840.20/3–1549
Verbatim Report on a Meeting Between the Secretary of State and the Danish Foreign Minister
| Participants: | Mr. Gustav Rasmussen, Danish Foreign Minister |
| Mr. Henrik de Kauffmann, Danish Ambassador | |
| Mr. Frants Hvass, Danish Foreign Office | |
| Mr. Povl Bang-Jensen, Danish Counselor | |
| The Secretary | |
| Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor | |
| Mr. Ernest A. Gross, Assistant Secretary | |
| Mr. John D. Hickerson, Director, EUR | |
| Mr. Benjamin M. Hulley, Chief, NOE |
Mr. Rasmussen: Mr. Secretary, first of all, I would like to thank you very much for the information you gave me the other day and I [Page 211] think it has contributed very substantially to the clarification of our minds, and that it will enable me to give orientation and clarification when I get back to Denmark.
Then, I would also like to express my thanks for the detailed, free and open discussions which we have had with your advisers and officials. These discussions will further enable us to inform the Danish Government fully and give them, I think, all the necessary orientation. As a matter of fact, after these rather lengthy discussions which we have had since I saw you last, I think there are only a very few questions left and, with your permission, I should like to raise them.
Mr. Acheson: Please do.
Mr. Rasmussen: First, about Greenland. There, of course, the Atlantic Pact will throw a new light on the American-Danish relations as to Greenland. But nevertheless we still have our bilateral agreement from 19411 and the question is left open what to do about it, whether we should seek to terminate it or whether we should seek to make a new arrangement within the framework of the proposed Atlantic Pact.
I take it that you and your government will adopt a sympathetic attitude toward such Danish wishes which we may put forward in the future. We are convinced that the American Government does not intend to interfere with the Danish administration of Greenland and that the American personnel up there will continue to refrain from having dealings with the native population or attempt to influence them. If you feel able to confirm the correctness of this conception, I should be very glad to hear it.
Mr. Acheson: Well, I am very happy, indeed, to confirm the statement which you have just made.
Mr. Rasmussen: We also take it, Mr. Acheson, that the American bases in Greenland will not be further enlarged unless in agreement with the Danish Government. Our interest as we see it, is rather to take over gradually more and more establishments in Greenland, as we have in fact already done in the past with meteorological stations.
There is one point in connection with Greenland which will interest the Parliament in Denmark and that is the character of the United States establishments in Greenland. I am sure it would be very welcomed in Denmark if you might authorize me to state, or rather, stress the purely defensive character of the American establishments in Greenland.
Mr. Acheson: Well, I should be very happy to do that, Mr. Minister, and I’d like to make our attitude very clear on that point because [Page 212] it is a most important one. As in the case of bases anywhere within the jurisdiction of the members of the North Atlantic Pact, bases in Greenland would never be used for aggressive purposes. The whole objective of the Pact is defensive, and any military facilities which may be available to the members individually or collectively are intended for use only in resisting aggression. Greenland will not be used as a base for aggression. It will be a part of the area which is to be defended and will also constitute a part of the defenses which may be available for resisting an assault upon the territory of any members of the Pact. It may well be necessary to conduct the defense of the North Atlantic area on a long-range basis in order to resist aggression in any part of the area. Does that make the matter clear?
Mr. Rasmussen: Yes, that perfectly meets our point. Can I use that statement of yours, that declaration, publicly?
Mr. Acheson: Yes, I should be delighted to have you use it publicly.
Mr. Rasmussen: It would be most valuable. If I may, then, leave Greenland.
I’d like to say only just a few words upon the requirements of the armament question which we have discussed in detail, very fully, yesterday with Mr. Gross and his collaborators, and with General Lemnitzer. I would only like to stress one thing in this connection, that is, the importance of getting some arms to Denmark at an early date even if it be only in a small quantity as a token or symbolic in nature, but I think that even such a small shipment, in case the whole thing comes off would contribute substantially to soothe the public opinion in Denmark, and I also think it would have a beneficial effect on public opinion in Sweden. But I don’t expect you to be able to give any assurance or any promise, I am not attempting to extract that from you because I think I have understood how the political situation is, the constitutional situation, in the States. But I only want to stress this point that I think it would be a very good thing if such a thing would be possible, to send some of the arms which we so sorely need, to send them in the near future.
Mr. Acheson: Well, as I understand the situation at the present time, Mr. Gross, we are not able to give any assurances in advance of action of the Congress on the proposed legislation.
Mr. Gross: That is right, Mr. Secretary. I think that we have covered that rather fully with the Minister in our discussions.
May I add a point? I think what ought to be clear, too, from our discussions is that we are giving very urgent and sympathetic attention to the requirements, we fully realize the desirability of speed in accomplishing transfers. Our hope is that if the Congress does approve the program and authorize the expenditure of funds for the purpose, [Page 213] that we should within the first six months after the Congressional action, assuming that Congress does approve it, be able to accomplish some transfers if only of a token nature. I can’t now go into quantity, but it should be possible for us, under those circumstances, at least to make some transfers within a period of months after the program is approved by the Congress.
Mr. Rasmussen: Yes, I thank you. We discussed it at length yesterday and I think we have understood the position. Of course, we very much appreciate the spirit in which you led these discussions and we have done our best to provide you with the facts as to Danish defense, and we trust that you will deal with the matter in the same spirit of understanding and sympathy which we have had over here the whole time.
And, Mr. Secretary, we just mentioned the other day the advisability of issuing a communiqué and I would very much like to have one issued, but before proceeding to that there are one or two other items which I would just like to mention to you. They are entirely disconnected with what we have been discussing over here and they refer entirely to Danish-American relations. (The Foreign Minister then spoke of shipping problems, reported in a separate memorandum.2) (A statement for the press was discussed and agreed to.)
Mr. Gross: When do you think the Parliament will begin debate?
Mr. Rasmussen: I had a message from my Prime Minister yesterday asking when we could have our Foreign Relations Committee—I hope we can have our Foreign Relations Committee have a meeting at the end of this week. It was asked whether it would be ready for Saturday or Monday and I suggested Friday. In case I arrive according to plan on Thursday, I should be able to have it on Friday, then I think that we could have it in Parliament the following Tuesday or Wednesday. Then, of course, my job will be to speed it up as much as possible, but it may take two or three days in Parliament.