840.50 Recovery/11–649: Telegram
The United States Special Representative in Europe (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
priority
Repsec 40. Personal for the Secretary and Hoffman from Harriman, with only such further distribution as they may decide. This message relates to the subject which Hoffman and I regarded as central to the meetings here; namely, ways and means to vitalize OEEC and give it top-level governmental leadership. Hoffman on his return will fill in the details. I will cover briefly the background leading to the developments since he left Paris.
From the beginning, Hoffman and I recognized that development of leadership in OEEC was essential to give meaning to any other steps projected. We pressed this subject vigorously in separate meetings with Cripps, Schuman and Van Zeeland. Hoffman again emphasized it at a group meeting with Van Zeeland, Schuman and Cripps on Tuesday evening November 1 when the form of the resolution subsequently adopted by OEEC was agreed upon. At Cripps’ request, Hoffman [Page 441] refrained from taking it up with consultative group and council as a whole, until question could be discussed with Bevin personally. Cripps maintained that since the subject was political, Bevin would want to deal with it himself, and that therefore Cripps would be embarrassed to have it raised in larger group before consultation with Bevin.
We met with Cripps and Bevin Wednesday evening, November 2. Bevin declined to release Oliver Franks for OEEC position, as Hoffman will explain. The discussion then turned to consideration of what the job should be and of available personalities. Bevin gave the impression that he was prepared to support the plan and the selection of Spaak. (As we left, Cripps said he thought Bevin was 75 percent persuaded.) Specifically, Bevin agreed to arrange an informal meeting of 12 participating ministers still in Paris attending Council of Europe. The objective of this meeting would be to discuss the creation of the position and the selection of an individual. It was understood of course that if agreement among these ministers could be reached, the absent members would be appropriately consulted. Bevin specifically asked Hoffman to attend to present the American viewpoint. Hoffman agreed to come back from Frankfort or London on Thursday or Friday (November 3 or 4), if Bevin could arrange such a meeting. In fact, Hoffman agreed to consider staying over another day if necessary, although he pointed out that I would be available in any event. On Thursday afternoon, I sent word to Bevin that Hoffman was still awaiting a message from him as to the time of the meeting and I repeated that he was available to be in Paris any time Friday or would stay over until Saturday. I got back word from Bevin that he had been so far too occupied with the Council of Europe to arrange the meeting.
I heard nothing further until much to my surprise MacBride1 called on me Friday evening to tell me that Bevin had arranged a meeting of the 12 ministers Friday afternoon at which the question had been discussed for an hour and a half. He reported that Bevin had most skillfully played down the importance of the matter and given encouragement to opposition that came from the Scandinavian countries and Stikker. Schuman, although correcting Bevin’s presentation of what we had in mind, did not take a vigorous position. MacBride said that he himself supported the proposal as vigorously as he could and in fact offered to resign his position as vice chairman of the council in favor of Spaak if he were selected in the belief that that would avoid any need to amend the convention. In conclusion, the matter was referred to the council on the official level, with the understanding [Page 442] that if any member wished he could circularize the council outlining his position. This of course is tantamount to shelving the matter since it is inconceivable that the officials can deal with such a highly political question.
Since then I have seen Van Zeeland, Stikker and Sforza,2 who substantially confirm the above, although with the expected variations in interpretation and emphasis. Bruce tells me that in a meeting he had with Bevin and Schuman Friday evening to discuss Acheson’s visit,3 Bevin said that he had tried his best about the matter but had failed. It would appear from the reports that Bevin’s best efforts were directed at smothering the proposal, and he succeeded.
Saturday morning early, I telephoned Ambassador Harvey,4 asking him to tell Bevin I was still awaiting word and suggested that Bevin might want to talk to me. As a result, Assistant Under Secretary Berthoud called on me to report to me at Bevin’s request the outcome of the meeting, which was not in any substantial respect at variance with the previous reports. He explained that under the circumstances it was not necessary for Hoffman to return to Paris. I showed surprise that Hoffman had not been invited to the meeting in accordance with our definite understanding. Berthoud replied that Bevin was under the impression that Hoffman was to come if the ministers generally favored the idea in order to work out details. I explained to Berthoud that the effect of Cripps’ request for delay and Bevin’s failure to invite Hoffman to attend the meeting had resulted in Hoffman’s inability to carry out one of the central points of his visit; namely, a discussion with the ministers of this vital subject. I asked Berthoud to explain this to Bevin and suggest that it would be well for Bevin and me to have a talk prior to Acheson’s arrival.
I feel that we now should face up to the situation. It seems clear that we can no longer tolerate this type of maneuver by the British. The OEEC organization is unsatisfactory and ways must be found to bring the governments, rather than officials, into the direction of OEEC affairs. I am convinced that as the organization is now set up, there is no hope for cooperation on as significant and effective a basis as American policy requires. The resolutions taken by the OEEC at the recent meeting of the council are not likely to have much meaning unless there is a driving force which does not now exist to translate words into action.
I hope that the situation can be discussed between Acheson and Hoffman before the former’s departure for Paris, and that Acheson will be prepared to discuss it as a question of high priority with Bevin [Page 443] and Schuman. It is in my opinion essential to have a firm agreement from both the British and the French that they will give their full support to a definite method for making OEEC an effective organization. In light of what has happened, I am inclined to believe that the appointment of Spaak or anyone else on a proper basis, is perhaps no longer feasible. This makes the job all the harder, but the ministers must find a way to get it done.
As an additional factor, I should mention that the ministers I have talked with reported their disappointment over the meeting of the Council of Europe and Bevin’s negative attitude. It seems to me clear that the whole situation has serious implications for the attainment of our objectives in Europe. I will look forward to further discussion with Acheson on arrival in Paris.
Sent Department Repsec 40, repeated London unnumbered eyes only for Douglas and Kenney;5 repeated Paris unnumbered eyes only for Bruce.
- Seán MacBride, Irish Minister for External Affairs.↩
- Count Carlo Sforza, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.↩
- Documentation on Secretary Acheson’s visit to Paris, November 9–40, to discuss the German question is in volume iii, chapter iv, part B.↩
- Sir Oliver Charles Harvey, British Ambassador to France.↩
- W. John Kenney, Chief of the ECA Mission in the United Kingdom.↩