I submit herewith for your consideration a paper drafted following
consultation between the Department of State and the Department of
the Army, which deals with:
I have not thought it necessary to include the appendices which
represent detailed position papers prepared for the forthcoming
discussions with Mr. Bevin and
Mr. Schuman.1
[Annex]
Paper Prepared in the Department of
State
2
secret
[
Washington
, March 31,
1949.]
I. U.S. Policy Respecting
Germany
- 1.
- The objectives of the policy of the United States
toward the German people are inextricably interwoven
with its interest in, and policy toward, the other
peoples of Europe. The basic considerations are the same
whether they can extend to all of Germany or must be
restricted to Western Germany.
- 2.
- The immediate emphasis of that interest, in the
present situation, is (a) on the
preservation of a climate of freedom for the free
peoples in Europe, (b) on the
efforts of such peoples to maintain a common
understanding and to create a new common structure which
will make possible soundly functioning economic and
political relationships among themselves and with the
other countries of the world, and (c) on their efforts collectively to maintain a
posture of defense of their liberties.
- 3.
- As means to these ends, it is the policy of the United
States (a) to give temporary
economic assistance to such free peoples to aid in [Page 144] their efforts
for recovery and reconstruction and in their efforts to
establish a common structure of new economic and
political relationships, (b) to
participate with them in their and our common defense
through the regional Atlantic Pact as well as in the
overall activities of the United Nations—all for the
effective preservation of peace.
- 4.
- In this setting, it is the ultimate objective of the
United States in its policy respecting the German people
that they, or as large a part of them as may prove
practicable, be integrated into such new common
structure of the free peoples of Europe to share in due
time as equals in its obligations, its economic benefits
and its security. We recognize both that the form and
pace of the development of such a structure are
predominantly matters for the Europeans themselves and
that the ultimate effective integration into that
structure of the German people will be dependent upon
reciprocal willingness and upon belief in the long range
economic benefits and the greater security which would
inure to all through mutual participation therein. The
United States, through its own security interests and
through governmental responsibilities in Germany has a
natural interest in the form and development of such a
structure.
- 5.
- Even if this closer association of the other European
countries were not called for by their other needs, it
would be requisite because of their common interest in
the handling of the German problem. The most
constructive, if not the only method for the solution of
that problem, lies in the creation of such a common
structure and the ultimate integration of the German
people into it on a mutually beneficial basis.
- 6.
- There is a fundamental desirability in setting in
motion in Germany a governmental system dedicated to
uphold the basic civil and human rights of the
individual in which the German people function in
accordance with democratic procedures. It is, therefore,
the policy of the United States to carry out the
determinations arrived at by the three occupying powers
in the London Agreement for the development of such a
governmental system in Germany. The tempo and method of
the further relinquishment of present external
governmental authority in Germany must be geared,
however, to the development of the common structure of
the free peoples of Europe and the objective of the
integration of the initial German governmental system
with that structure. It would be against the interest
and policy of the United States, and an obstacle to this
objective, to recreate the prewar completely
uncontrolled, segregated and aggressively nationalistic
type of political and economic unity of the German
people which had existed for seventy-five years, and had
twice been used in this century in attempts to dominate
Europe and the world. To do so would also create the
danger of an attempt through Germany’s central position
[Page 145] and
potential strength to regain its 1939 frontiers and
position of dominance by playing off the East and West
against each other.
- 7.
- The United States recognizes from the experience of
the past that once such an uncontrolled and segregated
political and economic entity were to be recreated,
paper limitations on armaments and industry, no matter
how necessary it seems now to adopt them, might well
once more prove to be ropes of sand and create merely a
delusion of security. The only enduring security in the
future, so far as the German people are a factor in it,
must lie in the renewed vitality of certain of their
great cultural traditions prior to the recent period of
their economic and political unity, together with a
radically new reciprocal approach by the German people
and the other peoples of Europe on a meeting ground of
the mutual benefits of a strong common structure of free
Europeanism.
- 8.
- The United States Government recognizes that the
economic needs of Europe, as well as the obligations of
the occupying powers as the present final governing
authority over the German people, imperatively require
measures for economic reconstruction among the German
people. But the United States also recognizes that this
must not be pursued now or in the future as a wholly
independent German program. Instead, it must be in step
with, and geared to, the interrelated economic
possibilities and programs of the other OEEC countries and to
prospective markets within these countries themselves
and the world generally. On the other hand, it is
essential that there be recognition of the need of the
German people for a degree of participation in the
overall Western European economic program which will
enable them along with others to become self-supporting,
with opportunities for initiative and with incentives
for them to cast their lot with the common free European
effort. A main factor in economic recovery is the will
and energy with which a people applies itself to the
task. Recovery in Germany must rest primarily on the
efforts of the Germans themselves. It would be against
the policy of the United States to deny to them the
reasonable fruits of such efforts as are of a nature to
inure to the benefit of Western Europe as a
whole.
