840.20/3–1249

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of the Department of State (Bohlen)

top secret
Participants: Mr. Gustav Rasmussen, Foreign Minister of Denmark
Mr. Henrik de Kauffmann, Ambassador of Denmark
Mr. Frants Hvass, Danish Foreign Office
Mr. Povl Bang-Jensen, Counselor, Danish Embassy
Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor
Mr. Ernest A. Gross, Assistant Secretary
Mr. John D. Hickerson, Director, EUR
Mr. Theodore C. Achilles, Chief, WE
Mr. Benjamin M. Hulley, Chief, NOE
Mr. Gray Bream, NOE

Foreign Minister Rasmussen said he would first like to discuss the text of the Atlantic Pact, the March 5 edition1 having been substantially reported to him by his Ambassador. He stressed the importance to Denmark of underlining in the Preamble the peaceful objectives of the Pact. He commented that Article II does not provide for improved relations with countries outside the Pact. I observed that we do not consider this Article as exclusive or that it implies other than good relations with nations not in the Pact. He feared that the phrase in Article IV relative to attack on vessels or aircraft might have the result of giving rise to a state of war when only an incident was involved. I explained that we did not think an incident would result in war and I cited the bombing of the Panay2 as an illustration. The parties would consult in case of any kind of attack and would judge from the circumstances how serious it might be. As he has understood from our Senate debates, the Treaty does not provide for automatic entry into the war. He took up my reference to consultation and asked how quickly it could take place in case of a deliberate attack on Denmark. I pointed out that consultation is not required before parties take action under Article V and that if the facts of an aggressive attack were obvious, each nation would presumably take steps under Article V without waiting for consultation. Mr. Rasmussen said this point was of primary importance to Denmark which feels it is most vulnerable. I said that we regard the Treaty primarily as a restrictive force. We want a potential aggressor to know that it would have to engage the full strength of the United States and Britain if it attacked any of the parties and we believe that this will deter an aggressor [Page 199] from taking over small nations one at a time. He referred to the accession clause in Article X and asked when it would come into effect. I replied that it would be effective as soon as the Treaty goes into force through ratification by the required number of nations. He referred to Article XIII and asked if there were any possibility of any party giving notice before the 20 years were up. I said that this Article had been the idea of the European members and that no country could withdraw before the period of the Treaty had elapsed. Concluding his remarks on the text, he said he had no comments other than these questions as to the meaning.

The Foreign Minister referred to frequent press statements about our frontier being on the Rhine, Pyrenees or somewhere else and said it made a bad impression in Denmark where people concluded that Denmark was written off in advance. I said that these statements emanated from amateur strategists who enjoy this kind of speculation and we are also aware of the unfortunate political effects of such statements. Mr. Gross observed that the signatories are not committed to any strategic plan nor does the Treaty imply that any such plan exists. Mr. Hickerson commented that the Defense Committee under the Pact would discuss strategic possibilities but no attempt has yet been made to say how a war would be fought nor would the Treaty provide this. To his question as to whether any unified command were planned, I said this had not yet been discussed.

He said that he had with him a list of Denmark’s military equipment needs which he would like to discuss when convenient. Mr. Gross said he would be glad to arrange a meeting on this for Monday morning. At that time his question about the use of United States funds to purchase supplies in other countries such as Britain and Sweden would be considered as well as we can at our present stage of development.

The Foreign Minister observed that the Danes feel their country is in a very dangerous spot with its border only 30 miles from the Soviet Zone of Germany. His people are not afraid, but there is a latent unrest. He said it would encourage the people if they had some arms, even a token supply, as a psychological booster. He expressed disappointment that his request of a year ago3 brought no result. Mr. Hickerson said he shared this disappointment as he had used his utmost efforts but it turned out that there simply were no surplus Garrand rifles. He hoped that after the legislation was approved some would be found surplus which would be allocated promptly.

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The Foreign Minister then said that the question of Greenland would be raised in the Danish Parliament and he would want to know what to answer. The general view of Denmark on the Treaty of 19414 is that it should have been canceled by now. It was based on the German threat which has disappeared. I said that this was a matter which I thought the Defense Council set up under the Treaty would consider and that the group as a whole rather than the United States would work out the question of defense of the area. Mr. Rasmussen said he thought the Danes had been patient. He even made an oral statement to Ambassador Marvel on the subject a year ago which continues the present status.5 There is a latent feeling in Denmark that this was a war-time arrangement and should be abolished. Mr. Hickerson said that we are very grateful for the attitude the Danish Government has shown in this matter. We believe that if Denmark becomes a party to the Pact the group will be able to work out the details. I commented that I thought the Greenland question should be considered in the framework of the Pact as the proper setting in which to settle the question of facilities in Greenland. Ambassador Kauffmann commented that in his view one of the benefits which Denmark would derive from the Pact is that it would facilitate a solution of the Greenland question. The Foreign Minister said it would be valuable to the Danish Government for domestic reasons if he could make a statement in Parliament that Greenland would be used purely for defensive facilities and not as a bastion for attack. Mr. Hickerson observed that he had given such assurances to Ambassador Kauffmann sometime ago and that the Danes could inspect the facilities at any time to see that they are entirely defensive. He added that under Article III the whole outlook is defensive and that we think Article IX gives the means for working out the details. The Defense Committee when set up will probably find that defense facilities in Greenland are necessary to defend North America and to get troops over to Europe for defense there. The Committee may decide that the United States will build such facilities as are necessary in Greenland, and that Denmark as a member of the Committee would have the opportunity to pass on what facilities would be necessary. The Foreign Minister asked whether he could be authorized to say something on this in Parliament to the effect that the whole idea is a defensive one as regards Greenland. I said we would see if something could be worked [Page 201] out on the line that the whole purpose of the Pact is defensive. The Foreign Minister explained that he would have to forestall the argument that Denmark has made Greenland available for attack on Russia. Ambassador Kauffmann thought a statement might take the form of citing an assurance given by the Secretary of State and that this would create a favorable impression. I said there might be danger in the United States presuming to speak for all the Pact members, but that we would study this to see if something could be worked out.

Ambassador Kauffmann raised the question as to timing the announcement of the list of countries which would sign, which he understood would be on March 15. Mr. Hickerson said that this had been changed and we now hoped when we publish the text on March 18, to publish also a list of the countries which have been invited and will sign the text. The invitation to Denmark would be forthcoming unless the Foreign Minister indicated that it should not be offered.

Charles E. Bohlen
  1. Not identified in Department of State files.
  2. For documentation on this occurrence on the Yangtse River in China, December 13, 1937, see Foreign Relations, 1937, vol. iii, pp. 798 ff.
  3. For documentation on Danish requests for military purchases in the United States during 1948, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. iii, pp. 1 ff.
  4. For the text of the Agreement between the United States and Denmark respecting the defense of Greenland, signed April 9, 1941, and exchange of notes, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 204, or 55 Stat. (pt 2) 1245, and for related documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. ii, pp. 35 ff.
  5. For a report of this conversation of March 11, 1948, see telegram 233, March 12 from Copenhagen, ibid., 1948; vol. iii, p. 587.