Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Western Europe, Volume IV

840.20/3–449: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Denmark

top secret
niact

Washington, March 5, 1949—5 p. m.

us urgent

90. Believe Rasmussen should have following information urgently:

We fully understand Danish (Embtels 173, 174, 175 Mar 4¹) internal political problem and wish to be as helpful as possible. Norwegian Govt has since yesterday been participating fully in discussions. Agreement on text has been substantially reached here and tentative agreement of eight participating govts hoped for by midweek. As soon as such tentative approval given we would expect to communicate text officially to Danish, Icelandic, Portuguese, and probably Italian Govts and then make it public forty-eight hours later. We hope text can be made public next Fri, or Sat. Accordingly there is little likelihood of substantial changes in text being made in future. We welcome Rasmussen’s suggestion on Preamble which accords with our own thoughts and which we hope can be given effect.

We contemplate conference here during last days of March with participation such Fon Mins as wish to attend for final consideration and signature. Present thinking of participants in discussions here differs from London proposal that only original seven govts sign as original signatories, others adhering later, and favors signature not only by original seven but also by Danish, Icelandic, Portuguese, and probably Italian Govts as original signatories if they wish to do so. In view of requirement in the Treaty for unanimous consent of parties for invitation to other govts to accede later and of danger of particularly heavy Soviet pressure on nations which may be considering adherence, it would seem preferable for Denmark, should its Parliament decide that Denmark should become a Party, to be an original signatory.²

Acheson

1. None printed.
2. In answer to this instruction, the Chargé in Denmark, Edward J. Sparks, in telegram No. 176 of March 6, advised that he had conveyed the information to Rasmussen that afternoon. He reported that Rasmussen was disturbed over the possibility of delay if Denmark were not an original signatory, and he was speeding his government’s action on the Pact to make possible his arrival in Washington on March 10 (840.20/3–649).