840.20/6–2149: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France
2471. Following reply handed Bonnet today to Schuman’s aide-mémoire of June 16 (Embtel 2534, Jun 21):
“The Govt of the US cannot overemphasize the importance which it attaches to the North Atlantic Pact. The Pact is a collective undertaking and the question of its ratification is one to which no unilateral assurances can attach. Rather, the Treaty must be considered on its own merits by the signatories in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.
The view of this Govt, which it understands is shared by the French Govt, is that the Pact, by making clear the intention of the signatories [Page 308] resolutely and collectively to resist armed attack should it occur, will exert a powerful deterrent effect on any nation which might be considering such an attack against any of them. The ravages of war in any country can be avoided with certainty only by preventing war from starting. It is this priceless benefit which the Pact is designed to go far toward assuring all the participating nations.
If, despite the existence of the Pact and all the efforts of its members in the interest of peace, the aggressive designs of some nation should lead it to attack a Party, each of the other Parties would be committed to assist the Party attacked by taking such action as it deems necessary to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. The strategic policy necessary to achieve that objective cannot, of course, be determined now but will depend upon the success achieved in building collective defense capacity before an armed attack occurs, on the development of combined planning, and the situation as it develops in connection with such an attack. The French Government will nevertheless have noted various public statements made by high officials of the United States Government in this connection. For example, the Honorable Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense, stated in a speech before the National War College on June 21:
‘Because the United States could not—without grave distress to the civilized world—abandon Western Europe to enemy occupation with the later promise of liberation, our long-term strategy—in the event of war—must rest in the containment and thereafter in the defeat of an aggressor’s land-army strength. To live in preparation for so onerous a wartime task, the Army must plan for the rapid mobilization of its mechanized manpower. And it must compensate for our numerical disadvantage both by the destructiveness of its firepower and the mobility of its maneuver.’
General Omar N. Bradley, Chief of Staff of the United States Army has also made various statements of a similar character.
With respect to future military organization under the North Atlantic Treaty, the United States Govt believes that it would be inappropriate for this question to be the subject of public statement before it has been discussed by the signatories and put into operation after the Treaty comes into force. However, as the Govt of the French Republic is aware, this Govt is fully conscious of the important part that France must play in that organization. The position of France in the organization would certainly be no less important than that of any other Party.
The Govt of the US would like to reiterate its belief that only by determined efforts on the part of all Parties can the objectives of the Treaty be achieved. In this connection, great importance attaches to the undertaking in Article 3 to maintain and develop collective defensive [Page 309] capacity through ‘continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid’. The Govt of the French Republic will recall that the President of the US has stated his intention to ask the Congress to provide legislation at this session authorizing this Govt to furnish military assistance to the other signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty and to certain other countries.
Questions asked by a number of Senators during the recent hearings on the Treaty indicate that the Senate’s consideration of the Treaty, and to an even greater extent the Congress’ consideration of military assistance legislation, will be materially influenced by the extent to which other signatories have shown, through action upon the Treaty, through public opinion as reflected in parliamentary debates upon ratification, and through other actions and statements relating to defense, that they are not merely interested in securing benefits for themselves under the Treaty and from the legislation but that they are truly determined to do their utmost to defend themselves and to contribute their full share to the security of the North Atlantic area as a whole.”