Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Western Europe, Volume IV

840.20/4–2649: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

secret

London, April 26, 1949—8 p. m.

1600. For Secretary and FACC. Following are Embassy’s views on possible British reaction to congressional handling of MAP legislation:

1. As result acceptance by US, particularly during past two years, of wide responsibility in international matters, there is now great confidence here in consistency of US policy and dependability of US as potential ally in event of aggression. US–UK unity is regarded as fundamental to British foreign and defense policy and every precaution will continue to be taken to minimize differences with US. These views hold throughout British Government as well as general public. It may therefore be expected that regardless of what may occur in connection with MAP legislation and regardless of what the real feelings may be, the Government will probably try to put best possible interpretation on the outcome of MAP. The following comments must be viewed in the light of the foregoing general proposition.

2. We feel there would be a strong, and possibly an openly adverse, reaction here if MAP was financed through cuts in ECA. If ECA is to be cut it should, we think, be justified solely on grounds of economic recovery and should be wholly unrelated to MAP. The two programs should be kept separate and distinct.

3. There will also be a strong and open adverse reaction if unilateral or onerous conditions were attached to MAP by congressional action. Such legislative conditions might be, for example, insistence on specific military and air base rights or attachment of extraneous conditions as quid pro quo for aid. This would not of course preclude arrangements for air base or other military rights in agreement with British either under MAP or under Article 3 of the North Atlantic Pact. In fact US bombers are using British air bases at the moment. There would also be unfavorable reaction to legislative limitation on assistance to recipients because of possible differences over matters unrelated to defense of Western Europe; i.e. with Holland over Indonesia, France over Indochina or UK over Palestine. Similarly, any indication that UK should curtail social welfare and housing or similar expenditures and redeploy Government expenditures to defense front as an imposed legislative condition of US aid, would provoke most serious reaction here.

4. If MAP appropriation is reduced below the presently contemplated, it need not provoke adverse reaction, (a) if dollars bear no direct relation to real value of equipment, and publicity is concentrated on increased military posture made possible by such physical aid; and (b) if Britain is provided enough dollar aid to pay hard currency costs of her expanded program. Adequacy of MAP from British viewpoint will not necessarily therefore depend on size of appropriation.

5. If Congress should fail to pass enabling legislation, regardless of size of appropriation, it would come as a real shock to the British, for it would again give rise to grave doubts as to consistence and reliability of US in international affairs, and it would cause British to review their own plans for expanding defense arrangements, especially where dollars are involved.

6. What would worry the British most is the effect on the Continent, particularly France, if any failure to pass enabling legislation or make adequate MAP revision. The British “will to resist” Russia is so strong that it would take much more than one shock to affect it. But the British do not have the same confidence in France, where such a shock might have serious psychological consequences.

Sent Department 1600; repeated Paris 297 for Harriman.

Douglas