Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Western Europe, Volume IV

840.20/9–1449

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

top secret

[Washington,] September 14, 1949.

Participants:	Mr. Bevin
	Sir Oliver Franks
	Sir Gladwyn Jebb
	Sir Roger Makins
	Mr. Barclay1
	Mr. Acheson
	Ambassador Jessup
	Mr. McGhee2
	Mr. Thompson3
	Mr. Achilles
	Mr. Satterthwaite

1. Atlantic Pact

Bevin opened by saying that the Working Group on the Atlantic Pact has almost made it unnecessary for him to stay in Washington for the council.

He thought that we should persuade Italy to withdraw its claim to be a member of the standing group. If Sforza made a speech pressing this claim, he might draw some curt replies from some of the other countries. I said we would do our best to prevent Sforza from raising this issue in the meeting. We see no reason why Italy should be in a standing group. We might change the name of the regional group to the “Southern European-Western Mediterranean Group” and give further assurances for full coordination between the groups, if that would help Sforza. Bevin repeated that from the British point of view, it was most important to keep Italy off the standing group. I agreed.

Bevin then said he had been perturbed about our unwillingness to be full members of the European regional groups. He would like us to be full partners in all their activities. He understood our military and political difficulties but hoped we would take as active a part as possible and be represented by high ranking officers who could speak authoritatively for the Joint Chiefs. The French had tried to get the British to make specific commitments on their contribution of ground forces. The British feared being caught between pressure from the French for commitments in advance of or outside the grand plan and our unwillingness to furnish information on our own plans adequate to enable the British to make theirs. The British, like us, must pay due attention to global strategy.

Bevin then stated that he understood from his advisers that, if he submitted two questions on our position he would receive an answer which, while not all that he would desire, would be the best we could give. He handed me the attached Aide-Mémoire and I handed him the attached reply.⁴

I went on to say that we also were pressed by various countries for specific commitments which we were not in a position to give. We realized the British problem but believed that such matters could be discussed bilaterally much better than in the regional groups. The Joint Chiefs of Staff could not be expected at this time either specifically to define “participation as appropriate” or to express complete views on the strategic conduct of a war. Our unwillingness to commit our forces on a piece-meal basis did not imply any dodging of responsibility.

Bevin then said that if Britain fully met the French desire for commitments on the continent, there would be no troops left for the Middle East. I said we could handle that between ourselves. He asked how much pressure the French had recently been exerting on us and was advised that the fact that the French were to be members of the Standing Group had temporarily reduced the pressure but that it would of course be renewed as soon as the organization began to function.

Bevin then referred to the Economic and Financial Committee. He said Cripps agreed that it was desirable to delay establishing it. I agreed.

Bevin suggested that there be an Economic and Financial Committee on the ministerial level as well as one on the expert level. I thought that it would be a mistake to have too many committees, a Financial and Economic Committee at a high level with whatever special assistance was necessary would do. Bevin agreed.

In reply to Bevin’s inquiry as to whether the Council would finish on Saturday Mr. Achilles said the only problems remaining were those raised by Sforza and that the discussions should be finished Saturday.

I said that if the MAP passed Congress in its present form, a hundred million would be available immediately and four hundred million only when there was a plan. Achilles said we had reminded the other countries of this and hoped that following the October 5th meeting and the military meeting immediately thereafter, planning would begin at once.

Attachment A

Aide-Mémoire

The Working Party is recommending the setting up under the Atlantic Pact of five regional groups to prepare detailed plans for possible war. Two of these groups, the North Atlantic Ocean Group and the United States-Canadian Group, are regions in which the United States is geographically located and the United States have announced their intention of playing a full part in all their activities. In the other three groups, the North European, the Western European, and the Western Mediterranean, which will probably be located in Europe, the United States provide for their participation in the following terms:—

“The United States have been requested and have agreed to participate actively in the defence planning as appropriate.”

The British Chiefs of Staff have not yet been able to find out from their United States colleagues what precise form of participation this formula is intended to embrace and we are therefore still somewhat in the dark. But we feel very strongly that the fullest United States participation in these groups is essential to the success of the Pact both from the military and the political points of view. The United States and British Chiefs of Staff are both agreed that the real work—the work which will make defence under the Atlantic Pact a reality—has got to be done in the regions. The idea that this important work should be carried out with anything less than the full cooperation of the United States seems to us to be quite out of tune with the whole Atlantic Pact conception.

As we see it the two essentials are:—

(a) that United States representatives be appointed to play an active role in the work of the three European Regional Planning Groups;

(b) that these representatives should be in a position authoritatively to represent the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff.

In our view, failure of the United States to associate themselves with the European Regions on the above basis will mean that the existing Western European Organisation will slowly die.

Washington, 14th September, 1949.

Attachment B

Aide-Mémoire

The United States will appoint representatives to play an active role in the work of the three European regional planning groups within the limits of the policy of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, and it is hoped that their work will lead to the further development of policy by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as may be necessary.

Washington, September 14, 1949.

1. Roderick E. Barclay, Principal Private Secretary to the British Foreign Minister.
2. George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and African Affairs.
3. Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.
4. This arrangement was worked out by Achilles and Jebb and was approved by British authorities and by the Office of the Secretary of Defense after consultation with representatives of the Director of the Joint Staff. Acheson was briefed on the plan by a memorandum directed to him by Achilles on September 14; not printed (740.5/9–1450).