Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Western Europe, Volume IV

840.20/6–549: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

top secret
priority

London, June 5, 1949—8 p. m.

2187. For FASC and FACC from ECC. Personal for Webb, Johnson, Hoffman from Douglas, Harriman, Huebner and Taggart.¹ First item on agenda ECC meeting June 2² was question of effect in Europe of delay in consideration MAP legislation until next session of Congress. Reports from Washington indicate that present congressional calendar may necessitate such delay.

Unfortunately this possibility has already become general knowledge Europe as result reports in press under Washington date line, and has already caused some apprehension.

We are of unanimous opinion that delay in consideration of MAP legislation until next session would have seriously adverse effect on total situation in Western Europe. Briefly our opinion based on following reasons:

1. Canada and US are taking momentous step of linking their defense and security with Europe through Atlantic Pact. Having taken this positive and unprecedented step with its heartening effect throughout free Europe, a delay in MAP would raise question in minds of some continental European countries and people that we are lukewarm in intent to give effective support to the Pact by affirmative action. The implementation of Article III of Pact is viewed in many places on continent as of equal if not perhaps greater significance than Article V. In Europe the hope that the Pact will be an effective deterrent to war rests not only on the intent of all parties to act together when and if war comes but also on their intent to rebuild military strength by mutual aid so that it is a tangible proof of a strong military posture in Europe and an ability as well as an intent to resist aggression. Serious delay in acting on MAP would resurrect old doubts and uncertainties as to dependability and consistency of US foreign policy. It would give renewed force to those elements in Europe who have supported the illusion of appeasement and neutrality against those who have courageously led their governments to place their security in the Atlantic Pact concept. It would result in setback to our general position in Western Europe. We would lose the momentum that has been created as result of our consistent efforts over the past two years to restore strength and assurance in the political, economic, and military fields in Europe.

2. Although confidence has steadily strengthened, there still remains in Western Europe a deep latent feeling of insecurity, a feeling which springs from the fear that Western Europe cannot now be defended against Soviet invasion and that our military power cannot be brought to bear in Western Europe in time to prevent forcible occupation. Our farreaching political and economic efforts over the past two years, and our intent to assist rearmament which has been widely disseminated by the press, have played unquestionably vital part in rebuilding confidence and in strengthening the will to resist. But delay now in MAP would bring back old fears that our intentions are not to help defend but only to accept the necessity for another liberation of Western Europe. The people of Western Europe know that their civilization will not survive Soviet occupation. It is the opinion of those working intimately with the Western Union organization that a lengthy postponement of MAP would stop much effective work.

3. Relapse into this fear and insecurity would retard economic recovery, and would play into hands of Communist and fellow-travelling elements. In view of Communist strength in France and Italy, and the sensitivity of large segments of population to propaganda, political stability as well as economic recovery might be jeopardized in these countries by seeming slackening of US interest in MAP.

4. Present indications of Atlantic Pact powers intent to rearm and increase military potential are encouraging. For some time now slowly increasing assurance in face of Soviet has been evidenced. If this important upswing is suddenly halted by seeming slackening of US interest, retrogression will set in. To reverse the process again and regain the upswing may be immensely costly, if indeed it can be fully regained. Delay of legislation which would provide for some military equipment and augmented local production for armed forces would play their part in halting the upward trend, adversely affect morale, and provide Soviets opportunity to capitalize on our seeming vacillation.

We reiterate our deep concern and emphatic recommendation that all possible efforts be made to have Congress consider and act upon MAP legislation earliest date possible during current session.³

Sent Department 2187, repeated Paris 393 for Bruce, Rome 77 for Dunn, Oslo 23 for Bay, Copenhagen 14 for Sparks, Brussels 113 for Millard, The Hague 100 for Baruch. [Douglas, Harriman, Huebner, and Taggart.]

Douglas

1. Under Secretary of State James Webb; Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson; ECA Administrator, Paul G. Hoffman; Lt. Gen. C. R. Huebner, Acting American Military Governor in Germany and Acting Commander in Chief, European Command; and Joseph H. Taggart, U.S. Representative to the Military Committee on Equipment and Armament.
2. Summary minutes of this second meeting of the European Correlation Committee, held in London, dated June 2, 1949, are in Department of State file No. 840.00/6–1449.
3. Under Secretary of State Webb, in a memorandum dated June 10, not printed, said that President Truman had told him on the preceding day that he had read telegram 2187 from London, agreed with the reasoning presented therein, and wanted all officials of the Department and the various Embassies concerned with the matter to maintain an attitude of confidence with the assurance that he would take every occasion to urge the program’s enactment. (Secretary’s Memoranda, Lot 53 D 444, June 1949)