Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Western Europe, Volume IV

840.20/4–249

Minutes of a Conference of Foreign Ministers at Washington, April 2, 1949, 11 a. m.

Washington, April 2, 1949, 11 a.m.

top secret

Participants:	Belgium
	Mr. Paul-Henri Spaak, Baron Silvercruys, Messieurs Walter Loridan, Conrad Seyfert, Roger Taymans, Robert Vaes
	Canada
	Messieurs L. B. Pearson, H. Hume Wrong, T. A. Stone, [A. L.] Wright, R. L. Rogers
	Denmark
	Messieurs Gustav Rasmussen, Henrik de Kauffmann, Frants Hvaas, Povl Bang-Jensen
	France
	Messieurs Robert Schuman, Henri Bonnet, Maurice Couve de Murville, Armand Bérard
	Iceland
	Messieurs Bjarni Benediktsson, Thor Thors, Hans Andersen
	Italy
	Count Sforza, Messieurs Alberto Tarchiani, Gastone Guidotti, Mario Mondello, Mario Luciolli
	Luxembourg
	Messieurs Joseph Bech, Hugues Le Gallais
	The Netherlands
	Messieurs Dirk U. Stikker, E. N. van Kleffens, O. Reuchlin, C. Vreede
	Norway
	Messieurs Halvard Lange, Wilhelm Munthe de Morgenstierne, Eigil Nygaard, Sivert A. Nielsen
	Portugal
	Messieurs José Caeiro da Matta, Pedro Theotónio Pereira, Antonio Faria, Manuel Rocheta, José Duarte Figueiredo
	United Kingdom
	Mr. Ernest Bevin, Sir Oliver Franks, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, Sir F. R. Hoyer Millar, Messieurs J. N. Henderson, R. E. Barclay
	United States
	Messieurs Dean Acheson, Charles Bohlen, Ernest Gross, J. D. Hickerson, T. C. Achilles, W. J. Galloway

Mr. Acheson welcomed the Foreign Ministers and said that it was an honor to have them in Washington. This honor was even greater when it was remembered that the Ministers had come for a purpose which was full of significance and hope for the world.

Mr. Acheson suggested that the first order of business should be the question of formal approval on behalf of governments of the text of the Treaty.¹ He mentioned that he had in his possession the engrossed copy of the Treaty which would be signed on Monday. He thought that everyone had both English and French copies of the text. He asked if there was any objection to unanimous approval of the text. Since no objection was voiced, he assumed that the text was approved.

He proposed for consideration and discussion the question of determining a method for proceeding after the signature of the Treaty to the formation and establishment of the organization created under the Treaty. He had in mind the council, the defense committee, and any other subsidiary bodies which might be deemed appropriate. He did not think that agreement should be reached on the various aspects of this question until the Treaty had been ratified and had gone into effect, but he thought considerable time might be saved by a discussion of certain principles during the present meeting. The matter could then be turned over to a working group representing all the signatories, for further development.

Mr. Acheson stated briefly the preliminary thinking of the United States representatives. It was considered that the council might be composed either of the Foreign Ministers of the signatory countries or of plenipotentiaries representing the chiefs of state. The choice might be left open in each case to the signatory governments. There were many reasons why the Foreign Ministers might prefer to have someone other than themselves on the council. However, there might be occasions when they would wish to be present on the council.

With reference to the defense committee, he thought it might be composed of representatives of the Ministers of Defense and that other arrangements might be worked out for a military representation in connection with the strategic planning. He assumed that the defense committee would have duties other than strictly professional military duties. There would be questions of supply, arms, and other pertinent military matters where the Ministers of Defense or their representatives might have an important role to play. The actual planning obviously was a professional military matter. He asked for views of the other representatives.

Mr. Rasmussen asked if any thought had been given as to where the council and the defense committee would sit. He thought this aspect would have some influence on the choice of representatives. Mr. Acheson thought that would be a matter for the members of the council to determine—also, the working group would probably be able to explore this aspect further.

Mr. Bevin understood that the first point was whether the Foreign Ministers would attend all the meetings of the council or whether their governments could appoint other representatives. Since he did not want to be permanently away from home, he thought that governments should be allowed to designate representatives other than the Foreign Ministers. However, he thought it was a reasonable suggestion that governments could, if they desired, send Foreign Ministers. He assumed it was intended that the Foreign Ministers would be primarily responsible, but could arrange for other representation on the council. If that was the intention, he supported it.

