Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Western Europe, Volume IV

840.20/3–1149

Minutes of the Seventeenth Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, March 11, 1949

Washington, March 11, 1949

top secret

Mr. Acheson suggested that the committee consider (1) the timetable, (2) the text,¹ (3) procedure in relation to other countries which might be asked to join the Pact, (4) agreed interpretations of various provisions, and (5) the possibility of discussions and statements in the Security Council.

Mr. Van Kleffens stated that the Netherlands Government broadly agreed to the timetable. It was in favor of the idea of having the signature of the Treaty in Washington.

Mr. Bonnet thought it would be difficult to conform with the timetable in every detail. He did not think there would be difficulties in connection with the text of the Preamble. His Government would be glad to have the signature of the Treaty in Washington. Referring to the timetable, he said that the French Foreign Minister had not been able to secure definite approval of the text at the last meeting of the Cabinet. It had not been a question of opposition to any particular provisions of the Pact, but the members of the Cabinet had asked for a little more time to study the text of this very important document. The text would probably be approved on the following Thursday or Friday, thus necessitating a change in the schedule for publication and certain other events.

Mr. Acheson observed that if the text were not approved until Friday and then communicated to other governments, the rest of the proposed schedule would be difficult to maintain.

Mr. Bonnet had no objections to communicating the text in its present form to other governments. The previous schedule would have left several days between approval by negotiating governments and publications to allow during that interval invitations to be sent to four other governments and communication of the text to the British Dominions and the Latin American republics. The text could be communicated in its present form to the four countries to be invited in order to allow them time to consider the text before publication.

Sir Oliver Franks said that the text as agreed at the last meeting was to have been approved by his Government prior to the present meeting. But the recent changes in the text resulting from Mr. Acheson’s talk with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the major alteration in the Preamble, and the proposed interpretative minutes had not yet been submitted to the British Cabinet. The Cabinet would, however, consider them as soon as possible.

He said that his Government had all along maintained the view that the text should not be communicated to other governments until it had been agreed by the negotiating governments. He thought this was the only way of making certain that the whole question was not opened again. He thought that the earliest day other governments could be informed would be the day when approval had been announced by all negotiating governments.

Mr. Wrong said that the Canadian Cabinet had considered the text before the latest changes were made and were prepared to accept it. They still had certain changes (not of substance) to suggest in the interest of perfecting the text. He had no instructions on the question of communicating the text in its present form to other governments, but he was inclined to think that it would be difficult to communicate it to Italy, Denmark, Portugal, and Iceland until some more progress was made and it was certain that the negotiating governments were agreed.

Mr. Nygaard² said that so long as agreement was reached on the text, the Norwegian Government had no further remarks to make on publication or further timetable procedure. He had no instructions on communicating the text to other governments and could agree to any solution reached in the committee.

Mr. Le Gallais said that the Luxembourg Government agreed to the text which had been sent to them. Also, it was in agreement with the timetable which had been suggested. As to the new question, he could not state any views because he had no instructions.

Baron Silvercruys said that the Belgian Government approved the text which had been submitted and the procedure which had been outlined at the previous meeting. He felt there was an implied understanding that the text to be communicated to other governments should have received full and formal approval of the negotiating governments.

Mr. Acheson thought the situation might be serious because of the danger of the text finding its way into print during the coming week. Also, it would be necessary to continue the defense with the press, which might give rise to speculative reports that difficulties had been encountered.

Mr. Bonnet thought it would be difficult to contract the three steps envisaged in only one. Such would mean getting approval of all governments on the following Thursday or Friday and communicating the text to the other governments and publishing it on the same day. It would be desirable to give the text to the other governments before publication. In response to questions, he explained that he expected the French Government to approve the text without any changes on Thursday or Friday.

Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar understood that the French Cabinet was meeting on Wednesday morning and thought that if the agreement was obtained then, a meeting could be held on Thursday morning for formal approval by all governments.

