Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Western Europe, Volume IV

840.20/3–249

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

top secret

[Washington,] March 2, 1949.

Memorandum of Discussion With the President

I told the President that it was necessary to raise with him again the question we had discussed on Monday¹ of the relationship of Italy to the North Atlantic Pact. I brought the President up to date on the Tuesday meeting with the Ambassadors² and on the two meetings, one on Monday³ the other on Tuesday evening with Senators Connally, George and Vandenberg.⁴

I then went over with the President the reasons for and against the inclusion of Italy in the Atlantic Pact as contained in the attached memorandum. The President had and wished to keep the ribbon copy of this memorandum.

I then said that it seemed to me that the real issue was not at the present time on the merits of the arguments outlined in the memorandum. The real issue grew out of the position into which we now found ourselves. There had never been a well thought out United States position on the inclusion or exclusion of Italy from the Atlantic Pact which had received the approval of General Marshall or Mr. Lovett and the matter had never been presented for Presidential decision. Nevertheless, in the course of the negotiations, the United States negotiators had drifted into the position that the European nations must take a position upon Italy. This position had now crystallized. France was so emphatically in favor of Italian participation that she had stated, and we believed she meant it, that she would have to reconsider her whole relation to the Pact if Italy was not to be included. Canada now took an affirmative attitude in favor of Italian inclusion. The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, although not as positive as Canada, were now positive rather than merely non-objecting. The British had stated that they would withdraw their objections if the other nations around the table were in favor of Italian inclusion and we thought that at the next meeting the British objection would be withdrawn. Therefore, the United States would find itself in the position of either accepting the European judgment or rejecting it. I believe that if we reject it we would have serious difficulty with France, considerable delay in the conclusion of the treaty and a good deal of publicity about a split among the Western powers. It seemed to me that in the end we would probably accept Italian inclusion. If we did not accept it we might still have a treaty but we would get it in a rather damaged condition.

I explained to the President the attitude of the Senators and the attitude of Senator Lodge. I thought that while the three Senators first mentioned were not in favor of Italian participation Senator Connally did not hold this position very strongly and that the other two might in the light of Senator Lodge’s view alter their position. We thought their fundamental view was that the responsibility for a decision rested with the Executive and that they would not undertake to oppose a decision once made. Under these circumstances, I recommended to the President that he authorize me to agree to the inclusion of Italy in the Pact, and that he leave to us the best method of working out that inclusion.

After going over the various factors involved, the President accepted the recommendation and told me to proceed on that basis. He would have preferred, certainly at this time, a pact without Italy, but he felt that under present circumstances we should agree to it.

D[ean] A[cheson]

[Annex]

Arguments Against Inclusion of Italy in the North Atlantic Pact

1. Italy is not physically on the North Atlantic Ocean.

2. Inclusion of Italy extends the commitments of the Parties beyond the North Atlantic area into the Mediterranean. Mediterranean security problems might better be dealt with in a separate Mediterranean security arrangement.

3. Inclusion of Italy would raise legitimate questions as to why Greece and Turkey were not also included.

4. The arms limitation clauses of the Peace Treaty strictly limit the size of Italy’s military establishment and hence the contribution it can make through self-help and mutual aid to the collective security of the North Atlantic area.

5. As a member of the Pact Italy would expect her territory to be defended, which would be difficult and which would impose a drain on the limited military forces and resources available to the other Parties.

6. In two world wars Italy has shown herself to be an ineffectual and undefendable ally, having switched sides in both wars.

7. In 1940 Italy stabbed France and the UK in the back.

8. Inclusion of a former enemy state would be an unnecessary affront to the Soviet Union and give rise to further Russian charges of US intentions to encircle the Soviet Union.

Arguments for Inclusion of Italy in the North Atlantic Pact

1. The essential criterion for membership is not what a specific country can contribute to the common defense nor what forces are available for its defense, but rather whether a given country is sufficiently vital to the security of the other Parties that an armed attack upon that country would necessitate the other Parties’ taking military action to safeguard their own security.