- 9.
- The United States recognizes a certain danger to its
own security and that of Germany’s neighbors inherent in
the industrial potential and facilities of an
economically recovered Germany through their possible
capture and utilization by another power for the
purposes of aggression. The United States was confronted
with similar considerations as to all Western European
industrial recovery when it decided to make a tremendous
outlay of its national resources for the European
Recovery Plan. It then recognized that certain of these
nations were similarly subject to possible aggression,
and, therefore, that their industrial potential,
expanded by the European Recovery Program [Page 146] might be turned
contrary to their will against the United States. From a
very short range viewpoint, the vulnerability of Western
Germany to aggression is considered by the United States
to be no greater than the vulnerability of other nations
of Western Europe, and from the longer range viewpoint,
the ultimate establishment of a satisfactory military
posture by such nations, coupled with their economic
recovery and that of the free part of Germany, will in
the opinion of the United States diminish materially the
possibilities of aggression throughout all Europe,
including Germany.
- 10.
- The United States recognizes that particular economic
and political programs of the Western Powers and the
U.S. affecting the German people should now and
hereafter be influenced by considerations of security,
both short and long range. With such considerations
European peoples as well as our own are vitally
concerned. The United States expects to bear a part in
the maintenance of forces in areas in the Western German
Zones, so long as necessary to safeguard the decisions
arrived at as to Germany, in the interest of its own and
Western European security, and also for the security of
the German people or such segments of them as it becomes
possible to integrate into a free European structure. In
this connection the United States Government has given
an assurance it will not withdraw its occupation forces
without consultation with its major Western Allies and
until the peace of Europe is secured.
- 11.
- The United States recognizes that as the German
people, or a large part of them, may later become a firm
part of such a structure of free European nations, it
may become reasonable for them to contribute to the
armed security of that structure, but only if there
should be a strong prevailing sentiment within the
membership of the group that such contribution shall
have become necessary and desirable.
It is against this general background of policy that the United
States has participated with the occupying powers of the Western
Zones in steps already in progress with relation to Germany, and
will approach the particular matters in the further development
of these steps and others which now call for their decision.
II. The United States Has
Already Gone Far in Applying its Basic Policy in a Way Which
Justifies Full Confidence on the Part of Western European
Nations as to Protection of Their Security Vis-à-Vis
Germany
- 1.
- The United States has put general security
considerations first:
-
a.
- By the Atlantic Pact.
-
b.
- By its proposed action as to assistance with
arms.
-
c.
- By maintaining and proposing to continue to
maintain indefinitely its armed forces in Germany
so long as necessary to effectuate its policy and
decisions reached as to Germany.
-
d.
- By the creation of a Military Security
Board.
-
e.
- By joining in and maintaining certain
fundamental prohibitions, restrictions and
controls with respect to German industry,
including the security aspects inherent in the
proposed Ruhr Control Authority Agreement.
-
f.
- It is also noted that the above statement of
policy itself contains a most important specific
security provision in the statement that, until
the present insecure situation in Europe has been
replaced by a satisfactory measure of
international confidence and balanced normal
relationship, the United States Government does
not propose to withdraw from Germany, thus
maintaining the protection to Western Europe
inherent in the presence of United States
occupation troops.
- 2.
- The United States has emphasized that the German
economy be integrated into and treated as part of the
general Western European economy:
-
a.
- By its ECA
contributions and policies.
-
b.
- By the economic aspects of its proposed
participation in the Ruhr Authority
Agreement.
III. To Carry Out the Above
Policies, Decisions at Top-Level and Action on the Following
Matters Are Necessary Immediately
1. We must:
-
a.
- Carry into effect the London Agreement to set up a
Federal Government in Western Germany.
-
b.
- Set up an effective administration by the Western
occupying powers to exercise their reserved powers and
their joint responsibilities in Germany under that
plan.
-
c.
- Take stock of the Berlin situation and possible
proposals for a four zone government, particularly as
bearing on the implementation of the London
Agreement.
2. The first necessary step is the immediate clearing away of
obstacles to keeping our mutual commitments, and our joint
commitment to the German people, for the prompt establishment of
a German Federal Government in Western Germany.
Such commitments were made between the occupying powers in the
London Agreement almost a year ago.
They were made to the Laender authorities
and the German people July 1, 1948.
The present obstacles to keeping these commitments are:
a. Failure of the three occupying powers
to reach, in current London conferences, final agreement on one
provision of the Occupation Statute as to inclusion of a German
in the membership of The Administrative Court of Appeal set up
to review observance by the occupying powers of the exercise of
their reserved powers.