Mr. Acheson said that it was his thought that representatives on the council should have plenipotentiary powers.

Mr. Bevin referred to Mr. Acheson’s comments on the division of functions between the defense committee and a strategic planning body. He, Mr. Bevin, thought it essential that the defense committee should be on the Defense Minister level because of the closely associated supply, finance, and other functions which would have to be performed as a part of the defense work. He supported Mr. Ache-son’s idea in principle but thought it essential that a working party be appointed to work out the details.

Mr. Schuman thought that the proposal made by Mr. Acheson corresponded to the needs of the task ahead. He, Mr. Schuman, believed that the choice of the delegates other than the Foreign Ministers should be left to each government. It should be understood, however, that a delegate other than the Foreign Minister would not be a deputy of the Foreign Minister but should be a plenipotentiary of his government. Delegates should have full powers at any meeting. As to representation on the defense committee, each government should be left to choose its representative. It might be that special delegates would be selected. With regard to the question of strategic planning, he thought it might be advisable to have a smaller group. At least, the possibilities should be considered.

Count Sforza agreed with the comments of Mr. Bevin and Mr. Schuman. He, Count Sforza, wondered if it would not be useful, for the purposes of general policy, to detach the question of deciding the authority of the defense committee and related matters from the general problems. He thought it proper that such questions concerning the defense committee should go to the council.

Mr. Acheson said it was his understanding, based on Article 9, that the defense committee would make recommendations to the council and the council would make recommendations governments. He thought that the point Count Sforza had raised would, therefore, be met. Mr. Acheson asked if there were other comments and, since none were forthcoming, assumed that the discussion represented a general directive of the Foreign Ministers. If each Foreign Minister would inform him as to representatives on the working party, that party could be constituted and could begin work in the light of the discussion just concluded.

Mr. Caeiro da Matta stated that his country had a Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression with Spain. This was not, of course, the only treaty that his country had concluded. For instance, it had a treaty with the United Kingdom. However, in 1939 Portugal signed a Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression with Spain and in 1940 signed an additional Protocol to that Treaty. In this connection, he wondered how Article 8 of the North Atlantic Treaty should be interpreted. His Government had consulted with the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, who had expressed their views. He interpreted the opinion of the United States Government as meaning that there was no inconsistency between the Portuguese-Spanish Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty. The Government of the United Kingdom had expressed a similar opinion. He wanted to be quite certain as to how Article 8 should be interpreted. Should it be interpreted to the effect that the signing of the Treaty was not compatible with any treaties entered into previously, or, on the contrary, should it be interpreted as meaning that the North Atlantic Treaty was in no way inconsistent with the treaties Portugal had entered into previously?

Mr. Acheson observed that the question posed by Mr. Caeiro da Matta already had been the subject of comment by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom. He, Mr. Acheson, presumed that in Article 8 there was an undertaking that each Party declared that none of the international engagements in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third state were in conflict with the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Government of Portugal had declared that its treaties with Spain and with the United Kingdom were not in conflict with the North Atlantic Treaty. The Government of Portugal had asked the opinion of the United States Government, which had replied that it did not consider Portugal’s other treaties to be in conflict with the North Atlantic Treaty. Mr. Acheson thought that Mr. Caeiro da Matta wanted to know if any of the Foreign Ministers had a different view.

Mr. Spaak was not certain that the question as Mr. Acheson had summarized it was exactly the same as posed by Mr. Caeiro da Matta. He, Mr. Spaak, was not certain that Mr. Caeiro da Matta had asked the Foreign Ministers to express opinions as to whether treaties between Portugal and Spain and Portugal and the United Kingdom were or were not consistent with the North Atlantic Treaty. Mr. Spaak did not think the Foreign Ministers would be able to answer a question of that type. He, for one, did not know the exact terms of the two treaties in question. Moreover, he thought that this question was outside the scope of Article 8, which he interpreted as being a unilateral declaration of each signatory government and engaging the responsibility of that government only. It was for each Party to declare that the North Atlantic Treaty was not in contradiction to any other treaty it had signed. Each Party was responsible for its own declaration.

