840.20/12–3148
The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Forrestal)
Dear Jim: I have your letter of December 31,1 enclosing the memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject of “Base Rights for the United States in Return for Military Aid to Foreign Nations.”2
[Page 38]Since there do exist certain political considerations which it will be important for us to keep in mind in dealing with these matters, I am glad that you raised this subject.
The unilateral maintenance of military bases by this country on the territory of other countries involves considerable disadvantage from the political point of view. It tends to emphasize unduly and undesirably the dependence of other countries upon the United States and carries with it a strong implication that the United States would undertake to defend in its entirety the territory of the country on which the base is established. It furthermore has obvious propaganda disadvantages in that it provides a convenient object on which to focus anti-American and nationalist feeling for the nation concerned.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recognized in Admiral Leahy’s memorandum that they have in mind in this connection primarily the members of Western Union and those other countries which may become parties to the proposed North Atlantic Pact. It is our thought that any North Atlantic Pact which may be concluded would provide for some sort of consultation among the members on military and security matters. Under this framework, careful studies would be conducted, probably among a limited number of the members of the group, of the security problem of the North Atlantic area. If these studies indicated the advisability of the maintenance of military bases of one sort or another on the territory of any member in such a manner that they could be immediately utilized by forces of other members in case of war, the member in question would be approached by the group as a whole and would be asked to make such bases available to the group as a whole. It might then be a matter for the military consultative body to determine which member or members of the group should man and maintain those bases in peacetime. In certain instances, the United States would obviously be the most suitable power to fulfill this function.
The concept would be one of a coordinated defense program under which each country would contribute, commensurate with its resources and geographic location, what it most effectively could whether in facilities (base rights), manpower, resources or in other ways. A collective approach to this problem may also be advantageous from another point of view since the countries in which base rights are most important are not necessarily those most anxious to obtain military equipment.
However, should any member of the North Atlantic Pact be uncooperative in implementing measures recommended for the assurance of the security of the North Atlantic area, this would undoubtedly be a factor to be taken into account by this Government in responding to [Page 39] any request for military assistance which that member might have advanced.
In this way, I think that a clear connection can be established between granting of military aid and negotiations for base rights. We do not envisage, however, that the United States would unilaterally demand such rights from other members of the pact. This would be inconsistent with the spirit of the pact and would, encourage the assumption of the very thesis we are trying to avoid: namely, that it is only the United States which has a real interest in thwarting Russian expansion and that the others are entitled to expect us to bargain with them to induce them to take measures essential to the defense of the North Atlantic community.3
Sincerely yours,
- Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. iii, p. 347.↩
- Scheduled for publication in ibid., volume i .↩
- Forrestal acknowledged this letter on January 21, indicating that he was making it available to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration in their more detailed studies. (840.20/1–2149)↩