copies of the text to Italy, Denmark, Iceland, and Portugal, to make arrangements about transmitting the text to the American Republics and the Commonwealth nations, and to arrange for a further meeting, possibly on Monday, at which the Danes and the Italians could be present if they wished.

Mr. Hickerson said he understood this to mean that nothing would be said to the Italians or the Danes until after the meeting on Friday or Saturday.

Mr. Wrong raised the point of procedure at the time of signature. He thought that if several Foreign Ministers were to come to Washington they could not be faced with a fixed text; they must be allowed to discuss it.

Mr. Acheson hoped there would be nothing left to discuss.

Mr. Wrong thought that it would not be wise to count on this. He also inquired about the establishment of an authentic French text, and was informed that this was now in hand.

Mr. Hickerson suggested that a message be given to Denmark, Iceland, Italy, and Portugal to bring them up to date on the present negotiations and to tell them that a text would be communicated to them as soon as it was ready. This appeared to be generally agreeable.

Sir Oliver Franks asked if there was any suggestion as to a date on which the Treaty might be signed.

Mr. Acheson replied that he thought there should be a minimum of two weeks for discussion and suggested the possibility of Monday, April 4, for signature.

1. Roger Taymans, Counselor, Belgian Embassy.
2. The draft text of March 5 and the revised text incorporating changes agreed to in this meeting of March 7 were not attached to the file copy of these minutes, and they have not been identified separately in Department of State files. Presumably the text of March 7 was the one that Secretary Acheson presented on March 8 to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, which approved it subject to minor changes in language, as noted in Mr. Acheson’s letter to President Truman (infra).