Executive Secretariat Files

Report by the National Security Council to President Truman

top secret

NSC 38/4.1

Future Courses of U.S. Action With Respect to Austria

the problem

1. To consider the nature and timing of possible courses of action available to the United States with respect to the Austrian treaty and Austrian post-treaty security.

analysis

2. U.S. Views Concerning the Austrian Treaty

a. Negotiations on the Austrian treaty were resumed by the Deputies on September 23, at the invitation of the United States. Current negotiations have included informal meetings of the Foreign Ministers. [Page 1191] After discussion on October 26, 1949 with the Secretaries of State and Defense2 and in the light of the discussion at the meeting of the National Security Council on October 20, 1949,3 the President has determined that it should be United States policy to agree at an early date to a draft Austrian treaty on the best terms obtainable. If the present schedule prevails and agreement is obtained, the Austrian treaty may be concluded by the Deputies within the next few weeks and presented to the four governments for final acceptance.

b. Assuming the early conclusion of the treaty, the United States is thus faced with the necessity of meeting the problem of Austria’s internal security following the withdrawal of the forces of occupation. From the strategic viewpoint, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated that withdrawal of the occupation troops before Austria can organize, train and equip reasonably adequate security forces would create a military vacuum in Central Europe in which the communists, following their common practice, may be expected to seize power and dominate the country, thus creating a Soviet salient in the East-West line.

3. The Problem of Austrian Internal Security

a. Views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated that they recognize that political and economic considerations may dictate the conclusion of an Austrian treaty now, but that, from the strategic point of view, the treaty should be concluded in such a manner that Austrian armed forces are reasonably adequate to perform all tasks envisaged in the treaty.

b. The Immediate Need for an Austrian Army

General agreement exists that the most urgent problem involved in the conclusion of the treaty is the creation of an initial Austrian army capable of maintaining internal order during the period immediately following the withdrawal of the occupation forces and pending the expansion of the army to the full strength authorized by the treaty. Specifically, the internal security of Austria requires, in addition to local police, a mobile army competent to impose martial law in the principal industrial and political centers in the event of internal disorder, and to prevent the entry of foreign action groups attempting to create internal disorder or to engineer a coup d’état.

c. Views of the Austrian Government

The Austrian Government considers that it will be able to maintain internal security by means of its police and gendarmerie, and reasonably adequate armed forces.

[Page 1192]

d. British and French Views

Agreement exists between the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and France on the one hand and between the Governments of the United States and Austria on the other hand that the conclusion of the treaty at this time is desirable. However, the exact extent or effectiveness of British and French participation in the program for Austrian internal security has not been determined. An official request was sent to the British and French Governments on July 224 for information on the assistance which they could give to the fulfillment of the Austrian military program. The British Government has replied that it considers the equipping of the Austrian army a United States responsibility. Mr. Bevin informed the Secretary of State on September 15, 1949 that he would inquire into the possibility of leaving surplus British equipment for the Austrian army following the withdrawal of the occupation forces. There is no estimate as to the amount of such equipment which might be available. The British Government has indicated its willingness to equip and train the Austrian air force consisting of 5,000 men and 90 planes. The British Foreign Minister stated on September 15 that training could take place outside of Austria. The French Government has stated that its Ministry of National Defense is engaged in a study of possible French assistance in equipping the Austrian army. The French Government added that it might be able to provide light weapons, machine guns, automatic rifles, pistols and ammunition, but raised the question of how the transfer of this equipment would be financed. These questions are being pursued through diplomatic channels by the Department of State in an effort to obtain more precise information as to the extent of assistance which may be expected from the British and French.

e. Availability of Funds

It will be necessary to take immediate steps, simultaneously with other required actions, to provide funds for equipment for the Austrian army. Detailed methods for obtaining these funds are set forth in paragraph 4g below.

f. Treaty Limitations

Article 33 of the draft treaty, which article is consistent with other post-war treaties and has been accepted by the Four Powers, provides that all occupation forces will be withdrawn within 90 days after the treaty comes into force. Austria has no army at present. Unless steps are taken toward the creation of an army prior to the effective date of the treaty, the possibility exists that Austria may be faced with the necessity of organizing, equipping and training, within a period of [Page 1193] 90 days, armed forces adequate to assume responsibility for internal security. Even if all the required military equipment were readily available, no adequate force could be organized and trained in that period.