2. The President on February 10 [March 15], 1948, approved a conclusion of the National Security Council that, “The US should make full use of its political, economic and, if necessary, military power in such manner as may be found most effective to assist in preventing Italy from falling under the domination of the USSR either through external armed attack or through Soviet-dominated Communist movements within Italy, so long as the legally elected government of Italy evidences a determination to oppose such Communist aggression.”⁵

3. The purpose of the Pact is to prevent an armed attack on certain countries (which, in view of the NSC decision, should include Italy) by making clear in advance to the Soviet Union that an armed attack on those countries would involve it in military action with all the other Parties, including the US.

4. Even under the limitations of the Peace Treaty, Italy has the third largest navy in Western Europe, an authorized army of 12 combat divisions (which already exist on a cadre basis), an air force of 350 planes including 200 fighter planes, and one of the largest merchant navies in Europe, with a surplus of trained seamen. This compares favorably with the military forces and resources of not only such other countries as Norway but with France, which although it is counted upon for the bulk of available ground forces, contemplates maintaining only 9 divisions.

5. Northern Italy has a highly developed industrial complex and the country has a surplus of skilled manpower, which could be utilized, if arms were available, after the outbreak of war which would logically release Italy from Treaty limitations.

6. The US military authorities have estimated that “in terms of land warfare in Western Europe, Italy is strategically important. In terms of sea warfare, there is no question as to her critical strategic potentiality with respect to control of the Mediterranean”. It is of great importance to deny an enemy the use of Italy as a base for sea and air domination of the central Mediterranean, as well as to deny to the enemy the use of Italy’s industrial complex and manpower.

7. The French consider Italy vital to the defense of France and the military authorities of the two countries are currently engaged in staff talks.

8. Italy is by race, tradition, arid civilization a natural member of the Western European community, is committed to an economic union with France, has taken an active part in the movement for integration of Western Europe, and is being included from the start in the Council of Europe. It would be illogical to exclude Italy from the Pact while encouraging efforts to integrate her more fully, economically and politically, with the other European Parties.

9. The French Government has strongly intimated that it would not be able to sign or obtain ratification of the Pact if Italy were not included.

10. Italy can logically be invited to become a party on grounds of geographic continuity, an argument not applicable to Greece and Turkey.

11. The provision in the Pact for accession provides for the admission, by agreement, of any European country “in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area”. Although no countries other than the Scandinavian states, Iceland, Portugal, Ireland, and Italy are now being considered for membership, it is desirable from the point of view of public opinion in both the US and Europe to make clear that any European country willing to subscribe to the principles of the Treaty and to undertake its responsibilities can become a member.

12. The US has, since the end of the war, notably before the Italian elections of 1948 and through interim aid and ERP, devoted a great deal of effort to strengthening Italy’s western orientation and weakening the Communist threat in Italy. The Italian Government has made similar efforts toward both ends and has made great progress in the past year. In the process it has endeavored, against strong Communist opposition, to prepare Italian public opinion for closer cooperation with Western Europe and membership in the Atlantic Pact. It has twice asked to be included in the Pact, and the second time to be included at once in the discussions. Ambassador Dunn feels very strongly that a rebuff to Italy in this connection coupled with our inability to satisfy Italian aspirations for all its former colonies, would substantially nullify all that has been gained in Italy during the past year and lead the Italian Government to adopt a position of neutrality through which it would attempt to play West off against East. A rebuff would increase Communist influence in Italy and discredit the present government and its pro-Western policies.

13. Since the Brussels Treaty countries and Canada are becoming increasingly disposed to include Italy and since the French (and Reston⁶) are keeping the Italians closely informed, the Italian Government and people would conclude that a refusal to include Italy was primarily the responsibility of the US and that it indicated a definite cooling of our attitude toward that country.

14. If Italy is not invited to be an original signatory, the reaction of public opinion in Italy to its exclusion may make it impossible for the government to accede later.

1. See memorandum of conversation, February 28, p. 125.
2. See minutes of the Fourteenth Meeting, March 1, p. 126.
3. See footnote 1, p. 128.
4. Memorandum of meeting with the Senators on Tuesday, March 1, not found in Department of State files.
5. For text of the document referred to here, NSC 1/2 of February 10, 1948, the conclusions of which were actually approved by the President on March 13, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. iii, pp. 765 ff.
6. James Reston, correspondent of the New York Times.