Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Western Europe, Volume IV

840.20/2–1349: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Norway

top secret

Washington, February 13, 1949—8 p. m.

us urgent

56. Norwegian For Min Lange, Defense Under Secy Bryn, majority leader Torp in conversations with Secretary and other Dept. officials during past week have posed numerous questions re Atlantic Pact, US arms assistance to Norway, and US attitude toward Scandinavian Pact. At final meeting Feb 11¹ US policy explained by Secretary as follows:

Careful and sympathetic consideration given Nor problems by Dept. Our conclusions fully discussed with Pres and reflect his views. Following points advanced.

1. If Nor Govt wishes join Atlantic Pact at any time, during discussions, at end of discussions, after treaty has been signed or ratified, warm welcome assured from US and presumably others. However, decision entirely up to Nor Govt. US has not and will not persuade, advise or apply pressure notwithstanding statements by certain newspaper writers.

2. Re question Norw security during period between possible decision to join Pact and coming into force of Pact, no one authorized to commit US in advance of its constitutional procedures. However, no doubt whatever that aggression against any country considering defense pact with us “would be regarded very gravely and US would take most serious possible view of it.”

3. Re question military supplies raised by Norwegians, this subject will not be used by us as indirect method persuasion or pressure. Under no circumstances will matter of military assistance to any country be used for political purposes. Nevertheless clear that demands for assistance much greater than our ability supply. This necessitates system of priorities which must be awarded where US has commitments or interests. Priorities not determined solely by Pact as for example Greece and Turkey, but assistance will be given from viewpoint overall military effectiveness.

After above statement following specific questions and answers discussed:

1. Does Pact require members to raise defenses to defined level? Answer clearly no. Fundamental purpose of Pact and any US military assistance would be its deterrent value. Balance must be maintained between recovery and security in order that military measures do not defeat recovery objective and thus weaken rather than strengthen. Member country must do all it can without impairing economic recovery or political stability. No arbitrary fixing of limits.

2. Under Art 5, would attack on any part Norw territory require all members automatically take action against aggressor? Answer. Although Art 5 still under discussion, armed attack on any member considered armed attack on all and individually and collectively all members will take all appropriate action meet emergency. Nothing happens automatically, other than certain actions executive might take. Will of people intervenes. Great question of whether nation goes to war must be decided by Congress in light of Treaty commitment which would condition its freedom. It would have international obligation which it would certainly exercise.

3. Would commitment cover all Norw territory including Spitzbergen where by international Treaty Norway precluded from preparing defence? Answer. Pact would cover European Norway but because of Spitzbergen’s special status Atlantic Pact participants should examine latter question.

4. How long before defense machinery comes into effect? Answer. We hope put Pact before Senate middle or latter part March for urgent consideration and action within next couple months. When Treaty comes into effect, or possibly earlier, there would be staff discussions, and depending where and how serious attack was machinery expected to operate quickly. If matter involved war action might take a little longer but Congressional action in regard to war usually follows matter too clear to leave doubt and is ordinarily very rapid. Consultative body established by Pact would probably be in practically continuous session, thus avoiding delays.

5. Duration of Pact? Answer. No decision yet. Europeans propose 50 years as in case Brussels Pact. We have thought in terms 12 to 20 years with reexamination midway for possible revision.

6. Inclusion of Italy (which Lange had said would raise political difficulties in Norway)? Answer. Still open question primarily for Europeans to settle, and we hope they will take positive attitude. Italy has taken initiative which we feel it important not to rebuff.

