Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Western Europe, Volume IV

840.20/3–149

Minutes of the Fourteenth Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, March 1, 1949, 10 a. m.

Washington, March 1, 1949, 10 a.m.

top secret

Mr. Acheson asked if there were comments on the text which had been considered on Friday.

Mr. Wrong said he had some minor drafting comments suitable for the working group. He would put them forward when the other representatives had received instructions.

Mr. Acheson suggested that the next point for discussion should be the question of Norway, discussed briefly at a previous meeting.

Mr. Van Kleffens thought that there was no tendency in his Government to link the questions of Norway and Italy.

On the question of Norway his instructions were explicit. In the view of the Netherlands Government, Norway should receive, if possible, admission to the discussions at once.

With regard to Italy, the position of the Netherlands Government was that action could not well be delayed. If there was a unanimous feeling around the table for admission of Italy, he would not be found in opposition.

There was, of course, a difference between the contributions that Norway and Italy were able to make. Italy should, however, not be treated too much as a separate case; this might perhaps have repercussions in countries like Portugal, which was considering joining the Pact.

He wondered whether there would be any merit in setting up, perhaps after Norway had been admitted, a commission on admissions which might deal in the first place with Italy. Perhaps this suggestion could be helpful in solving the dilemma. There was not only disadvantage but also danger in delay.

Mr. Bonnet reserved his comments until his colleagues had spoken.

Sir Oliver Franks said that on the subject of Norway, his Government assented completely with the view put forward by Mr. Acheson at the last meeting. The UK would be glad to see Norway asked to join the discussions at a very early date and would wish that information transmitted to Norway just as soon as it was needed for Mr. Lange’s purposes. The question was a separate one which should be dealt with on its merits because of the particular position in which Norway had found itself in the last month.

On the question of Italy, the UK had always thought that on the whole it was better not to have Italy a member of the Pact. However, it would be fair to say that the strength of that preference had diminished during the progress of negotiations. The UK would not stand in the way of a general opinion and would not press its initial preference. On the other hand, his Government was not happy at the suggestion of linking the question of Italy with that of Norway. Such a link had not grown out of the discussions and did not belong to the actual situation in which the two countries found themselves. One was under threat; the other was not under threat.

Sir Oliver felt that it was the right of his French colleague, who had consistently favored the admission of Italy, and, if he felt it so, his duty, to press for a decision on Italy in principle at an early date. Sir Oliver would agree to arriving at an early decision but would not agree to arriving at a decision linking the questions of Italy and Norway.

Mr. Wrong had instructions to do everything he could in favor of the immediate extension of an invitation, i.e., the type of notification for which Mr. Lange had asked. He had already stated the reasons for the Canadian Government’s position and had nothing to add to what Sir Oliver and Mr. Van Kleffens had said on that question.

The Canadian Government was prepared to agree to accept the admission of Italy, but it was strongly of the view that the questions of an invitation to Norway and an invitation to Italy were separate and should not be linked. He thought a similar question in relation to Denmark might soon arise.

Mr. Le Gallais said that the Belgian Ambassador had received instructions which were more elaborate than his own and that he would concur with the Ambassador and with his other Benelux colleague on the two questions before the group.

Baron Silvercruys said that his Government felt very strongly that Norway was in a special position. He thought it unnecessary to give the quite obvious reasons for this view. Norway had been in consultation with the negotiating governments, Mr. Lange had journeyed to Washington, and the Pact had been discussed very freely with him. Moreover, Norway had had to take a stand on the arrangement suggested by Sweden. Norway, at the moment, was confronted with the problem of answering a Russian note and her action in answering this note would undoubtedly be courageous. All in all, the matter was one of extreme urgency because of political reasons of the highest order. The Belgian Government felt that, under the circumstances, it would be grievous mistake not to accede immediately to Norway’s request for information indicating that it would be welcome should it decide to ask for inclusion in the negotiations.

At the same time, the Belgian Government considered that the position of Italy should not be ignored. He explained that, in the minds of his Government, there was no connection between the questions of Italy and Norway, but that for political and psychological reasons Italy should not be ignored and its request for admission made some six or seven weeks previously should receive a reply soon.

Mr. Acheson said that after the last meeting he had reported the discussions which had taken place to the President who had asked him to confer with leaders of the Senate.¹ After conferring with the Senators, he had reported again² to the President who thought the matter over and gave his views and instructions for the time being at least. Both the President and the Senators believed that an immediate answer must fee given to Norway. Also, they thought that the answer must be a favorable one. The President thought that the same considerations applied to Denmark because of the connection of Greenland. Mr. Acheson thought that the question of Norway and Denmark should not be linked with Italy and that it was a matter of great urgency that Norway should receive at once a reply to the effect that the negotiating governments would be happy to have Norway join the negotiations.

