840.20/1–1449: Telegram
The Ambassador in Sweden (Matthews) to the Acting Secretary of State
53. The Karlstad formula is in my view completely contrary to the whole conception of the Vandenberg resolution; its avoidance of any provision for mutual aid either to the US or; to other Western European countries outside Scandinavia is against both the spirit and the letter of that basic document. The essence (Copenhagen’s telegram 27, January 13 [12] to Department) of the Danish arguments for US blessing on Karlstad formula seems to be that (1) we are relieved of the burden of defending Norway and particularly Denmark (2) we gain Swedish agreement to go to war in defense of Denmark and/or Norway (3) we lose nothing essential re Greenland and Faroes.
As to (1) I assume that decision to invite Norway and Denmark to join Atlantic Pact was based on our overall conclusion that advantage would accrue to our national security from their membership. I do not see how their failure to adhere would lessen their importance to us strategically, nor lessen our real interest in defending them if they are attacked. On the other hand their non-adherence to the Atlantic Pact plus their membership in a rigidly neutral Nordic bloc (Sweden will accept no Scandinavian alliance at this time which would permit anything but absolute neutrality by any of its members) would prevent us from the vitally important prior planning, coordination and other advance preparations for their defense which are so essential in modern warfare if such defense is to be in any way effective. Of possibly greater importance the Karlstad formula completely ignores the whole conception of the Atlantic Pact as a preventive or deterrent to war by serving notice on the Soviet Union that an attack on any pact member is an attack on all and is an attack on an Atlantic [Page 26] group pledged and ready to act in concert. If Norway and Denmark as members of such a pact are in fact a burden to us, may not the same apply to other prospective European members with the exception of Britain? Why then have an Atlantic Pact at all?
As to (2) the argument is based on a tragic over-estimate of Swedish military strength both as a fighting power and as a source of military supply for Norway and Denmark. I emphasized in mytel 1206 October 27 [28] (see also mytel 30, January 10, 2 p. m.)1 that the Swedes were utilizing this argument with same effect in their efforts to deter Danes and Norwegians from any association with the west. As I have pointed out in the past the Swedish Army has no training either by unit or by staff for anything larger than a battalion. Its Navy with few exceptions is unequipped with radar. All western military observers here are agreed that Sweden’s ability to defend itself, let alone Denmark and Norway, against any Russian attack is at best limited to a period of weeks. It is fantastic to conceive that a Swedish commitment to defend Norway and Denmark has any basis of reality unless coordinated with the west. Surely the realists in the Kremlin would never consider a Swedish commitment to defend Norway and Denmark as any serious deterrent for any plans in that regard the Soviet may have. Whatever treaty commitment Sweden might make to defend Denmark, I am certain that Sweden would have neither the ability nor the will to make such commitment really effective.
As to (3) while I cannot, of course, speak with any knowledge, it is inconceivable to me that in the world situation today Denmark would wish to oust us from Greenland.
I feel strongly that acceptance of the Karlstad formula by us would be generally interpreted in Sweden, in Moscow, and elsewhere as a diplomatic setback for us of the first order and that it might well have serious consequences for the whole Atlantic project and for our success in the vital task of coordinating the defensive strength of all western countries now living in fear of Soviet aggression.
Sent Department 53 repeated Copenhagen 14, Oslo 13, London 18, Paris 19, Moscow 11.2
- Neither printed.↩
- In telegram No. 104, January 15 from Moscow, Chargé Kohler answered as follows: “Desire record our agreement Stockholm’s 53, January 14, to Department, particularly as regards estimates Kremlin attitude, i.e., that Swedish commitment defend Norway and Denmark would not be considered serious obstacle and that acceptance Karlstad formula would be regarded as serious setback for US (conversely as Soviet diplomatic, propaganda victory).” (840.20/1–1549)↩