740.00119 Council/10–449
Memorandum to the Ambassador at Large ( Jessup ) by his Special Assistant ( Yost )
Subject: Austrian Treaty
Following are what seem to me principal considerations in relation to Austrian Treaty negotiations, which have reached what may prove to be point of ultimate decision.
The determination of the United States Government to seek an Austrian Treaty was made in the belief that, while serious risks are involved in any settlement concerning a country so situated, the risks arising from a treaty are less than those arising from failure to get a treaty. In recommending this course from the Legation in Vienna we always attached three conditions: (1) that the terms of the treaty not impose on Austria an economic burden impossible to bear considering the help from the West that could reasonably be expected; (2) that a small but well-armed security force be in existence before the occupation forces withdrew; (3) that before withdrawal the Western Powers make a public statement which would make perfectly clear to the Kremlin that they continued to consider Austria a part of the Western security sphere and would not be indifferent to an attack upon her. These last two points we considered more important than the terms of the treaty, since we believed that, in view of the extreme weakness of the Austrian Communists, point 2 would prevent internal subversion and, in view of the fact Austria is not worth serious risk of war to the Soviets, point 3 would prevent direct attack.
On the other side, we considered that a very great positive gain would have been achieved by the withdrawal of the Red Army from Vienna, both from the strategic and the political point of view, and by removal of justification for retention of Soviet troops in Hungary and Rumania. The Yugoslav situation makes this point currently of even greater importance. Moreover, we were convinced in Vienna that a definitive breakdown of treaty negotiations would not lead merely to continuation of the status quo but to a very sharp deterioration. This deterioration would involve, at the least, a much more direct intervention of the Soviets in the political and economic affairs of Eastern Austria, which would destroy the benefits of ECA there, or, even more likely, a definite partitioning of the country along the German pattern. This could mean the loss to the West of the eastern third of Austria and a serious diplomatic defeat with wide repercussions in the region. In this case, pressure in Western Austria for an Anschluss [Page 1174] with Germany would become very strong and would create a new and serious cause of friction within Western Europe.
It seems to me very likely, in the context of recent Soviet behavior, that while they may have been willing for ulterior motives to accept an Austrian treaty in June they may well not be willing now. I would consider it however even more in our interest to obtain one and would urge we do whatever we can to pin them down.
There are obviously limits beyond which we cannot go in making concessions on an Austrian Treaty. I am inclined to agree with the Austrians that the difference between what we have already conceded and what we are now pressed to concede is probably not sufficient to undermine Austrian sovereignty or to aggravate materially the already precarious state of the Austrian economy. I am also a little cynical about any treaty provisions these days lasting more than ten years. However, I would feel that (1) it would be dangerous to our overall position to give the Soviets the impression we will surrender completely if pressed hard enough and (2) the problem of ratification may be a serious one if the NME should decide to oppose it.
My concrete suggestions under all these circumstances would be that we decide tomorrow the maximum we can concede, leaning in the direction of conceding as much as possible, and that we inform Vishinsky at the outset of Thursday’s meeting (1) that we are offering our maximum concessions, (2) that if he is prepared to accept we can agree at once, (3) that if he is prepared to reconsider his stand on the disputed points we will be ready to continue the negotiations here or elsewhere but we shall insist on settlement within a brief period, and (4) that if he is not prepared to reconsider we shall feel at liberty immediately to inform the public, particularly the Austrians, of the reasons for the failure to obtain a treaty. It seems to me that, since the meeting can last only an hour and a half, an attempt to deal again with the detailed points, unless Vishinsky manifests a sharp change of heart, might merely result in a failure to sharpen the issue to the point of decision and lead to a breakdown not fully considered by either party.
It seems to me this strategy would be most likely to lead either to a Soviet retreat, if they are not prepared for a breakdown, or to a break under conditions which would manifest our good faith and which could be publicized in Austria in such a way as to protect our position as well as possible. This memorandum is not the proper place to go into it but I am convinced that, if there is a breakdown, we should very promptly announce a new policy towards Austria which, while [Page 1175] maintaining the Allied Council, would amount in other respects to a treaty without a treaty.