Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Western Europe, Volume IV

840.50 Recovery/3–3149

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

secret

[Washington,] March 31, 1949.

Participants:	The Netherlands Foreign Minister, Mr. Stikker
	The Netherlands Ambassador, Mr. Van Kleffens
	The Secretary
	Mr. Reed, South East Asian Affairs
	Mr. Nolting, Western European Affairs

The Netherlands Foreign Minister and the Netherlands Ambassador called at their request. Mr. Stikker opened the conversation by referring to a communication recently received by him concerning the United States’ position on the Brussels Treaty Powers’ request for equality of treatment in the Military Assistance Program. He stated that he considered any “singling out” of The Netherlands with regard to possible military assistance and the placing of The Netherlands on a different footing from the other members of the North Atlantic Alliance as an action which would be incomprehensible to his government and people. He asked for clarification of our position on this point.

In reply, I described to Mr. Stikker the reaction of the American people and Congress to Dutch actions in Indonesia, relating this reaction to the European Recovery Program as well as to the Military Assistance Program. I frankly stated that reaction to be that “the Dutch were wrong” and that The Netherlands has been guilty of aggression. I said that this deep-rooted conviction on the part of our people has now led to a situation which gravely jeopardizes the continuation of ECA assistance to The Netherlands. I referred to the support in Congress for the Brewster Amendment.¹ I said that the Administration has consistently opposed this amendment for various reasons, but that the basic cause of its growing support—namely, the failure of The Netherlands to reach an equitable settlement with the Indonesians—must be promptly removed. I said that the removal of this root problem is just as important to the Administration as it is to Congress. I stated that, even if the Brewster; Amendment should fail, the same problem would plague the ensuing appropriations legislation in the event of no progress toward a settlement in Indonesia; and that, following this, the problem would plague the legislation for military assistance. I pictured quite frankly our legislative problems, stating that we had deliberately decided to handle the Pact and the MAP as two separate matters. I said that, while ratification of the Pact seemed, assured, I could give no guarantee respecting the passage of the MAP legislation, it having already encountered considerable resistance. I made it plain that in my opinion, in the absence of a settlement in Indonesia, there was no chance whatever of the Congress authorizing funds for military supplies to The Netherlands.

Mr. Stikker said that he, too, is confronted with legislative problems and parliamentary reaction. He referred to the difficulties of a coalition government and to his own efforts to reach a compromise solution. He then stated that he would have to give an explanation to his Parliament regarding this Government’s position in connection with military assistance to The Netherlands, and that he feared that our position, as he understood it, would result in reconsideration by his government of the advisability of signing the Pact. Mr. Stikker further stated that he would have to consult the other members of the Brussels Treaty about this matter. He restated his understanding of our position as follows: “If in June, when the MAP legislation will probably be introduced, there is no settlement in Indonesia, I understand that The Netherlands will not participate in the Military Assistance Program”.

I replied that it was quite possible that the involvement of The Netherlands in the Indonesian affair would be the factor which would defeat the Military Assistance Program in toto. Concerning Mr. Stikker’s point that the Pact might not seem attractive to his country without the Military Assistance Program, I pointed out that we regarded the Pact as of great value whether or not there should be a Military Assistance Program; and that we considered the commitment of the United States under the Pact to regard an attack on any signatory power as an attack upon all, a very substantial commitment.

Mr. Van Kleffens said that his people and government could understand the United States’ attaching conditions both with respect to ERP and MAP, if such conditions were reasonable and if they applied generally to all participants. For example, he mentioned the withholding of financial aid from any country against which the Security Council had voted sanctions, and the withholding of military supplies from any country which violated a commitment to retain such supplies for defense in Western Europe. I replied that our criteria in this matter would surely not be whimsical, but that we were faced here not with a question of principle but with a question of hard political facts. I said again that the root trouble—the failure of The Netherlands to reach a settlement in Indonesia—has been of very long duration already, and that what is necessary to cure the malady is prompt tangible evidence on the part of The Netherlands of its willingness to negotiate a settlement. I suggested that Mr. van Roy en should proceed to Batavia just as promptly as possible to begin negotiations.

Mr. Stikker stated that his government was prepared to restore the Republican leaders to a seat of governmental authority in Jocjakarta, but that they could not do so unconditionally. He stated that the conditions outlined in his letter to Mr. Bevin were about as far as they could go. He said that the admission of Republican army troops to Jocjakarta, and the admission of radical elements, including Tan Malakka and his followers, would put pressures on the Republican leaders which would prohibit their reaching any settlement with the Dutch. He pictured the bloodshed which would result from a complete restoration of the Republican regime.

I replied that what is necessary is a prompt initiation of discussions with the Republicans with the object in view of clearing the obstacles to the proposed roundtable negotiations at The Hague; that the United States must maintain flexibility regarding conditions imposed by either side; that I had confidence in Mr. Cochran and knew his desire to promote The Hague negotiations; that I also knew of his efforts to gain Republican participation in the preliminary conference without conditions or reservations. I emphasized once again that there is not much time to be lost in getting on with this matter.

As the meeting broke up, Mr. Stikker raised the question of whether his speech after the signing of the Pact should be made in English or in Dutch.

1. For documentation regarding the Brewster Amendment and other matters of U.S. concern regarding Dutch action in Indonesia, see vol. vii, pp. 119 ff.