Mr. Caeiro da Matta said that the question was a very simple one in the eyes of his Government and he did not think it was the question outlined by Mr. Spaak. The Portuguese position was entirely different. The Portuguese Government had studied the North Atlantic Treaty and had posed to itself the question: Was the Treaty compatible with the treaties Portugal had signed previously, or was it not compatible with those treaties?

Portugal had always honored the treaties it signed and if the North Atlantic Treaty was incompatible with previous ones, or had the effect of nullifying previous ones, Portugal’s position would be difficult.

Mr. Bevin said that Portugal and the United Kingdom had a treaty which was probably the oldest in the world, having endured some six hundred years. It must have been a good treaty to last so long. In the late war it was operative, particularly in relation to the Azores, and had been brought into operation immediately upon request. It had been very useful and effective in anti-submarine warfare. He thought there was no conflict between the United Kingdom-Portuguese Treaty and the North Atlantic Pact, and so far as he knew, between the Pact and the Portuguese-Spanish Treaty.

Mr. Lange, associating himself with the interpretation of Article 8 given by Mr. Spaak, suggested that if anything were to be done collectively with the question raised by Mr. Caeiro da Matta, the Foreign Ministers take note of the declaration of the Portuguese Government to the effect that there was no inconsistency between engagements entered into under the agreement with the United Kingdom and the agreement with Spain. Also, note could be taken of the concurring opinions expressed by the United States and the United Kingdom representatives to that effect. Beyond that Mr. Lange thought it would not be proper for the other representatives, not having the texts of the agreements in question, to give any formal opinion. Mr. Caeiro da Matta said that it was not so much the text of Article 8, but rather the interpretation pertaining to that text, brought to his attention a few moments before, which cause some concern. That interpretation read:

“(5) With reference to Article 8, it is understood that no previous international engagements to which any of the participating states are parties would in any way interfere with the carrying out of their obligations under this Treaty.”

Mr. Acheson said that he did not believe any difficulty arose from the interpretation. If the Portuguese Government declared, as it had declared, that no international engagements in force between it and any third party were in conflict with the North Atlantic Treaty, it meant that no existing treaty would prevent the Portuguese Government from carrying out its obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty. He hopes that the matter might be left at that if it were satisfactory to Mr. Caeiro da Matta.

Mr. Caeiro da Matta said, in consequence, that Portugal was not undertaking anything which would be in conflict with the Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression with Spain. If such was the understanding, he was fully satisfied. And he was pleased to have this opportunity to declare that the acceptance of the Atlantic Pact on the part of Portugal was entirely compatible with the obligations deriving from engagements previously assumed by the Portuguese Government, particularly those under the Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression with Spain, of March 17, 1939, and the Additional Protocol thereto, of June 29, 1940.

Mr. Spaak said that he did not quite understand the question being asked. He thought that no one represented was asking Portugal to renounce any of her treaties, but, at the same time, the other representatives could not declare that the Treaty between Portugal and Spain was in agreement with the North Atlantic Treaty. It was not the part of the other representatives to make such a declaration. Article 8 asked Portugal, not the other Parties, to make such a declaration, and he could not go beyond that. If Mr. Caeiro da Matta declared that there was no contradiction between other treaties his country had signed and the North Atlantic Treaty, naturally his declaration would be accepted. The other representatives could not be asked to pass on the treaties Portugal had signed. Such a procedure would not be consistent with the provisions of Article 8.

Mr. Acheson associated the Government of the United States with Mr. Spaak’s very clear statement, and he hoped that Mr. Caeiro da Matta would accept that statement.

Mr. Caeiro da Matta agreed and said that he had raised the question only because of the interpretation concerning Article 8 to which he had previously referred. The text of Article 8 itself did not give rise to doubt.

Mr. Acheson put forward for consideration another question on which he asked the advice and, if it were deemed desirable, suggestions for possible action from the Foreign Ministers. The Government of the United States and, according to the Moscow radio, the Governments of six other nations presently represented had received a communication from the Soviet Union² declaring that the North Atlantic Treaty was aggressive in purpose and was directed against the Soviet Union. He assumed that each interested government would answer the note in detail. However, it had occured to him that it might be useful for all of the Foreign Ministers, while they were in Washington, to issue a short statement on the subject. If this idea did not commend itself to the other representatives, he would drop it. However, if it was desired to pursue the matter further, he had a draft which the other representatives might wish to study. If there was no doubt in the minds of any of the representatives, the statement could be issued on that day, or it might be issued on the following Monday.

