740.00119 Control (Austria)/5–3149: Telegram

The Chargé in Austria (Dowling) to the Secretary of State


634. While Soviet attitude thus far re fourth party issue does not indicate their policy now aimed at action along lines set forth Deptel [Page 1213]519, May 27,1 we have been concerned that moves by Austrian authorities or Western Powers should not enable them adopt such course if it subsequently became expedient. In discussion US position (Deptel 508, May 272) prior May 27 AC meeting, it was noted that endeavor obtain reaffirmation 1945 decision might provide some indication Soviet intentions this regard, as it seemed unlikely they would agree this legal clarification if they were deliberately planning basis on which to challenge validity of elections and legitimacy Austrian Government thereafter.

In AC meeting, Soviets not only agreed affirmation as desired by other elements (Legtel 621, May 273) but at close of debate introduced prepared statement which if accepted at face value was merely plea that AC abandon unwarranted objections heretofore raised by Western Powers to number of political party applications and instruct political directorate approve all comers provided only that they met minimum requirements of 1945 decision. (Western Powers denied Soviet allegations re previous rejections, and after offering consider any new evidence re previous applicants, argued political directorate needed no new instructions.) We are inclined to believe, however, that Soviet motive was to offset any possible stabilizing effect which might result from reaffirmation 1945 decision, and thus ensure agitation fourth party issue be kept alive.

Hazard of future Soviet action therefore remains, and must be weighed in AC consideration of forthcoming British proposal for rescinding 1945 decision, as well as new election law which is now being studied by legal division and will come before Executive Committee June 17.

  1. Not printed; it asked whether the Soviet Government’s refusal to reaffirm the Allied Council’s 1945 decision on political parties would enable it to challenge the validity of the October elections, to withhold recognition of the new government or, if the elections were challenged, deny the legitimacy of the existing government’s acting as a caretaker (863.00/5–2749).
  2. Supra.
  3. Not printed.