He had also discussed with the President and the Senators the question of Italy. On that they were entirely open-minded and prepared to discuss and decide the question on its merits and as to whether it was for the best interests of the Pact. It was fair to say that at the present time they did not favor Italy being an original signatory, but were thinking in terms of its accession later.

Also, the President and the Senators thought that it would be dangerous to delay further the drafting of the terms of the Treaty and the publication of the Treaty once agreed. This aspect of the work should receive priority and there should be as little friction as possible on the question of other nations which would be invited to join the Pact. Mr. Acheson stressed very strongly the necessity for answering Norway that day.

Mr. Bonnet had not received written instructions but had had exchanges of views with his Government in Paris. The view was taken there that the situation was serious. He noted the views expressed to the effect that the questions of Italy and Norway were not the same and thought that such was obvious. As to the insistence that there should be no linking of the two cases, that was a matter of definition, but it was possible that there was no link.

The French Government wanted to make its position clear in advance. If that government had to present to the public and the Parliament a pact including Norway and to which Italy would not be a party, not mentioning the question of the Algerian Departments in addition, then the French Government would have to reconsider its position as far as its own participation was concerned. He had received the clearest possible indications on this question and felt that it would be difficult for his Government to secure ratification of a pact signed under such conditions. He agreed with the necessity for speed and hoped that very soon he could Report to his Government the decisions on the structure of the Pact and on the decision taken concerning Italy. But he hoped that conclusions would not be reached which, by including Norway, would exclude France. If it were decided to send an invitation to Norway immediately, he hoped that he could report to his Government that the question of Italy would be discussed soon and that every effort would be made to meet the French position. Mr. Bonnet added that if Norway should join the discussions, his Government could not accept the thesis that Norway should have a voice in the decision on the admission of Italy. The question of Italy’s participation should be decided by the seven governments now conducting the negotiations.

Baron Silvercruys suggested that the questions be taken separately, one after the other. The question of greatest urgency, Norway, could be solved and then the other questions could be considered.

Mr. Acheson agreed with Baron Silvercruys’ suggestion but said that he was not clear as to the meaning of Mr. Bonnet’s last remarks. Did he mean that Norway should have no voice on the question of Italy or that Norway should have no veto on the admission of Italy?

Mr. Bonnet thought that the question of Italy’s admission should be decided by the seven governments represented around the table. As a result of statements by the Norwegian Foreign Minister, it could be concluded that Norway would oppose the participation of Italy. The question should be decided without the participation of any of the other nations which might be invited to join the discussions.

Mr. Acheson thought it would be difficult to say “without participation”. If it were meant that other nations should not have a veto on the participation of Italy, that was a different matter, but any member joining the discussions would have obvious standing to express any views he might have and presumably the present members would wish to hear those views.

Mr. Bonnet thought that if the Norwegians were ready to participate in the next meeting, it would be an easy matter to separate the discussion of Italy from the discussion on the text and to have the Norwegians present only for the discussion of the text.

Sir Oliver Franks observed that during the many discussions he had had in the past with his French colleague there had been some disagreements. Perhaps the manner in which the French put their views and the manner in which the English put their views, rather than the substance of the question, sometimes had something to do with apparent disagreements. When Mr. Bonnet spoke of conditions, Sir Oliver was not happy because it was not the way in which the negotiations had been conducted. He did not think that the importation of that kind of consideration helped in getting the united result that the Pact required. He would appreciate it if the French position could be put, not in the language of conditions, but in the language of views strongly held by the French Government. He did not think that it was really a question of conditions but of a joint effort to achieve a right result under difficult circumstances.

It was obvious, Sir Oliver thought, that the natural view of Great Britain, about the question of Italy would tend to be different from the point of view of France which was on the continent of Europe and had a strategic frontier with Italy. But during the many months of discussions there had been no talk about laying down conditions, one to the other. Views had been advanced frankly. Although it might be a defect of national temperament on his part, it made it more difficult for Sir Oliver to reach an agreed solution if, using the natural metaphor, a pistol was put at his head. His natural instinct was to react against it and he did not wish to be put in that position.

Mr. Bonnet said that his natural reaction was the same, when he was engaged in a negotiation and had the impression of talking to a wall. He said, however, that after the long delays which had been experienced in the negotiations, his Government could not have the greatest confidence in the issue of the negotiations.

