740.0011 EW (Peace)/11–2849

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Italian-Austrian Affairs (Williamson)

top secret
Participants: Mr. Jean Daridan, Minister Counselor, French Embassy
WE—F. T. Williamson
E. P. Allen
[Page 1199]

Mr. Daridan called to present an aide-mémoire1 giving in detail the position of the French Government with respect to further negotiations on the Austrian Treaty which had been outlined on November 28 by Mr. Berthelot to Mr. Reber (Delau 362, November 282). Mr. Daridan inquired whether the Department of State had any comments on the aide-mémoire. I outlined the Department’s position as follows:

An agreement was reached by the three Ministers on September 15, 19493 that the three Governments concerned would approach the Soviet Government through diplomatic channels at the time of the signature of the Treaty to request that the Allied Council decisions against remilitarization be set aside in Austria and that the Austrian army be organized prior to the coming into force of the Treaty. At that same time the Ministers agreed on a tripartite position respecting the remaining unagreed articles in the Treaty. After September 15 further meetings of the three Ministers were held in New York and informal meetings were held with Vishinsky. During the course of these subsequent meetings the positions on the remaining unagreed articles as agreed on September 15 were modified with a view to obtaining the conclusion of the Austrian Treaty at an early time. There was no discussion, however, of the agreement concerning the diplomatic approach to the Soviet Government on the Austrian army.

It was stated that the Department took a serious view of the problem raised in the French aide-mémoire since an approach to the Soviet Government on the question of the Austrian army at this time would create an interminable delay in the conclusion of the Treaty. It was pointed out that final agreement had not been reached on the military clauses but that agreement in principle had been reached on the German assets settlement. Therefore, nothing in the remaining articles provided any bargaining power for the Western Powers to force a Soviet acceptance of the proposed communication on the Austrian army.

It was further pointed out to Mr. Daridan that the U.S. Government considered that its extensive interests would be protected by the procedure proposed for paragraph 9 of Article 42 respecting claims of UN nationals. It was further pointed out that we were reluctant to [Page 1200] accept the Soviet paragraph 5 of Article 16 on displaced persons but would not consider that this issue should block the conclusion of the Austrian Treaty. Every effort will be made to secure adequate protection for the DP’s affected by this article outside the framework of the Treaty. Similarly, adequate protection for UN and Austrian interests can be achieved outside of the formal commitments made in Articles 42 and 48 bis.

Mr. Daridan was informed that the U.S. Government was deeply concerned by the problem of post-Treaty security in Austria and was considering every step which can be made under existing regulations to provide for the organizing and equipping of the Austrian army. He was informed that the French Government would shortly receive a formal communication from the U.S. Government on this question. He was informed that to date full coordination of tripartite policy existed among the three High Commissioners in Vienna on this question.

Mr. Daridan finally was informed that the three Western Deputies had agreed to postpone any further meetings on the Austrian Treaty until the French position was clarified. This action was taken in order to preserve tripartite unity in the negotiations, to save Mr. Berthelot from embarrassment and to prevent Zarubin from utilizing this move for disrupting the Treaty talks. He was informed that representations would be made by the Embassy in Paris to Mr. Schuman4 with the hope that the French position would be altered and that the Austrian Treaty could be concluded at an early time on the best terms obtainable. Mr. Daridan stated that he would transmit these views to the French Foreign Office.

  1. Not found in the Department of State files.
  2. Not printed; it reported that Berthelot had urged Mallet and Reber to maintain their positions on Articles 16 and 42 until the Soviet Union agreed to the organization of an Austrian Army prior to the entry into force of the Treaty. The French Government now considered Article 42 should be subordinated to prior Soviet agreement on the formation of the army. Reber added his feeling that this position was only a pretext for the indefinite postponement of the treaty which French officials in Vienna had recommended. (740.0011 EW (Peace)/11–2849)
  3. Sent as an enclosure to the message from Acheson to Schuman, September 17, p. 1154.
  4. In telegram 4574, November 28, to Paris, not printed, the Department of State instructed Bruce to see Schuman, explain the United States position, and urge the withdrawal of the French proposal. Bruce was to tell Schuman that the United States was giving careful consideration to working out the best procedures for the organization and equipment of an Austrian Army once the Treaty was concluded. (863.20/11–2849)