Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Western Europe, Volume IV

Paris Embassy File: Lot 55F43

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson)

personal and top secret

Paris, January 28, 1949.

Dear Jack: I have your letter of January 13¹ about the possibility of my finding some way of having a talk with General de Gaulle. I have given the matter further thought and have gone over our correspondence of last February and March² on the subject.

In our earlier correspondence this meeting was conceived of under two contingencies: The first would be a meeting to protect the record (i.e. to avoid the criticism that our Government was not in direct touch with one of the outstanding French political leaders) and to be sure the General knew our views. The second contingency would be in the event that we had something definite and immediate to impart to the General.

To take up the second contingency first, the General spends several days a week in Paris and I think that there would be little difficulty to arrange a meeting through his aide-de-camp if I were to request it. However, I know of nothing specific at this time which it would be essential or even desirable for us to get across to the General personally and this contingency would therefore seem to be ruled out for the time being.

The first point raises a more difficult problem. Ever since the municipal elections of October 1947, I have been a little unhappy that I did not have an easy, casual and direct contact with the General. I have also been conscious of the fact that the longer this lack of contact continued, the more difficult it would be to bring about the ultimate meeting without creating a public stir. The delicacy of the question is attributable to two main factors: first, the fact that the General is far and away the most controversial figure in France and everything he does or says is immediately magnified out of all proportion to its real importance; secondly, ever since de Gaulle’s retirement as head of the French Government, we have had a long series of coalition cabinets whose political lives have been so precarious that their fortunes have been seriously affected by minor incidents which would not even create a ripple in countries enjoying a reasonable degree of political stability. The circumstances attending Schuman’s downfall are a good case in point.

For these reasons it has been extremely difficult—and remains so—to find the ideal circumstances in which to arrange a meeting. You will recall, from my letter of March 17, 1948, that last year an informal exchange of views was made with de Gaulle’s entourage and finally word came back that the General thought it was too dangerous for us to meet at that juncture because he said that it would be impossible to keep such a meeting secret and that he feared that news of such a meeting would result in serious embarrassment to Prime Minister Schuman, which he wished to avoid at that time. (He then had hopes of reaching a satisfactory agreement with the Third Force through an agreement with Schuman.) A few days later I received a very pressing appeal from Schuman not to see the General because he said it might harm the Government’s position.

Today the circumstances are quite different. Owing to a number of factors, including the economic and financial measures taken by the present Government, the stock of the RPF is very low and our latest word is that the spirits of the General and his followers are at rock-bottom. Superficially this might suggest that the present is a good moment for me to see the General. But we have also to bear in mind the unfortunate fact that recent French coalition cabinets—and I fear this one may prove no exception to the rule—have shown an incorrigible tendency to come apart at the seams over some relatively minor question of internal politics whenever, through their own efforts or the errors of their opponents, they have achieved a measure of popularity and the external pressures holding them together have been relaxed. If the present loan is successful, as it now promises to be, the Queuille Government should theoretically be in as strong a position as any Third Force Government in the last two years. However, signs of the above-mentioned tendency are already beginning to appear and we have heard rumblings of discontent from the MRP and the Socialists, neither of whom were unduly averse to having a Radical Socialist at the helm when the going was rough, but both of whom would like to take over command themselves now that they see a prospect of somewhat easier sailing ahead.

While it was the General himself who was afraid of the meeting, an approach by me at this juncture would provide a sore temptation for his entourage to endeavor to raise the General’s falling prestige by distorting the interview into an indication that the United States was behind him. I should prefer this not to happen, particularly while the loan is under way.

I shall keep the matter very much in mind, however, and an occasion may well present itself, such as a Franco-American ceremony at which we would both normally be present, or the atmosphere may change in the next month or two so as to permit me without undue risk to arrange the meeting in Paris.

All the above does not, admittedly, take care of the criticism which I do not doubt has been voiced from time to time over the Embassy’s failure to be in direct contact with the General. As you know, however, we are in constant touch with practically all his major advisers so that, while the above criticism is unfortunate and undesirable, I sincerely believe that our Government’s best interests have not suffered as a result of the situation. I also personally believe that it is wiser to remain vulnerable to this criticism than to gamble with the fate of the present cabinet. I may add that to my knowledge there has been no meeting of the kind we have in mind between de Gaulle and my British colleague or any other diplomat.

One final word about intermediaries. There are but too many candidates among the rivals in the entourage who daily scramble for the General’s favor. The problem is to use the least unsteady one and, to judge by our experience with him and his handling of John Foster Dulles’ interview, I question whether General de Benouville would be an ideal choice. I would be more inclined to make the approach through someone like Major Guy, the General’s aide-de-camp, who is devoted to him personally and has no political axe to grind.

With all good wishes,

Very sincerely yours,

Jefferson Caffery

1. In addition to expressing the hope that Caffery might find some way of having a talk with de Gaulle, Hickerson had stated that “I think the hammering you and the boys have done on the importance of his not antagonizing non-Communist labor may have done some good” (Lot 55F43, Box 67).
2. Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. iii, pp. 622 and 629 ff.