4. Measures Required for Austrian Internal Security

a. The United States High Commissioner for Austria has stated that the full treaty-limit army of 53,000 (including 11,000 gendarmes) will be required to assure the internal security of Austria. The Austrian Government considers that one to two years will be required to organize, train and equip such an army. Realizing that a lesser force must be constituted initially, the United States High Commissioner has recommended an initial army of approximately 28,000,5 which can be recruited as soon as the Austrian Government is given the authority to do so. The complete cooperation of the Austrian Government will be required in the creation of the Austrian army and its effective use in the maintenance of internal security.

b. It has been determined that small arms and ammunition could be furnished within three to four months, and armored cars and light tanks within four to six months, without reducing the minimum requirements of the United States Army. Procurement of motor transport would require at least twelve months.

c. It is estimated that, given United States assistance on the necessary priority, weapons, ammunition, armored and transport vehicles to equip an Austrian army equivalent to two divisions could be furnished within approximately twelve months.6 If United States assistance is rendered in the form of equipment needed in the internal security role, artillery, fire control equipment, and similar expensive items could be eliminated and more small arms, automatic weapons, armored cars, light tanks, motor transport, and mobile communications equipment could be furnished.

d. The United States could furnish equipment for an initial army of approximately 28,000 or for an expansion of the gendarmerie training program within nine to twelve months at a cost of about $82,000,000 under conditions outlined in subparagraph c above.7

[Page 1194]

e. A normal training program for the army would require about nine months. By confining unit training entirely to the internal security role, this training period could be reduced to a minimum of six months. This minimum training time is based on the required individual and unit training subjects which must be covered, regardless of the size of the force involved. Furthermore, whether the Austrian security force is organized in army or constabulary type units, the six months minimum training period will be required. In any event, training can proceed concurrently with the arrival of equipment.

f. It would be preferable to furnish equipment for the army from a single source in order to avoid difficulties in procurement, supply, financing, and training. It is desirable, however, to secure tangible assistance from the British and French. Such assistance could be rendered initially by transfering to the Austrian army suitable types of supplies and equipment within the British and French Zones.

g. The Availability of Funds

(1)
It was not practicable, in view of international commitments, to name Austria specifically as a recipient country in the legislation for the Military Aid Program (MAP). It would, however, be appropriate for the Congress to designate Austria specifically as a recipient immediately upon the signing of the treaty, provided Four Power agreement to proceed with the organization of the Austrian army has been obtained. Failing such agreement it would not be practicable to designate Austria as a recipient until the coming into force of the treaty. When Austria is designated in the legislation as a recipient, military equipment can be provided from the following sources:
(a)
From U.S. military stocks in the occupied areas in Europe.
(b)
From domestic U.S. military stocks.
(c)
From stocks previously furnished to or programmed for North Atlantic Treaty countries under MAP.
(2)
It probably will be impossible to transfer equipment formally to Austria before the treaty is ratified. It is also inadvisable to transfer such equipment formally to Austria before Congressional authority is obtained. However, it is possible to take action now to insure that the necessary equipment will be available under the Military Assistance Program promptly on the coming into force of the treaty and the taking of Congressional action. To accomplish this, the following actions should be taken now:
(a)
Program equipment for Austria under the Military Assistance Program with a sufficiently high priority to insure its availability when required.
(b)
Ship such equipment to Austria and/or Germany under the Military Assistance Program for storage and retention there under U.S. controls.
[Page 1195]

Should conclusion or ratification of the treaty be seriously delayed with a resultant postponement of an Austrian army, the equipment could then be made available to the North Atlantic Treaty countries with a minimum of delay.

5. Alternative Courses of Action

a. Acceptance of the Treaty

(1)

Without regard to the security problem

This would involve organizing, training and equipping the Austrian army within the 90-day period stipulated in the treaty. Since this period is wholly inadequate to provide the means necessary for maintaining Austrian internal security, this course of action should not be adopted.

(2)

Delay in ratification

Unless modified, the Allied Council prohibition on the creation of the Austrian army is binding until the coming into force of the treaty. From the military viewpoint, a delay in ratification would not provide the required time unless the Western Powers agree to take action without Soviet approval to create the army at least three months prior to ratification. Furthermore, from the political viewpoint, the United States should not be placed in the position of delaying ratification. It is doubtful whether the British or the French Governments would support such action. The onus for delay would be placed solely on the United States and would jeopardize United States influence in Austria. Therefore, for political reasons, this course of action is not desirable. However, this method should be considered as an alternative if delays are encountered in the creation of the Austrian security forces.

(3)

Creation of the Austrian army or expansion of the present gendarmerie training program without Soviet approval

The Western Powers are currently training and equipping one gendarmerie regiment in the Western zones.… The expansion of the present gendarmerie program would require at least six months. An initial Austrian army of approximately 28,0008 could be organized, trained in the internal security role, and partially equipped in a like period. The creation of an army is the preferable solution, as the urban police force and the present gendarmerie regiment meet the requirements for constabulary type units.…

(4)

Obtain Soviet concurrence for Austria to organize its army prior to the coming into force of the treaty

The three Western Ministers agreed on September 15, 1949,9 that the question of Austria’s right to organize its army prior to the coming into force of the treaty would be raised with the Soviet Government at the time of the signing of the treaty. If Soviet agreement is obtained, this course of action would provide sufficient time for organizing, training, and equipping the army and would be the most desirable solution from both the political and military points of view.