Count Sforza recalled that he had had sad experience with a totalitarian regime. He thought he knew how the question just posed should be answered. As to the timing of the answer, it would be better to answer immediately or as soon as possible. It was the moral duty of all present to answer the allegations made by the Soviet Union at once so that there could be no doubt in the minds of some honest but perhaps naive people who might be misled by false propaganda. The allegations made by the Soviet Union should not be left before the world but should be answered at once.

Mr. Schuman agreed that a rapid reply was needed. However, any collective answer given at that time could take into account only one of the points made by the Soviet Union. All that could be accomplished at present would be a unanimous statement that the North Atlantic Treaty was not aggressive but was purely a defensive treaty. Another reproach contained in the Soviet memorandum was aimed at members of the United Nations. He observed that all countries represented were not members of that organization. Another reproach concerned countries which had signed treaties with the Soviet Union and he thought this reproach should be answered by those countries individually, and on their own responsibility. He intended to answer the Soviet memorandum on Monday and believed that individual answers should not be later than that day. He added that the Government of France had considered the question and he affirmed that there was no incompatibility between France’s treaty with Russia and the North Atlantic Pact.

Mr. Rasmussen called attention to the fact that not all governments represented had received a protest from the Soviet Union. This was the position of his Government and personally he felt disinclined to answer communications sent to other governments and not addressed to his own. Also, he wondered whether it was quite proper to issue a statement such as that proposed so long as the North Atlantic Treaty had been neither signed nor ratified. This did not mean that he was opposed to the idea of a collective statement, but he preferred that such a statement should not take the form of a direct reply to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Bevin suggested that a little time should be given to consider the idea. He had not consulted his Government and did not know how it proposed to deal with the matter. He thought that by the following Monday it could be decided whether or not a collective declaration should be made rather than have each government deal with the question individually. He personally inclined to the view that instead of answering the allegations made, it would be better to assert positively the views of the governments which had received the memorandum. It sometimes seemed that the governments concerned were chasing the Soviet Union rather than asserting their own point of view.

Mr. Pearson wanted to be certain that it was clear in the minds of all representatives what had been proposed. He understood that Mr. Acheson’s suggestion was not to send a collective reply to the Soviet memorandum, which some governments had received and some had not, and to which Canada had already replied, but to make a joint affirmative declaration on the pacific and defensive character of the North Atlantic Treaty which was to be signed. He was inclined to think that there was real value in that suggestion. As to individual replies to the memorandum, he thought it would be useful if they followed more or less the same line. Otherwise, the results might be embarrassing. He doubted that there could be a collective reply to individual notes.

Mr. Acheson said that Mr. Pearson’s understanding was correct. He, Mr. Acheson, had not suggested that there be a collective answer by the present group to the Soviet Union. Pie had tried to make clear his assumption that each government which had received the Soviet memorandum would unquestionably reply directly to it. However, the Soviet communication had been handed to the press and put on the radio. Basically, it constituted an attack on the North Atlantic Treaty on the ground that it was an aggressive treaty directed against the Soviet Union. Accordingly, he had thought that it might be desirable for the Foreign Ministers to consider making, as soon as possible, a statement to the effect that they had noted the Soviet statement, made in the press and on the radio all over the world, and that the best answer to the charges made was the Treaty itself. He went on to read the text of a draft statement in the above sense for the consideration of the Foreign Ministers:

“The Foreign Ministers of the countries assembled here in Washington for the signing of the North Atlantic Pact have taken note of the views of the Soviet Government concerning this Pact made public in its communications to seven of the governments represented here.

The Foreign Ministers note that the views expressed in these communications of March 30 are identical in their misinterpretation of the nature and intend of this association with those published by the Soviet Foreign Office in January,³ before the text of the pact was even in existence. It would thus appear that the views of the Soviet Government on this subject do not arise from an examination of the character and text of the North Atlantic Pact but from other considerations.