Mr. Acheson observed that if approval of the text were obtained on Wednesday, the text and invitations could be communicated then so that the other governments would receive them on Thursday.

Sir Oliver Franks said that he could agree to the text being communicated to other governments as soon as he was notified that all negotiating governments were agreed.

It was agreed that the text and invitations would be communicated to other governments as soon as all representatives had been notified telephonically of approval by negotiating governments. It was also agreed that publication of the text would be postponed until Friday, March 18, at an hour to be agreed later.

Mr. Wrong suggested some minor changes in the text. After some discussion alterations were made in the Preamble, Articles 6, 7, 8, and Article 11 was broken up into Articles 11, 12, 13, and 14.

It was agreed, subject to approval by the Canadian Government, that the title of the Treaty as published would be “North Atlantic Treaty Proposed for Signature During First Week of April”.

Subject to concurrence by the United Kingdom Government, it was agreed that the Treaty should be signed in Washington.

Mr. Nygaard said that the Norwegian Government agreed to the text with one major exception, concerning the Preamble and Article 1. He stated the Norwegian objection and said that if there was no agreement on the proposal, he would report the observations made to his Government. In its answer to the last note of the Soviet Government, the Norwegian Government declined to accept the non-aggression pact offered and pointed out Chat Norway considered it unnecessary to repeat obligations already undertaken under the Charter of the United Nations.

Norway would place itself in a difficult position in its relations with the Soviet Union by agreeing in the Atlantic Pact [to] what it had declined to accept from the Soviet Union. The text of Article 1 was in reality a repetition of paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 2 of the Charter and had a content similar to that of a non-aggression pact. The Norwegian Government proposed that Article 1 be deleted. If this could not be accepted, the Norwegian Government proposed that the contents of Article 1 be incorporated in the Preamble.

Mr. Van Kleffens clearly saw the necessity for the Norwegian Government to avoid any contradiction between the Treaty and the Norwegian note to the Soviet Government. However, in his opinion the Treaty was not a non-aggression pact. Only the word “undertake” which seemed to introduce a new commitment, could perhaps be construed as a justification for such a contention. But the immediately following words “as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations” made it clear that the expression “undertake” amounted to a restatement of what had already been agreed to by Norway, when it ratified the Charter of the United Nations, He had considerable sympathy for the difficulty in which the Norwegian Government obviously found itself and wondered whether for the expression “undertake” the term “reaffirm” could not be substituted.

Mr. Hickerson pointed out that originally the word “reaffirm” had been adopted. It had been changed to “undertake” because of the possible participation of Italy, which not being a member of the United Nations could not reaffirm its purposes and principles.

Mr. Van Kleffens doubted whether the expression “reaffirm” could not be subscribed by Italy. He drew attention to the difference in position with regard to the Treaty between Norway, which had been ally during the war, and Italy, which had been on the other side. He further thought that Article 1 was one of the operative clauses and could not be well transferred to the Preamble.

Mr. Bonnet said that if there was no difficulty regarding Italy and Portugal he was prepared to support the suggestion made by Mr. Van Kleffens. He thought that if the Norwegian Government had to answer some further Russian inquiry in the future, reference should be made to Article 52 of the Charter. It has been decided that not only a mutual defense arrangement but a regional arrangement was being concluded arid the Charter authorized such regional arrangements provided they were consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. It was stipulated in the Charter that members entering into such arrangements shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes, etc. He thought that Norway was free to enter into a regional arrangement which was foreseen by the Charter and that Norway could answer that Article 1 was in full conformity with the Charter and had nothing to do with a non-aggression pact. By concluding, a regional agreement which referred to the purposes and principles of the Charter, Norway was abiding by its obligations according to the Chapter.

Sir Oliver Franks said that he did not wish to follow any suggestion for a major alteration unless it was shown to be really necessary. He said that it was a misfortune that all present negotiating governments had not been represented during the entire discussions, but it was now necessary to get to the point of publication and arrange for the signature, and a suggestion such as that made by Mr. Nygaard would mean major discussions in the Cabinet of each country and would be a real delaying factor.

