863.20/11–2849: Telegram
The Minister in Austria (Erhardt) to the Secretary of State
1625. Deptel 1481, November 23.1 Suggestion that it would be preferable not to approach Soviets re Austrian army originated, we understand, with British military authorities here. Cheetham of British Legation,2 at instance his military, saw Gruber. General Keyes and we not aware approach to Gruber was intended. As Department knows, security problem has been considered for some time by three Western High Commissioners who agreed, at least General Keyes thought so, that they would act in concert.
In any event, Gruber now tells us he is definitely of opinion that it would be mistake to raise matter with Soviets, either before or after signature of treaty.3 He feels it would be difficult for Austrians to proceed with anything more than elementary planning should Soviets refuse their consent to Austrian action prior to effective date of treaty, but is even more concerned re situation which would exist if Soviets agreed and insisted that preparations be carried out under supervision [Page 1253] of Allied Council. In that case, Soviets could interfere endlessly with planning, and at same time create difficulties re costs of program and source of equipment.
Gruber’s idea is that Soviet signature of treaty should be assumed to be approval for preparation of implementation all treaty provisions by Austrian Government, which should thereupon proceed quietly with army plans. Presumably following British thinking, he argues that in interim before ratification preparations could be carried to point where 20,000 infantry could be called up for service on day treaty came into force, and that, with US assistance, training and equipment this group could be completed within 90 days before withdrawal of occupation forces. He considers force of 20,000 sufficient for initial needs internal security and border patrol, and that remaining forces permitted under treaty could be built up rapidly in following months under Western guidance. He adds that if Soviets should plan attack, Austrian army of 20,000 or 50,000 would make little difference in their calculations, and that basic defense would lie in Soviet realization that Austria would resist aggression, regardless of resources.
Leaving aside Gruber’s estimates of military factors and considering only political question of approach to Soviets, we would be willing to assume Austrian Government ought to prepare, in interim between signature and ratification, for implementation of treaty provisions. However, Soviets would be in strong position if they assert in AC, which they will, that control agreement is effective until treaty is ratified and any action in this direction should have quadripartite approval.
Final decision this question must of course depend upon whether, plans having been completed in interim period after treaty signature, force of sufficient strength for Austria’s initial needs can be assembled, trained and equipped in 90 days following ratification. In this connection, we must assume that even if Soviets should consent to preparations before ratification, they would not give Austria and Western Powers free hand, and that as much might be accomplished without hindrance in 90-day period as could be achieved with Soviet “cooperation” prior to ratification.
Prior to ratification three Western Commanding Generals might in concert coordinate with Ministry of Interior in creating a gendarmerie sufficiently mobile to take care of all possible internal disturbances.
General Keyes has now had opportunity for discussions with Galloway and Béthouart, and will report his views to JCS.