740.00119 Control (Germany)/4–1849

The Acting United States Political Adviser for Germany ( Riddleberger ) to the Acting Director of the Office of German and Austrian Affairs ( Murphy )

personal and secret

Dear Bob : In transmitting the papers on the meeting of the Military Governors on 14 April 1949,1 I have very little to add to what is given in these documents and in the OMGUS telegram CC 8345 of 15 April.2 The outcome of the meeting with the Germans on 14 April has already been conveyed to you by telegram.3

With respect to the reply given to the Soviet protest on the establishment of the Deutsche Mark as sole legal tender for Western Berlin, the reason why the reply is so worded is that there is a certain merit to the Soviet contention, although the question of the amount of marks provided to the Western Sectors of Berlin by the German Bank of Issue of the Soviet Zone is open to debate. Therefore, the point of the letter is to let the Germans from both sides undertake to come to a settlement of the amount.4

With respect to the British proposal for relaxation of controls over the Berlin Magistrat, I hope to be able to transmit the text today. It was given to us very late in Frankfurt and, as you know, I was deep in constitutional questions and did not get a copy. In any case, we do not as yet have the French reaction to this proposal.

With regard to probable developments in Bonn, Lucius had a long and serious talk with Brian during the meetings with the Germans in Frankfurt.5 In one sense, the final position of the SPD is going to depend upon the amount of pressure which the British bring to bear. We think Robertson will now go through and bring such pressure to bear, but I do not have any good information as yet as to the [Page 244] probable effects. Unfortunately, I believe the British themselves are much to blame for our present difficulties with the SPD as they have allowed their Military Government to be dragged too deep into internal German politics. Kit Steel was present at the meeting with the Germans in Frankfurt and we had an opportunity for at least a brief talk. He told me he thought the SPD would settle for some kind of compromise on the Finanzausgleich problem and I told him in reply that if that were really the case, it was up to the British to bring the SPD to its senses and to come forward with some kind of compromise proposal. I told him frankly that correctly or incorrectly, the impression was widespread in Germany that the UK was completely backing up the SPD demands whether or not they conform to the London and the Military Governors decisions and that the time had come for the SPD to be told by the British that they had to show a more conciliatory attitude. As an interesting sidelight, Kit told me that when Herbert Morrison was here last week and went to see Schumacher the latter took the conversation in hand and never let Morrison get in a word. From all I hear, Schumacher is in one of his more dictatorial moods and is most difficult to handle. We very much hope that Robertson will have a serious conversation with him before the party meeting on April 20. I still have my fingers crossed but am rather optimistic if the British bring the pressure to bear that they should.

As ever,

Jimmie
  1. None printed. Attached to the source text were six briefs of the problems considered by the Military Governors and the conclusions reached at the meeting.
  2. Not found in Department of State files.
  3. Telegram 539, April 14, p. 237.
  4. For documentation on the currency conversion and the Berlin blockade, see pp. 643 ff.
  5. The references are, to Lucius Clay and Sir Brian Robertson.