He thought that the articles should be considered together rather than in isolation. They did not constitute a non-aggression pact and he thought that it should not really be embarrassing to the Norwegian Government, having declined one form of engagement with the Russians, to enter into a quite different form of engagement such as the North Atlantic Treaty.

He did not believe that Article 1 was just an idle reaffirmation of the principles of the Charter. Article 1 represented the link for moving into the articles of the Treaty in terms of the Vandenberg Resolution. He hoped that the Norwegian Government could be reassured that the entire Treaty was quite different from the engagement which had been offered by the Soviet Union and declined by Norway.

Mr. Acheson agreed with the foregoing comments, particularly those of Sir Oliver. Mr. Acheson had some sympathy with the Norwegian point of view because in a press conference concerning Mr. Stalin’s interview with Mr. Kingsbury-Smith,³ he, Mr. Acheson, had used almost the same phrase that the Norwegians had used in replying to the Soviet Union. If there was any embarrassment, he shared it almost as much as the Norwegian Government. The two points made by Sir Oliver were quite true, but what the Norwegian Government said to the Soviet Government was that in joining the United Nations they had undertaken to refrain from the threat or use of force and by so doing had pledged themselves not to attack each other. In these circumstances, the Norwegian Government had failed to see the need to reiterate this pledge by a special non-aggression pact between the two countries. Mr. Acheson’s comments on the Kingsbury-Smith interview had been of the same substance. All that was proposed to the Norwegian Government and all that Mr. Stalin stated in the interview with Kingsbury-Smith was that a government should make an agreement not to attack another. The reply was that such an undertaking had been made once and nothing was served by making it again. If the first promise was no good, the second was no good. However, this concept was wholly different from entering into a collective defense arrangement under Article 51 of the Charter in which there was announced a determination to settle all disputes with which the Parties were concerned by peaceful means. This was of great importance because the first article in the Treaty negates any possible suggestion of aggressive designs. Later it is said that in the case of an armed attack on any one of the Parties, all will respond. This was entirely different from the non-aggression concept.

He thought that deleting Article 1 or putting it into the Preamble, and thereby watering it down, would be a most serious thing to do from the point of view of weakening the entire position that there was nothing aggressive about the Treaty. Such action would also weaken the statement that everything said in the Treaty falls squarely within the Charter of the United Nations. He thought his task of getting agreement on deletion of the article would be almost impossible in the Senate, where great importance was attached to Article 1 as bringing the Treaty wholly within the United Nations.

Mr. Wrong sympathized with the Norwegian Ambassador, who had been confronted with a somewhat unfortunate situation by joining the talks at a late stage of negotiations. If the Norwegian representatives had been present during the entire talks, the present issue probably would not have arisen because they would have had the background which led to the inclusion of Article 1 in the Treaty. He said that it would be difficult in Canada to seek the deletion of Article 1 or its transference to the Preamble for reasons which had already been stated by Mr. Acheson, Sir Oliver Franks, and others present. Mr. Wrong was very sorry not to be able to do anything which would meet the Norwegian point, but he thought it impossible at the present stage to do anything without gravely delaying the conclusion of the negotiations.

Mr. Le Gallais said that he had the greatest sympathy with his Norwegian colleague because of his difficult position, but thought that at the present stage it would be very difficult to make such a major modification. Mr. Le Gallais agreed with the views expressed by Sir Oliver Franks and Mr. Acheson and would be in full agreement if a compromise could be reached by adoption of Mr. Van Kleffens’ suggestion.

Baron Silvercruys said that he fully sympathized with the Norwegian Government on the present issue in view of that Government’s recent reply to the Soviet Union, but the proposed North Atlantic Treaty was essentially a defense treaty and was within the framework of the Charter. There was reiteration of the non-aggressive purpose and the desire on the part of the Parties to settle their international disputes in a peaceful manner, which was in itself a non-aggression pledge.