[Page 148]
Comment:
The Occupation Statute must be formulated and published by the
time the proposed Federal Constitution framed by the
Constitutional Convention is submitted for ratification.
Further, we have committed ourselves to communicate our draft to
the Convention before it completes its labors. Lack of it is now
a factor retarding German agreement on the Constitution.
As is set forth in a separate annex some consideration is now
being given to a radical simplification of the Occupation
Statute and a far less complicated relationship of the Occupying
Powers to the new German Authority. If this new approach is
accepted by the Conference of Foreign Secretaries, many of the
present obstacles to agreement might be removed.3
b. Failure of the occupying powers to
reach, in current London conferences, accord on certain major
provisions of a trizonal agreement as to:
(1) The method of exercise by the occupying authorities of
the reserved powers; i.e., as to which of those powers shall
require unanimity in the exercise thereof; as to those in
which the U.S. shall have a dominant voice; and as to those
which shall be exercised by a majority decision.
Comment:
Reaching a three power accord on this and certain other
underlying provisions of the Trizonal Agreement is a condition
precedent to the proclamation of the Occupation Statute. The
United States, of course, cannot agree to an Occupation Statute
without assurance of a reasonable three power arrangement for
the exercise of the rights reserved thereunder. This is also
necessary for the information of the Germans as it will affect
their understanding and probably their reception of the
Occupation Statute.
The United States’ interest in the immediate decision as to these
points is fundamental, because as a practical matter it is
providing through the Army and ECA appropriations for the German deficit of
approximately a billion dollars per year. It is unrealistic to
assume that this sum will be appropriated unless the Congress is
assured that a workable arrangement exists under which the
German Government can function efficiently and the reserved
powers can be exercised in a manner which will accomplish the
United States’ policy as to Germany above stated without unduly
burdening the United States to make up avoidable German
deficits. While the German problem has, of course, many [facets]
other than the financial deficit, it is still the fact that the
success of the military occupation of Western Germany and, more
broadly, the success of the European Recovery Program, depends
upon such appropriations in order to make possible a balanced
and successful effort.
Present divergencies of views on the above points are such that
they should be readily resolvable in a top-level discussion.
[Page 149]
(2) Agreement as to the general outline of a tripartite
organization which, when decisions to exercise the reserved
powers have been reached as above stated, would administer
them.
Comment:
This would require some central staff at Trizonal Headquarters
and also small staffs at Land level, but
with assistance from the Military Governors in the respective
zones in the execution of decisions. Present divergencies of
views are not such that they should not be readily resolvable at
top level.
c. Certain questions as to the draft of
the proposed Federal Constitution by the Convention which have
arisen by reason of a comment by the Military Governors and in
the consideration of that comment by the Convention, which may
require top level consideration of the occupying powers.4
Comment:
The Military Governors have given to the Convention certain
comments on the tentative draft of the Constitution submitted to
them by the Convention. These comments would require the
exclusion at present of the Western Sectors of Berlin from the
membership of the Federation; certain provisions as to the
financial powers of the Federal Government and of the Laender; and certain provisions to insure
that the Laender would retain substantial
governmental powers and that the Federal Government would only
exercise the powers that were necessary to deal with matters
affecting more than one Land, and so
necessary for an effective Federal Government. This comment
represents a compromise between the extreme views on
centralization among the British and de-centralization among the
French. It may prove something of an “apple of discord” among
the Germans themselves, and they have presented a
counter-proposal, the acceptance of which will require top level
reconciliation of views and decision. An authoritative text of
the proposal of the Convention is not yet at hand, but top level
consideration of the principles involved is important at this
time if later delay is not to occur.
d. One or another of the occupying powers
have insisted that certain matters be cleared up by prior to
[or] coincident intergovernmental
agreement before the Occupation Statute can be proclaimed. These
are:
(1) Certain alterations in the lists of plants scheduled for
removal from the trizonal area as reparations; i.e., the
so-called “Humphrey
List”.
Comment:
Negotiations in London as to this matter have resulted in
substantial agreement, but this needs to be confirmed at the
governmental level.
(2) Revision of the present lists of prohibited and
restricted industries and provisions for a date for review
and possible extension or modification of such
provisions.
[Page 150]
Comment:
Agreement on this matter has been substantially arrived at in the
conferences in London but awaits final joint, top level action.
Insofar as any differences have not been ironed out, it seems
that they could be readily resolved, but only resolved by top
level conferences.
(3) The French desire that certain arrangements be made for
the Port of Kehl.
Comment:
Certain informal explorations in this matter have been going on
and which indicate that solution at a top level conference
should not be too difficult.
(4) The French desire a rearrangement of the borders of the
Land of Baden to include North
Baden, now in the American Zone, and suggest the union of
South Wurttemburg, now in the French Zone, with the Land of Wurttemburg, now in the
American Zone.
