The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Italy
Ital Amb saw Secy today and Secy took occasion, without comment: as to what Ital Govt shld do, to let him know of substance Bebler-Perkins conversation and reminded him that as he knows Perkins-reply to Bebler accurately reflects this Govt’s views on question.3 Suggest you also take suitable opportunity similarly to inform Sforza.4 Believe it desirable avoid giving any impression that by mentioning [Page 525] conversation both in Rome and in Wash we intend pressure on Itals for compromise; at same time might be open to misunderstanding if either you or Secy failed inform Itals.
Dept informing Brit Emb of Bebler–Perkins conversation.
Repeated to Belgrade as 764.
- In this telegram, not printed, Dunn expressed his conviction that the position as stated by Perkins to Bebler was the correct course for the United States. In the third paragraph he strongly recommended “that the two Governments should be left to seek solution Trieste problem without outside pressure.” (860S.00/12–149)↩
- In this telegram, not printed, Reams urged that advantages of an early settlement appeared to outweigh the advantages of continued presence of American and British troops in Trieste; that although the public stand on the declaration of March 20 needed to be maintained, this did not preclude private intimations-to the Italian Government that “we would welcome a peaceful compromise solution” (860S.00/12–149).↩
- In a memorandum of conversation of December 5, not printed, Secretary Acheson recorded: “I took occasion to advise the Ambassador [Tarchiani] that Bebler had approached Assistant Secretary Perkins to ask as a preliminary to a Yugoslav approach to the Italians on Trieste, that we urge the Italian Government to accept a compromise solution of the problem. I said that Mr. Perkins had made clear our position that we stood by the March 20, 1948 proposal and that, while we would welcome a solution of the problem satisfactory to Italy and Yugoslavia, we felt that the matter could be solved only directly between the two Governments and that we had no intention of seeking to influence either of them. I said that Ambassador Dunn would also be advising Count Sforza of the Yugoslav approach and our reply.” (Secretary’s memoranda, Lot 53D444, December 1949)↩
- In telegram 3992 of December 7, not printed, Dunn reported that he had informed Sforza of the matter without comment (860S.00/12–749).↩