Mr. Acheson thought that in any discussions the Norwegian Government might have with the Soviet Government, Article 1 would not be a source of embarrassment to Norway, but on the contrary, it would be a distinct asset. He thought that if Article 1 had not been in the Treaty, Norway would have had a much more difficult time. But with the article in the Treaty, Norway could tell the Soviet Government that the action on the part of Norway was exactly as had been outlined, was completely non-aggressive, and that in fact, there was a pledge that any dispute Norway had with the Soviet Union or any other state would be settled peacefully. Norway could further say that the only thing added by the North Atlantic Treaty was that among the group of nations adhering thereto an attack on one would be considered an attack on all. Mr. Acheson thought it would be a mistake for the Norwegian Government to consider deleting Article 1 because the real difficulty with the Soviet Government concerned Article 5 and not Article 1.

Mr. Nygaard realized that considerable difficulty would ensue if the Norwegian proposal were accepted at the late stage of the discussions. He stated that he would not take further time in discussing the problem, but would report the position taken by the other governments to his Government.

The committee then proceeded to a discussion concerning interpretations of certain provisions in the proposed Treaty.

The discussions concerning the interpretations were not concluded, but were recessed until the working party had progressed further in its discussion of the interpretations.

Mr. Acheson asked for comments on the possibility of making statements in the Security Council not for publication. Was it considered that any of the nations represented in the negotiations should initiate discussions in the Security Council, or should it be left to the USSR to raise the question in the Security Council?

It was generally agreed that none of the countries represented in the negotiations should initiate discussions of the North Atlantic Treaty in the Security Council.

Sir Oliver Franks asked for confirmation of his understanding that all representatives felt that it would be best that those of the four countries to be invited to sign the Treaty who were ready to sign on the agreed date should do so; in other words, the signature should be done all in one, rather than signatures at separate times or by later accession.

Mr. Van Kleffens referred to his previous suggestion to provide for an opportunity for signature on the part of invited countries which were on the verge of a decision, after the countries which now were ready to join had signed the Treaty. Thus, undesirable delay in their joining the Treaty, which accession would necessarily entail, would be avoided. Recent information from one of the invited countries had showed him that it might very well be useful to provide for such a contingency.

Mr. Bonnet thought that the four other countries should be invited as quickly as possible to join in the Pact and should be signatories of the Pact at the same time as the eight negotiating governments. He thought it would be acceptable if, as Mr. Van Kleffens had suggested, the Treaty were left open for signature for a short time in order that countries not ready to sign on the agreed date could sign as original signatories.

Mr. Acheson said that this was also the United States view.

Mr. Wrong said that was his view, but suggested that the Treaty should not be left open for signature longer than ten days or a fortnight.

The other representatives agreed in general with the views expressed.

Mr. Acheson referred to a communication previously received from the Irish Government⁴ concerning participation in the North Atlantic Pact. He assumed that all agreed that the question should not be pursued further with Ireland.

Mr. Van Kleffens wondered whether it would not be advisable to take note of the memorandum of the Irish Government by conveying informally to that government that the governments represented in the negotiations had regretfully come to the conclusion that in view of the present point of view of the Irish Free State, Ireland’s participation could not be successfully discussed. Thus the door might be left open for further developments. The United States authorities stated that they would undertake to make a communication of this nature.

1. The text referred to here is presumably the March 9 draft of the treaty which was quoted in an unnumbered circular telegram of March 10, 1 a. m., to the missions in Denmark, Portugal, Italy, Iceland, Norway, and the Brussels Pact countries, not printed (840.20/3–1049). The missions were advised not to take action on the text until instructed to do so.
2. Eigil Nygaard, Counselor in the Norwegian Embassy.
3. Secretary of State Acheson made remarks about Stalin’s answers to Kingsbury Smith at his press conference on February 2. For text of his comments, see Department of State Bulletin, February 13, 1949, pp. 192–194.
4. Aide-mémoire from the Irish Legation, February 9, 1949, not printed. See footnote 1, p. 90.