840.20/3–249: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Douglas ) to the Secretary of State
us urgent
750. Eyes only for the Secretary from Harriman and Douglas. Reference Deptel 627, February 24.1
Harriman, Bonsal2 and Bonesteel came over March first and together we prepared informal memorandum3 briefing major points Deptel 627. We met with Bevin afternoon of March first.
We initiated informal discussion by explaining character US concept [Page 137] and explained we were talking to Bevin in order to get UK general reactions before discussions with other WU countries. We asked that matter not be discussed by UK with others until we had benefit UK reaction. After discussing in broad outlines US concept of military assistance we gave Bevin our memorandum and then proceeded to cover in some further detail points in Deptel 627. As explanation went on Bevin indicated complete agreement with principle that ERP must not be jeopardized. He asked about relationships MAP to non-WU countries such as Norway and Italy. We answered our present discussions with him concerned WU countries only but that MAP in Europe contemplated some assistance to certain non-WU countries.
During explanation US dollar assistance for increased European production we gave Bevin figures on present US estimates, stressing their very tentative character.
We said confidentially we were thinking in terms of dollars 115–165 million assistance to WU countries if total additional WU program were about dollars 325 million including therein above US assistance. Also indicated we were thinking of transferring US equipment to extent somewhere between dollars 850 million to dollars 1.0 billion. (We asked that these figures be not circulated.) Bevin pointed out HMG going before Parliament at this moment with military budget of 760 million pounds, an increase over earlier contemplated military budget of nearly 100 million pounds. Consequently would be difficult UK to expand production much further without risk to recovery. Bevin pointed out difficulties in WU inherent in separate military budgets. It was far easier to pool military forces than to work out military budgets which reflected relatively equal contribution by each country. He had hazy hope that sometime in future some sort of super-budget covering consolidated country military needs could be worked out. Bevin also asked if figures we gave him included money to cover strategic stockpiling in UK of wheat, oil and sugar. We told him we understood figures did not include allowance for such stock-piling although matter is being considered in Washington.
While discussion point in paragraph 3 (d) (1) Bevin indicated agreement but made comment that he strongly believed unified basis could be achieved only by appointment of American as top commander. He expanded on this, saying that history of France and Britain made it well-nigh impossible for either to genuinely accept command by other.
We discussed question public presentation of MAP at some length, expressing our hope that it could be presented in Europe as coming from WU initiative and stressing importance, particularly in France, of program not appearing to be pushed upon Europeans by US. Bevin [Page 138] agreed importance this subject but offhand reaction was that presentation must include idea of US mutuality. Europeans consider themselves in “front line” and Bevin felt he had to be careful about seeming to go too far in the question of Europeans pushing rearmament.
Several times during conversation, Bevin stressed importance talking to French soon and cautioned on extreme delicacy of situation. French are supersensitive and we should make clear in talking to them that we had not concerted any substantive points with UK before talking to French.
In closing conversation, which lasted nearly two hours, Bevin undertook to arrange meeting next day with Prime Minister and other Ministers concerned with matter.
We met this morning with Messrs Attlee, Bevin, Cripps, Morrison, Alexander and Makins.4 They had studied our informal memorandum and had met last night to discuss it. We asked whether after consideration they felt US conception of principles was good, whether suggested approach met with their general approval, and whether they wanted to proceed on that basis. Bevin and Cripps replied that their reaction was favorable ill general but that they could not make any commitments in advance of discussions and agreement within WU. To do so might, they felt, permit the continental countries to assume that Britain would carry the whole load of additional programs. They were entirely agreeable to going ahead on the basis of our memorandum and would move as rapidly as possible to obtain such agreement. They had some worries on (a) matter of working out arrangements to permit transfer equipment among European members, and (b) on receiving due recognition of their increased military budget while other countries had not taken increased action. These matters would have to be worked out within WU.
Cripps raised question as to Canada’s position in MAP and felt this meant MAP must be considered within framework Atlantic Pact. Bevin asked if Canada were informed of US concept MAP and said HMG will want to apprise Canada of our informal memorandum at once. (We presume Canada being kept informed by Washington or, if not, that you will perhaps wish to let Canadians know status before they are informed by UK.5)
We made clear that US would expect reciprocal aid in return for [Page 139] MAP including such things as transit rights, services, some labor, etc. Question of base rights was raised and we said that US would expect arrangements to be worked out at some time, probably deriving from Atlantic Pact. Alexander hoped any discussion on bases would be kept most secret at the present because of Norwegian-Russian difficulties.
Regarding public presentation Bevin expressed idea that it could come out as sort of logical development from Dunkirk treaty, Brussels Pact, letter from Bevin to Marshall regarding US position regarding Brussels Pact, Truman’s speech on day of signing of Brussels Pact, Marshall’s letter replying to Bevin and Atlantic Pact.6 We stressed necessity working out presentation jointly between US and WU so as to avoid any uncoordinated statements.
Bevin suggested we proceed rapidly as possible to discuss our concept with French, then Belgians and Dutch. He said as soon as he was informed we had completed our talks he would raise the matter officially within WU attempting to get agreement on basic principles by March 17 and as nearly as possible full responses to paragraph 7 of Deptel 627 by end of March. If we could clear the ground fast enough he would move up date of next meeting WU consultative council to March 14 so as to have agreement in principle few days thereafter.
We are pouching copy our informal memorandum handed Bevin7 and British minutes of joint meetings.8 We were asked several times to keep the matter of our meetings and substantive discussion in highest possible security classification. Political implications any leak would be very bad. We got general impression that British were in general accord with our concept of MAP and were reasonably well pleased.
See Embtel 748, March 2,8 for next steps. [Harriman and Douglas.]
- Not printed.↩
- Philip W. Bonsal, Political Adviser to the U.S. Special Representative in Europe under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948.↩
- Not printed; for the text of a revised memorandum submitted to Schuman on March 3, see p. 148.↩
- Clement R. Attlee, British Prime Minister; Herbert S. Morrison, Leader of the House of Commons; Albert V. Alexander, Minister of Defense; and Roger Makins, Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office.↩
- Pursuant to this suggestion, the Canadian Minister in the United States was advised on March 3 of the substance of paragraphs 3–8 of telegram No. 627, February 24 to London. (840.00/3–249)↩
- For the March 1948 correspondence referred to here, the related documentation on the signing of the Brussels Pact, and President Truman’s speech concerning it, see the compilation on U.S. encouragement of a Western European Union, Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. iii, pp. 1 ff.↩
- Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 136.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Not printed.↩