He was sorry if his views were interpreted as conditions because they certainly had not been intended as such. He had merely asked that thought be given to the consequences which could result if the French position were rejected. If the structure of the Pact was such that there would be a strong reaction on the part of French public opinion, his Government could be obliged not to join the Pact. It had been his intention to draw attention to this consideration. Referring to Sir Oliver’s comment on the future of the Pact, Mr. Bonnet agreed that it was necessary in order to produce proper results that it should be well-balanced from the start. It would be useless to reach agreement on treaties if difficulties would mushroom at every step afterward. There had been many examples of that in the past, so he was in fact thinking of the interests of the Pact in the future when he stated the position of his Government.

Mr. Acheson said that he had shared the worry of Sir Oliver and that he was delighted to learn that Mr. Bonnet’s views had not been put forward as a condition. Referring to Mr. Bonnet’s observation on delays, Mr. Acheson made a few observations which showed some of the difficulties under which he had been laboring. On the question of the inclusion of Algeria, Mr. Bonnet had seemed to regard the delay in settlement of the issue as a bargaining effort on the part of the U.S. Nothing could be further from the truth.

Mr. Bonnet said this was not his impression.

Mr. Acheson observed that he had come into the discussions at a relatively late date. He had been disturbed to find that the discussions with the Senators had not progressed as far as he had been led to believe. In particular, the Senators did not know that the problem of Algeria entered into the Treaty and was a part of the French position; he had had a difficult time with them on the matter and it had been a problem of explaining to them the political problems of the French Government, the structure of the French State, and the relation of Algeria to France. They had gradually come to see the matter in a different light, and he was happy to report that it was now agreeable to include in the Treaty the Algerian Departments of France. Mr. Acheson mentioned this in order to illustrate the efforts in which he had been engaged in getting the Senators to understand the problems of other governments as well as their own.

Mr. Bonnet thanked Mr. Acheson for this information so important for the Government of France. He said that he had injected the question of Algeria in the discussion, not as a condition, but as an illustration of the fears that existed in his Government after the protracted discussions which had taken place. He had been unable to report the inclusion of the Algerian Departments to his Government prior to that day and it was a question which might have caused very strong parliamentary and public reaction in France, just as the question of the inclusion of Italy. He thanked Mr. Acheson for the effort he was making to have the French position understood in the Senate.

Mr. Acheson understood that the outstanding question of Norway was now settled and that a message should be sent to the Norwegian Government to the effect that if, at the conclusion of the Storting debate, it should ask for an invitation to join the negotiations, such an invitation would be forthcoming.

Mr. Van Kleffens did not feel that the imputation that anyone around the table had indulged in tactics of delay was well-founded. He felt that the discussions had consistently proceeded along lines of reasonable despatch and orderly progress.

He referred to Norway’s interest in the Italian situation. If he read the omens well, none of the countries represented in the conversations being adamant against the inclusion of Italy, that country had every chance of being admitted soon. Perhaps to the message to Norway just agreed upon some purely informal and unofficial information should be added about the present feelings with regard to the inclusion of Italy, which were now in a more advanced stage than the Norwegian Government might otherwise have been led to believe.

Mr. Bonnet referred to the last meeting of the Foreign Ministers³ in London and said that as a result of those discussions, certain opinions could be formed as to the delays which had been injected into the discussions.

He referred to the other points he had raised previously and hoped that these could be settled soon. Should the discussion proceed on Italy or would it be better to discuss Italy at the next meeting? Referring to the suggestion that Norway should be given some information as to the status of the discussions on Italy, he thought it would be necessary to explain the situation on Italy in such a way that the Norwegians would not be left with the impression that they could make a condition of the question of Italy’s inclusion.

Sir Oliver Franks said that there were one or two different considerations involved in the question of Italy and he had suggested that Italy be discussed at a later meeting because he was not prepared to express a view on at least one of the considerations in the present meeting. There was the question of principle as to whether or not Italy should be included in the Pact. The UK had expressed the preference that Italy should not be included. However, this was not a breaking point and he would be guided by the other views expressed. The other question was, if it was decided that Italy should be included in the Pact, should Italy be an original signatory? He had an open mind on this point and he had no instructions whatever. This aspect went beyond the question of principle and he did not see that it was bound up with those public and political considerations which Mr. Bonnet had urged in relation to the question of principle.

Mr. Wrong was in somewhat the same position as Sir Oliver except that there was a slight difference on the question of principle. The Canadian Government, on the whole, considered that the arguments were slightly in favor of the admission of Italy. In the paper of September last⁴ it had been recognized that Italy presented a problem. In discussing the other five countries which had been considered for participation, it had been agreed that if they were willing, it would be desirable to have them as full members of the Pact and that if they so desired, they should participate in the negotiations and become original signatories.

