840.20/9–349: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Italy

top secret
priority

niact

2033. Embtel 2734 [2734–A] Sept. 2.1 Believe advisable you see De Gasperi Sept 2 if possible before Sept 5 meeting2 and go over with him substance Deptel 1946, Aug. 26.3 Impress on him that Ital Govt [Page 324] must not instruct Sforza to assume adamant position in forthcoming Council meeting which would have effect of delaying establishment Pact organization. In view probable Congressional action making MAP contingent upon operation Pact machinery, it is imperative that Pact organization be established immediately and begin work forthwith.

All Pact members realize necessity Ital participation as appropriate in Western European Regional Planning Group but attitude of most Brussels Pact nations seems to us to place question of full membership for Italy in Western European Group without the realm of possibility. Therefore, Ital insistence on this point to extent of introducing delay in setting up organization might result in consequences onus of which would fall squarely on Italy and which other Pact members are certainly not prepared accept.4

Acheson
  1. Not printed.
  2. Meeting of Italy’s Supreme Council of Defense in Rome.
  3. In telegram 1946, not printed, Acheson reported that in the NAP working group meeting of August 25, the Italian representative had first questioned the need for a formal Steering and Executive Group in the NAP organization, and had then stated his belief that his government’s position would be that Italy should participate in such a group if it were formed, and should also be an equal member of the proposed Western European Regional Planning Group. Acheson expressed his sympathy for the Italian viewpoint but requested Ambassador Dunn to impress upon Sforza the impracticality of the Italian representative’s request and the danger of its antagonizing the other members of the organization. (840.20/8–2649)
  4. Ambassador Dunn, in his answering telegram 2744 of September 5, not printed, reported that in conversation that morning De Gasperi had told him that he could understand the U.S. position but he hoped that a formula could be found which might prevent severe criticism from the political opposition in his country’s approaching political campaign (840.20/9–549).