The text of the Treaty itself is the best answer to such misrepresentations and allegations. The text makes clear the completely defensive nature of this Pact, its conformity with both the spirit and letter of the Charter of the United Nations, and also the fact that the Pact is not directed against any nation or group of nations but only against armed aggression.”

Mr. Rasmussen thought that the draft had more or less the form of a reply to the Soviet protest, and he was not sure it was wise for all twelve countries to enter, at the present stage, into such a statement against the Soviet Union. He thought that all the Foreign Ministers, in the short speeches to be made on Monday, would say materially the same thing as to the peaceful and defensive purposes of the North Atlantic Treaty. Even if it was considered important to say something collectively on Monday, he would prefer a short statement containing no reference to the latest Soviet propaganda move.

Mr. Spaak regretted that he was not in full agreement with Mr. Rasmussen. If no reference were made to the Soviet communication in the proposed statement, there was no reason for making the collective declaration since the Treaty itself was such a declaration. He personally was of the opinion that an answer should be made to this propaganda started by the Soviet Union. It should be answered by counter-propaganda and it should be answered immediately. He thought that Mr. Acheson’s draft was a good draft, with the possibility of slight modifications. He thought it answered the essential points of the Soviet propaganda move, i.e., the accusation as to the aggressive intent of the North Atlantic Treaty. The remainder of the accusations in the Soviet memorandum should be answered individually by the different countries since their positions were not identical. He thought that if agreement could be reached immediately on a statement it would be a very useful propaganda move.

Mr. Schuman agreed entirely with Mr. Spaak’s remarks. He added that the Soviet memorandum had been sent to seven of the countries represented but that the reproach contained therein was directed against all the signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty. The propaganda using the Soviet reproach as a basis would be directed against all the countries represented. Consequently, he believed that these countries should reaffirm solemnly their solidarity on the matter.

Mr. Lange associated himself with what had been said by Mr. Spaak and Mr. Schuman. His Government had had occasion previously to answer reproaches of the kind contained in the Soviet memorandum and he thought it would be useful collectively to reaffirm what had been said before. He thought that the draft statement presented by Mr. Acheson was a good basis for a declaration.

Count Sforza thought that any modification of the draft might entail lengthening it. He thought that the draft was as strong as it was brief and he would agree with it as it stood.

Mr. Acheson suggested a wording change which he thought might remove some of the problems of Mr. Rasmussen. Mr. Acheson did not wish to press the question, but he did wish to associate himself strongly with the views expressed by Count Sforza, Mr. Schuman, Mr. Spaak, and Mr. Lange. He thought that in the present propaganda battle point after point would be lost if action were confined to the niceties of diplomatic procedures. The Soviet radio had been broadcasting its propaganda barrage every hour of the day and one short statement such as the one proposed would give all the countries represented a chance to answer rather than to sit silently.

Mr. Bevin agreed to the statement as amended and said that he could provide some bad language for inclusion in the statement if it were desired for propaganda purposes.

Mr. Rasmussen thanked Mr. Acheson for the amendment he had suggested and thought that it somewhat alleviated his concern. If it was the general opinion of the other representatives that such a statement should be issued, he would accept it.

It was agreed that the statement should be issued on behalf of the countries represented at the meeting (statement attached).⁴

There was a general discussion on the arrangements for the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on Monday, April 4.

Mr. Schuman recalled that Mr. Acheson had suggested the constitution of a working group for the study of the implementation of Article 9. He thought it might be useful to give some terms of reference to this working group or at least to determine a precise agenda. One question which would have to be discussed was the location of the two or three bodies to be formed. His Government would be favorable to the choice of Washington.

Mr. Acheson thought that the working party could use as reference the record of the present discussion rather than a formal directive. This was accepted by the other representatives.

The subject of a communiqué to the press was then discussed and that communiqué as agreed and issued is attached.⁵

1. Infra.
2. Ante, p. 261.
3. See telegram No. 228, January 29, from Moscow, p. 51.
4. The statement, read by Acheson earlier in the meeting, was issued with the following changes of wording: paragraph 1 was altered to close with the words: “… Soviet Government made public by that Government on March 31, 1949,” and the first sentence of paragraph 2 was changed to read “… the views expressed by the Soviet Government on March 31 are identical.…” For text, see Department of State Bulletin, April 10, 1949, p. 457.
5. Ibid., p. 458.