Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria, Volume III

740.00119 Council/9–2949: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Deputy for Austria at the Council of Foreign Ministers ( Reber )

secret
priority

Washington , October 4, 1949—4 p.m.

Audel 186. Fol are Dept’s comments on Brit proposal for comprehensive settlement outstanding points Aust Treaty in Delau 307 Sept 29:¹

1. Proposal for removal brackets in Art 16 in return for deletion of phrase in brackets Arts 26 and 27 raises serious questions in terms US policy. We consider issue on Art 16 will have to be put to Secy for decision since in our view Sov para 5 might prejudice operation within Aust of principle of voluntary repatriation. We consider importance military arts for Austrian, security overrides considerations of DP policy, and trade proposed by Brit cld be accepted. Any settlement on this basis however will require good will and cooperation by Aust Govt in effecting repatriation and DP policy within Aust in accordance with agreed international principles.

2. Proposal for acceptance in principle Sov draft war graves art 32 can be accepted.²

3. Art 35. (a) Oil. Brit proposal on oil settlement can be accepted as consistent with tripartite agreement³ and not imposing added burden on Aust.

(b) DDSG leases. Brit proposal in effect assures validity DDSG leases for indefinite future period. Dept considers this inadvisable (1) from point of view of reaction on informed public opinion in US, (2) on economic grounds, since Sovs wld have permanent holding of these areas in Vienna port and up river which wld support their dominance of Aust river traffic, (3) on security grounds, since port areas in Vienna have strategic significance. Accordingly, if any concession is to be made offer shld extend all leases for a definite period of years to be negot by Deputies.

(c) Industrial equipment held or claimed as war booty must be transferred to Aust as provided US draft para 6.

(d) Rolling Stock. We concur that discussion by Deputies wld be desirable in finding solution ensuring Aust adequate rolling stock.

(e) We agree with Brit proposal for para 7 a.

(f) We consider it desirable to continue to insist on “net profits” and “i.e., rents.” Sovs have agreed these words to be meaning their draft and ultimate draft shld express this meaning.

(g) We concur para 9 provided assurances of Sov Deputy are recorded officially in some manner.

(h) We believe para 10 must provide for outside appointment of third arbitrator. Since there have been four years of discussion among Four Powers as to meaning and intent of various draft of Art 35, it is only reasonable to expect that, even with best will and utmost good faith, Aust and USSR will run into some difficulties in its interpretation and that these difficulties may be so great as to prevent bilateral agreement on choice of third arbitrator. It is in best interests neither of US nor of Aust to agree to situation from which might arise long unresolved friction between USSR and Aust.

4. We concur in Brit proposals for Arts 42 and 48.

5. As regards Art 48 bis we can not accept Brit proposal in present form. While we appreciate Aust eagerness to conclude agreement at any cost we do not consider that Aust can deal directly with Sovs on this question without opening themselves to endless claims. Unless specified figure is inserted we consider that Sovs will attempt to obtain maximum claims from Aust to be used in connection with their property holdings and other rights for political purposes. We consider, therefore, that present tripartite draft must be upheld.

6. Since there is no indication of Sov attitude to possible general offer of this type we consider that tactical considerations are as important as substantive matters in Brit offer. Any compromise offer to Sovs shld include all points in dispute and not be made on piecemeal basis to insure that change in Western positions will secure conclusion of Treaty at this time. If Vishinsky maintains on Thursday same attitude as in previous mtgs or does not amplify his views as expressed to Bevin consideration shld be given as matter of tactics to question whether offer shld be made at this mtg or withheld altogether. If offer is made it wld provide us with good propaganda basis in Aust to demonstrate our willingness to conclude Treaty and wld highlight Sov intransigence on other hand. If offer extended but not accepted it wld constitute another concession to the Sovs without obtaining objective of conclusion of Treaty, thus weakening Western position in future negots. We consider that any tactical decision on this point must be made with tripartite approval and probably during course of actual negots with Vishinsky.⁴

Webb

1. Ante, p. 1165.
2. For the texts of the various positions on the unagreed articles, see the Unagreed Articles of the Draft Treaty for the Re-establishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria, September 6, p. 1131.
3. Under reference here is the undated memorandum, p. 1154.
4. Reber discussed the contents of this cable with Mallet and Berthelot. Besides sub-paragraph f of Article 35, three principal differences arose between the United States position and that of the British and French: the British still did not believe a definite period should be established for the DDSG leases, neither the British nor the French wanted to insist on the clause providing for the outside arbiter, and they were both prepared to drop Article 48 bis entirely. (Delau 312, October 4, from New York, not printed, 740.00119 Council/10–449).