7. Any further US reaction to Scandinavian regional group and position of such isolated pact vis-à-vis US assistance? Answer. We have felt it undesirable for any nation to pressure any Scandinavian country to join such group and we have no intention of exerting any pressure on Scandinavians who must reach own decision. However, degree to which effective military operations could be carried out without prior staff talks is problem. Correlation would be difficult if there were barrier between two groups. Arms supply question is one of priorities. If US military knew what would be done with US assistance in one case and not in another, they would naturally be more interested in former. No intention of exclusion; merely matter of priority. Question of payment or nonpayment related to recovery which we would not wish to impair. US has certain equipment now regarded as surplus (to certain levels of mobilization) although not enough to go around, other equipment must be manufactured. Equipment immediately available would go to countries where we have commitment or interest. Equipment to be manufactured might in time be available for others depending on technical considerations and strategic plans. Our effort will be directed towards carrying out coordinated military plan. Those outside plan, such as an isolated Scandinavian bloc, will be in less favored position and needs could hardly be considered for some time to come. (Lange interposed that Norway had felt under no pressure at all and that he would not regard our answer as pressure, but that he must make position clear as possible on his return. He therefore asked whether Norw acceptance of isolated Scandinavian plan would imply remaining outside common plan and thus that needs of such group would receive lesser and later consideration.) He was advised available supplies must be used first to give effect to common plan. It is problem of supply where requests are at present about three times availability. Furthermore, programming assistance based on uncoordinated requests more difficult for us than programming on basis common plan.

8. Question of Scandinavian bloc as neutral cushion between two chief possible antagonists (as urged by Lippmann)? Answer. Assumption that such bloc possible is wrong since Soviets would probably regard it as tempting prize, an area where action might be taken with least risk.

9. Bases on Norwegian soil? Norwegian Govt cannot grant bases in peacetime unless attacked or threatened by attack (with exception obligations under UN Charter). Answer. This would not constitute obstacle to acceptance into Pact. However, Lange stated understanding that coordinated plan would require certain materials to be on spot and people who are going to use them must know they are on spot.

10. Military supplies for Norway if not associated with Pact? Norway planning national defense organization for development over six year period, must know alternative positions re supplies in or out of Pact. Answer. We are still obviously unable talk in terms of quantities or dollars but discussion of general factors between Bryn and Gen. Lemnitzer might be useful.

11. Could Norway outside Atlantic Pact or in isolated Scandinavian Pact expect any supplies? Would integrated Scandinavia be considered more acceptable or too weak either as deterrent or for effective resistance? Answer. Military would be concerned regarding equipment sent to neutral area—and have doubt as to its fully effective end use. Equipment could conceivably be used against us. Unquestionably Scandinavian defense potential greater if united. However, our purpose in sending equipment to Scandinavia would probably be to strengthen defense particularly in Southwest Norway until help could be sent from West, but this difficult without prior coordination. Something would be lacking unless supply of arms was geared into larger purpose.

Atmosphere meeting sympathetic and cordial, Lange stating decision would be up to Cabinet and Parliament in light of information given which had greatly clarified delegations minds. At end Norwegians emphatically denied existence of pressure on them at any time and have so stated to press. Joint press release agreed.

Immediately following meeting Bryn met with Bohlen, Gross and Gen. Lemnitzer where he explained Norwegian defense plans and requirements, and transmitted list of needed equipment based on six year development program. List incomplete but indicative. Norwegians estimate completed list would amount to approximately $200 million. Bryn also mentioned necessity of building stockpiles of basic commodities such as food, fuel, etc. for civilian use to extent $100 million, but was informed we do not contemplate such assistance during first year program.

Bryn informed that we need specific information on what Norwegians plan during fiscal 1950, what forces they intend bring in, what equipment on hand, what equipment can be locally produced. We desire itemized list additional equipment thus required from outside to complete one year program, as well as information as to types of equipment presently possessed for purposes coordinating supply. List of information desired will be presented Bryn Feb 14 by military authorities. Bryn unable discuss one year plan of Norw Govt but promises info from Norway in approximately week.

Agreed that pending Norwegian decision join Pact it would be embarrassing for Norway further negotiate arms program in Washington now. Impossible state reaction of US to Norwegian requirements at moment but this will as far as possible be given promptly after military has examined list for fiscal 1950. Reaction may not, however, be in time to affect debate in Norway regarding Pact. Atmosphere meeting businesslike and apparently heartening to Norwegians who did not expect discuss details.

Acheson

1. A transcript of this meeting, dated February 11, 1949, is in Department of State file 840.20/2–1149. The Norwegian participants were the same as those present at the February 8 meeting. The U.S. participants were the Secretary, Bohlen, Hickerson, Gross, and Hulley.