He thought that at one stage in the earlier discussions the French position had been far from clear. He understood in the earlier meetings that it was the purpose of the French to have the project encompass the five Brussels powers, the United States and Canada. He mentioned this because some of the discussion might leave the impression that positions were fixed long before they actually had been fixed.

He had no instructions whether his Government would favor having Italy as an original signatory or would prefer to have it accede. His assumption, based on these discussions was that the most desirable course would be to provide for Italy’s accession. The military limitations of the Peace Treaty and the fact that Italy was not geographically on the North Atlantic would continue to present difficulties in explaining to public opinion in other countries the inclusion of Italy as an original signatory.

Baron Silvercruys thought the Norwegian Government might well be reminded that the question of participation of other countries was under active consideration. On this general question of other countries, he thought there were reasons making it opportune that early consideration be given the question. The question of Italy was of high priority and should be discussed as soon as possible. Such discussion probably would clear up the manner of Italy’s participation.

Mr. Acheson understood that the question of Italy would be taken up at an early occasion. However, the immediate point was whether some communication along the lines of Mr. Van Kleffens’ suggestion should be made. He thought that the idea had merit in that it would let Norway know exactly where it stood.

Mr. Bonnet emphasized that the communication given to Norway would have to be worded carefully so as to make clear to the Norwegian Government that the information was being transmitted because the countries conducting the discussions thought Norway should know the stage of the discussions on Italy. He would oppose the idea if the communication were worded in a manner which could be interpreted by the Norwegian Foreign Minister as a request that Norway’s views on the participation of Italy should be made known.

Referring to a remark of Mr. Wrong, Mr. Bonnet thought that the original position of the other Brussels Pact countries as well as France was that the proposed North Atlantic Pact should include the Brussels powers, the US, and Canada. Only after hearing the views of the US and Canada was it decided that other countries should be included in the arrangement.

As for Italy not being located on the North Atlantic, he observed that much of the territory covered by the Pact was not North Atlantic but Arctic territory. Italy and France had a common frontier and from the point of view of strategy as well as politics, his Government thought it better to include Italy if countries in the North of Europe were to be included.

Mr. Acheson asked if he was correct in understanding that the decisions reached on Norway would follow as to Denmark. As far as the US was concerned, Denmark was one of the most critical countries.

Mr. Bonnet personally thought that the questions of Norway and Denmark were very similar; however, he would have to ask for instructions before giving a final answer.

Mr. Hickerson said that the Danish Ambassador had informed the Department of State that the question of Denmark’s participation in the Pact or in the negotiations would be discussed in a very few days in the foreign relations committee of the Danish Parliament. In a few days, the Danish Ambassador expected to make an approach similar to the one made by the Norwegian Ambassador. In the light of this information, the situation naturally had assumed a sense of urgency.

Mr. Van Kleffens had no instructions but thought that Denmark undoubtedly would receive treatment similar to Norway.

Baron Silvercruys could not oppose the participation of Denmark after agreeing to the participation of Norway.

Mr. Wrong thought only one answer could be given to Denmark in view of the decision already taken. He thought his instructions would cover his agreeing on this question.

Mr. Acheson, referring to the question of Italy, said that he could not be sure that he would be better off at the next meeting, but that he hoped to have a more definite position.

Mr. Van Kleffens thought the question whether Italy should sign the Pact as an original member or adhere to it subsequently, was chiefly a matter of form, which at the present stage was of minor importance.

Mr. Acheson said that the question had some importance in the minds of the Senators. They thought that explaining the North Atlantic Pact would be more difficult if a large Mediterranean factor was involved. They were still considering the matter and he would have nothing further to say on the subject until he had talked with them again.

Mr. Bonnet said that if Italy were not an original signatory, there might be difficulty in the debates on ratification in the Senate if it were known that Italy was to accede. Would, for instance, the U.S. Senate attach a reservation that the Pact should not be extended.

Mr. Acheson preferred not to think of such a contingency.

Mr. Bonnet had mentioned it only as a possibility. He thought that in view of such indeterminate factors and in the interest of the happy life of the Pact, Italy’s admission as an original signatory would be better.

It was agreed that the next meeting should be concerned with the participation of other countries as well as the participation of Italy.

1. A brief memorandum of this conversation of February 28 with Senators Tom Connally, Walter F. George, and Arthur H. Vandenberg, prepared by Acheson on that date, is in Department of State file No. 840.20/2–2849.
2. Memorandum of conversation not found in Department of State files.
3. Meeting of the Consultative Council of the Brussels treaty powers, January 27–28, 1949.
4. See memorandum by the participants in the Washington Security Talks, September 9, 1948, Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. iii, p. 237.