Department of Defense Files
The United States High Commissioner for Austria (Keyes) to the Department of the Army
P 3477. ComgenUSFA sgd Keyes cite PACG Dept of Army for Bolte and Maddocks.1 I would like to again call attention to my concept [Page 1285] of the Austrian situation as given in P 33822 and telecon of 13th June.3 I believe the crux of the problem is contained in our cable P 3382. Before answers to all the detailed questions can be given it is first necessary to answer the basic question; namely, is military occupation of Austria strategically and/or politically, (a) essential or (b) desirable, and if so, to what extent? This decision must be taken at the top policy level, i.e., the National Security Council.
If the answer to this question is in the affirmative the answers to the detailed questions are simple, and readily found. Again, if the answer is affirmative, then since Austria as well as the rest of Europe and the United States must necessarily share in the benefits to be derived therefrom, there is no obligation or need to make excuses for or further justify an occupation which is the mildest in history. In this respect Austria herself can testify to that fact since she has been occupied throughout the past two or three thousand years by the Germanic tribes, the Romans, the Russians, the Turks, the Mongols, the French, the Germans and now, the British and the Americans.
And so we should abandon or reject this present attitude of basing both our policy and the execution of that policy on the Austrian reactions from the point of view of their internal politics or injured pride. Having strongly rejected a policy of appeasement toward the Russians we are now tending to adopt a policy of appeasement toward the Austrians at the expense of our national aims in the struggle for world peace when no appeasement is called for.