Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria, Volume III

740.00119 Council/8–3049: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy for Austria at the Council of Foreign Ministers ( Reber )

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Washington , August 30, 1949—4 p.m.

3108. Audel 168. Ur 3443 Aug 30¹ first step required in giving consideration Bevin’s message² will be extension of deadline as proposed Audel 164 Aug 27.³ Initiative in this regard shld properly come from Brit Del. SovDel cld be informed that you have no objection to continuing discussions in London for a specified period after Sept 1. We do not wish to appear in the light of making a concession in this regard. Try to ascertain whether Sovs are in favor of extension and if they consider useful purpose wld be served by such action.

If extension is obtained for specified period we consider efforts shld be made to clear up as many remaining issues as possible in Treaty but do not agree that final settlement can be made Art 35 without major change in Sov position. Bargaining of agreement on Art 35 against other unagreed arts is not an even trade and as Paris experience demonstrated will not necessarily mean final agreement on assets settlement. We do not consider that our entire position on Art 35 shld be sacrificed to obtain either agreement on other arts or a quick settlement on Treaty which might prejudice Aust future. It is desirable to obtain agreement on exploration areas if possible but equitable distribution is vital for Aust. Similarly, we consider that major concessions on pipelines and refineries wld not be in best interest of Aust. No assurance exists that bilateral settlement on transportation wld assure adequate rolling stock for Aust internal needs. In view of cut in Aust allotment by OEEC provision can not be made in direct aid for replacing in Aust any rolling stock transferred to Sov.

We appreciate Brit concern for quick agreement and recognize political advantages to be derived therefrom. However, we consider that vital points in assets settlement must be reserved for later decision in view of long range effects on Aust and acute economic and political situation which wld be created by conclusion of Treaty on Sov terms. We consider this issue of fundamental importance and do not desire that efforts of past four years in maintaining Aust be liquidated by Treaty reducing Western influence in Aust and increasing Sov chances of obtaining ultimate domination.

These issues will be discussed in detail with Bevin on his arrival in Wash. In meantime we hope you can secure extension of negots. Re Delau 276⁴ we do not object to Schuman’s proposal in principle, but consider that any Ministerial discussion must be preceded either by larger measure of agreement and clarification by Deputies or by diplomatic action in Moscow. We prefer latter course.

If extension is obtained, do your instructions provide sufficient latitude to permit settlement of issues other than Art 35?

Acheson

1. Not printed; it reported that the Foreign Office would be grateful for a reply to Bevin’s message before he left England for the North Atlantic Treaty Council meetings in Washington. (740.00119 Council/8–3049)
2. See extract from telegram from Mr. Bevin, p. 1125.
3. Not printed.
4. Not printed; in it Reber reported Seliuman’s agreement to ministerial consideration of the principal outstanding issues of the treaty in New York, provided that the discussions were limited to Austria. (740.00119 Council/8–2949)