[Page 1196]

b. Modification of the Treaty

From the military point of view, the phasing-out of the occupation forces in consonance with the ability of the Austrian army to assume the responsibility of internal security would further the desired objective, if other means are not successful. It would be necessary, however, to secure Four Power agreement to increase the 90-day period (Article 33) to 180 days. From the political viewpoint, such a proposal would not be desirable, as it would open the door for the Soviets to request reconsideration of any other agreed article, such as the article relating to Austria’s frontiers. A proposal to increase the 90-day period might also result in a Soviet demand for modification of the existing agreement on the schedule for the relinquishment to Austria of German assets now held by the Soviet authorities (Article 35).

conclusions

6. The United States should insure, by all appropriate measures prior to the withdrawal of the occupation forces, that the Austrian armed forces are reasonably adequate to maintain internal security.

7. An initial Austrian army of approximately 28,00010 would be required to maintain internal security in the period immediately following the withdrawal of the occupation forces and pending the expansion of the army to the full treaty-limit of 53,000 within one to two years.

8. Of the possible courses of action available to the United States (paragraph 5 above), the following are politically or militarily undesirable and should not be adopted:

a.
To accept the treaty without regard to the security problem.
b.
To modify the treaty by extending the 90-day period for withdrawal of occupation forces to 180 days.

9. After signing an agreed treaty, the most desirable course of action is to seek Soviet agreement at the first feasible time thereafter for the immediate creation of an Austrian army. If such Soviet agreement were obtained, any additional time which might be required could be provided by delaying ratification of the treaty.

10. If it proves impossible to obtain Soviet agreement for creation of the Austrian army prior to the coming into force of the treaty, the following course of action should be adopted as an alternative: After signing an agreed treaty, to take such steps as may prove feasible to create an Austrian army or expand the gendarmerie training program (preferably the former) in the Western Zones without Soviet approval and to obtain the Western Powers’ agreement to take such action at least three months prior to ratification. In judging the [Page 1197] feasibility of these steps consideration should be given to the possibility of Soviet retaliation such as refusal to ratify the treaty, creation of communist para-military forces in the Soviet Zone, or denunciation of a treaty if one has been ratified.

11. In any event the United States should take the following steps immediately:

a.
Continue efforts to obtain agreement by the United Kingdom and France to assume their share of the mutual responsibility for the internal security of Austria.
b.
Continue to impress upon the Austrian Government the necessity for complete cooperation with the Western Powers in the creation of the Austrian army.
c.
Program equipment for Austria under the Military Assistance Program with a sufficiently high priority to insure the availability of essential equipment for an Austrian army by the coming into force of the treaty.
d.
Ship equipment programmed for Austria to Austria and/or Germany for storage and retention there under U.S. control.11
  1. NSC 38/4 is a revision of NSC 38/3 dated November 8, regarding which, see editorial note, p. 1287. The differences are indicated in the footnotes to the source text.
  2. For a record of this discussion, see the memorandum by Secretary Acheson, October 26, p. 1186.
  3. No record of this discussion has been found in Department of State files.
  4. No record of this request has been found in Department of State files. For further documentation on the United States interest in the formation and arming of Austrian security forces, see pp. 1236 ff.
  5. In NSC 38/3 this figure was 27,000.
  6. In NSC 38/3 the end of this sentence and the beginning of the next one read:“…twelve months at a cost of about $77,000,000, plus ocean transport. If this amount were spent exclusively for equipment needed …”After the figure $77,000,000 was a footnote indicating that it was under revision by the Department of the Army.
  7. In NSC 38/3 subparagraph d read as follows:

    “The United States could furnish equipment for an initial army of 27,000 or for an expansion of the gendarmerie training program within nine to twelve months at a cost of about $40,000,000 under conditions outlined in subparagraph c above.”

    After the figure $40,000,000 was a footnote indicating that it was under revision by the Department of the Army.

  8. In NSC 38/3 this figure was 27,000.
  9. The text of this agreement was sent as an enclosure to the message from Acheson to Schuman, September 17, p. 1154.
  10. In NSC 38/3 this figure was 27,000.
  11. The conclusions contained in NSC 38/4 were approved by President Truman on November 18, and their implementation was to be coordinated by the Secretary of State (Executive Secretariat Files). On December 29, the Department of State submitted a report to the National Security Council which detailed the progress made toward coordinating policy with the British and French authorities for the formation of a future Austrian Army. A copy of this report is in file 740.0011EW (Peace)/12–2949.