857D.20/2–949

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

top secret
Participants: The Secretary
Mr. Erik Boheman, Swedish Ambassador
Mr. Benjamin M. Hulley, Chief, NOE

The Ambassador came at his request on the instruction of his Government to report on the recent Scandinavian defense talks which he had attended. He had found when he got home at the end of January that his Government had reached a decision with the consent of all important parties to enter a defense alliance with Norway and Denmark under which each country would automatically come to the defense of any of the others which was attacked on its own soil, excluding outlying territories. This was a radical change from previous Swedish policy in recent times. His country is not living in an atmosphere of fear. His Government believed that the military talks had shown that the three countries could defend a very considerable part of Scandinavia for perhaps as much as three or four months until assistance could arrive from outside. He said that Sweden would be able to equip and put in the field an army of about 700,000. His Government thought that this alliance would be the best solution for the three countries and also for the great democracies of the West. With respect to Soviet reactions to it, his Government believed that there would be the usual violent propaganda campaign but that this would not be accompanied by active measures such as occupation of Finland or moving bases nearer to the Scandinavian frontier.

I told him that I realized the seriousness of the problem, and that we proposed to give it very deep thought in all its aspects. Some points were not clear to me, for instance, would the arrangement preclude staff planning with countries or organizations outside of the group such as the North Atlantic group? He said that such consultations could not be formally arranged but, of course, there was such a thing as suggestions offered by our Service attaches in the northern capitals. I commented that this was hardly a strong enough connection and that it appeared to me that the Scandinavian group lacks sufficient strength to defend itself, and that a very important preparation for defense would be thorough preliminary staff talks. I asked whether the alliance would be based on neutrality in the sense that none of its members could have any military connection with other countries. He confirmed that this was the case. I asked what would happen if the Soviets failed to react on the limited scale he anticipated and took a [Page 90] much more vigorous line. He said in that case the Scandinavian countries would have to apply for admission into the Atlantic Pact.

He will be glad to place at our disposal his understanding of the strategic and military decisions reached by the three countries.

Dean Acheson