Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria, Volume III

863.20/7–949: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Austria (Keyes) to the Department of the Army

top secret

Vienna, July 9, 1949.

P 3574. From USFA Vienna signed Keyes to Dept of the Army. JCS pass to State from Keyes, and repeat to Reber London MilAtt.

1. Since the question of timely establishment of Austrian security forces prior to allied withdrawal was not raised at the Paris CFM, I again wish to emphasize the importance of a decision on this matter as contained in my P 3490, 17 June¹ before negotiations proceed too far. Satisfactory solution of this question prior to treaty signature is, in my opinion, essential in order to avoid grave risks to Austrian independence and to US interests and strategy.

2. Any proposal to postpone ratification of an agreed treaty in order to allow time for creation of an Austrian Army is unsuitable, since:

(a) The Allied Council prohibition against Austrian military activities remains in force until ratification of the treaty is complete, and

(b) The political position of the US would be untenable in event of undue delay. Such tactics would be taken as justification of Communist charges of imperialism, et cetera.

3. I consider that it would be futile to reintroduce into the Allied Council the US, British and French proposal of 28 March 1947, permitting the Austrians to undertake military planning, in view of the previous Soviet position rejecting the proposal in principle and declaring it to be outside the competence of the Allied Council; the Soviets likewise refused to seek instruction from their government.

4. Organization of the Austrian Army in the Western zones in the event the Soviets refused authorization at Allied Council level would be inviting disastrous reprisals and jeopardize the existence of Austria for which we have struggled for many years. Recent US emphasis upon the validity of past Allied Council decision² would only accentuate such a breach of international commitments on our part.

5. Even after four-power agreement to permit military planning by the Austrian Government, additional time may be consumed in resolving the conflicting concepts governing formation of an army now held by the Peoples Party and the Socialists, and is further reason why the Foreign Ministers should take up this question without delay.

6. I should like to reaffirm by recommendation contained in my P 2869 dated 6 January 1949 and also appendices to JCS 1685/11 dated 9 February 1949.³

7. PolAd concurs.⁴

[

Keyes

]

1. Not found in Department of State files.
2. Keyes was referring to the United States support of the Allied Council proclamation, September 11, 1945, which required that all political parties in Austria be approved by the Council. For documentation relating to the policy of the United States with respect to new Austrian political parties, see pp. 1206 ff.
3. Not printed.
4. In another cable, July 9, Keyes reported that at a meeting with Austrian Gendarmerie officials, July 8, the decision was taken to set July 18 as the date for the start of the training program and the issue of equipment (telegram P 3576, 863.105/7–949).