Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Western Europe, Volume IV

840.20/2–2549: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

top secret
niact

Washington, February 25, 1949—8 p. m.

597. For the Ambassador. See Dec 24 paper on Atlantic Pact,¹ Annex C concerning Italy and Annex D concerning other govts. Pursuant to Annex D US on Dec 31 advised Nor Amb of its substance and broad outlines of treaty. He was told we would be glad to receive any views his govt might wish to express concerning form and timing of official approach. Brussels Treaty Ambs here advised exactly what Norwegians had been told.

You are aware of developments in Norway, including, two Sov notes, Lange’s Wash trip and his statement in Storting yesterday. Nor govt believed it should participate in discussions here in time to influence final draft.

Feb 11 I told Lange that decision as to whether or when Norway might wish to participate was entirely up to Norway but that “If it should seem to Nor govt in its interest to join at any time, either during discussions or end of discussions, after treaty had been signed or after it had been ratified welcome of US would be very warm indeed.” I added that although I had no right to speak for other countries, it would not be taking much risk to say they would share that view.

Feb 23 Nor Amb inquired under instructions whether Nor Govt could be certain of being allowed to take part in discussions at once if it should decide to ask an invitation.² My earlier statement to Lange was repeated to him with statement question would be taken up at next Atlantic Pact meeting. He anticipated Storting decision next week.

At Pact meeting today³ I urged importance of giving affirmative reply preferably on Mon since Storting debate starts Tues. All except Bonnet expressed readiness ask their govts approval immediately. Bonnet in extraordinary exhibition insisted that all govts under consideration as prospective members particularly Italy be invited simultaneously. He was reminded by various persons present of Lange’s problem with Storting and Moscow, that Nor and Ital participation had never previously been linked, that present Nor situation represented crisis which must be met and that rebuff would be catastrophic. Most Bonnet would yield was to suggest that “a nice answer” be given Norwegians and Italians given same answer. I stated that Bonnet appeared ready, in order to get Italy in, to run extreme risks over Norway, risks to which he was not entitled to subject all of us and that if French govt insisted on this position I would not take responsibility for consequences.

Pls see Schuman or Chauvel at once and impress upon them essentiality of giving Norwegians prompt affirmative reply. Good faith of all seven participating govts is involved. French govt aware US has consistently sought to bring about satisfactory solution for Italy but latter is not under fire while Norway is. As I advised Bonnet unsatisfactory reply to Nor request would entail risks which I am emphatically not prepared to take.⁴

Acheson

1. Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. iii, p. 333.
2. A memorandum of this conversation between Morgenstierne and Acheson, dated February 23, 1949, is in Department of State file No. 840.20/2–2349.
3. Minutes of the thirteenth meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security (not printed) are in Department of State file No. 840.20/2–2549.
4. Caffery replied in telegram 815, February 26, 9 p. m., that he had complied with the instructions in a meeting that morning with Schuman and that he had just received from Schuman, that evening, a paper that he was led to believe formed the basis for new instructions to Bonnet. This paper, which he quoted in his telegram, indicated that France would not object to immediate admission of Norway to the Washington discussions, but would be forced to reconsider this action if the question of similar participation by Italy were not made, with least possible delay, the subject of a definite decision by the participating countries. (840.20/2–2649)