Comment:
This question is complicated by the presence of important
American military installations in North Baden, but informal
conversations indicate that agreement in a top level conference
should not be too difficult.
2. [3] While we believe that the above
statement of United States policy as to Germany will be
reassuring to the other powers, and hope that they will agree
with much, if not all of it, we recognize that it is not
necessary to ask them at this time to subscribe to it. However,
in order to set up a West German Government upon an effective
basis, and to exercise the reserved powers in a manner which
will make possible the success of the new government, the United
States does need assurance that all three powers will join
unreservedly in the completion of this effort. Beyond the
particular issues lies the need for the spirit and will of each
of the powers to make a success of this common enterprise. It
would be disastrous to set up a government subject to the
extensive reserved powers which the occupation authorities
retain under the occupation statute with an aspect of disunity
among them.5
[Page 151]
3. [4] It is vital that account of stock
be taken of the Berlin situation, including airlift and economic
and political position and the relationship of the Western
Sectors to the Eastern and to the Western and Eastern Zones.
Plans, if possible, with respect to these elements of the
situation need to be formulated at top level by the three
occupying powers and in any event any decisions that might
affect the carrying out of the London Agreement should now be
arrived at.
4. [5] This applies also as to the
attitude to be taken at forthcoming United Nations Assembly and
possible Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) with respect to setting up of a German
Government for all four zones or acceptance of present split of
governmental and economic activities between Western and Eastern
Zones.
IV. Proposals as to the Above
Issues
6
The United States proposes that the objective of setting up a
democratic Federal government for Western Germany, as agreed to
in the London conference, be unreservedly supported by all three
powers.7
2. Occupation Statute: The Statute should
be formally agreed upon, with the only point now open being
resolved as follows:
-
a.
- Court: For reasons of German morale there should be a
German member.
3. Trizonal Agreement: This should be
finally agreed to coincident with the Occupation Statute, with
the points remaining open being resolved as follows:
-
a.
- Method of determination as to exercise of reserved
powers: This should be:
- (1)
-
Unanimity on exercise of approval of amendments
to the Federal Constitution.
Comment: This is not
controversal as far as it goes, but Mr. Schuman has raised the
question of unanimity for approval of any Land Constitution or its
amendment. The United States’ position is against
this because such protection is adequately
supplied in the general provisions of the Federal
Constitution.
- (2)
- The United States, as under the Bizonal
Agreement, should have, in view of its
contributions, a weighted vote and resultant
dominant voice in matters of and affecting foreign
trade and foreign exchange. (The detail of a U.S.
proposal and present status of the negotiations is
set forth in Appendix A.)8
- (3)
- In the exercise of all other reserved powers
the decisions of the Military Governors should be
by majority vote. There should be certain appeals
to the three governments, but the majority
decision of the Military Governors should stand
unless there is unanimous reversal or unless, as
to matters affecting demilitarization and
disarmament, two governments agree on further
consideration. The text of the U.S. proposals is
in footnote.*
-
b.
- Tripartite organization for administration of the
decisions for exercising the reserved powers. This
should be:
- (1)
- By the Military Governors acting jointly
through a central tripartite staff and agencies
selected by them, with a minor central tripartite
staff and agencies, as found necessary, in the Laender, and with the carrying
out of strictly local functions and field
observers under the direction of the individual
Military Governors in their respective
zones.
4. Reparations—Humphrey Report: The United States
proposes the final approval of the results of the London
negotiations with the decision of any points which have been
left open. (We have not as yet the final results of these
negotiations.)
5. Prohibited and Restricted Industries:
The United States proposes the final approval of the result of
the London negotiations on this subject with the decision of any
points which have been left open. (We have not as yet the final
results of these negotiations.)
6. Port of Kehl: The United States
proposes that a plan for the Port Authority for Kehl, with
German participation, be worked out, as set forth in Appendix
B.9 But the Occupation
Statute, the Trizonal Agreement [Page 153] and the establishment of the Federal German
Government should not be delayed to await the working out of
such a plan.
7. Wurttemburg-Baden Boundary Revision:
The United States proposes that this question be handled as
follows:
-
a.
- That the Minister Presidents be authorized to conduct
a plebiscite on unification of Wurttemburg-Baden and
Hohenzollern as originally proposed.
-
b.
- That, if the proposed unification is approved, a
bipartite or tripartite military government be
established for the whole of the combined areas.
-
c.
- That, if the proposed unification is rejected, a
further plebiscite regarding the reestablishment of the
former states of Baden and Wurttemburg be conducted as
proposed by the majority report of the Minister
Presidents.10
-
d.
- That, if the latter proposal is approved, a bipartite
or tripartite military government be established for
each of the reunited areas.11
8. The Berlin situation and the Four Zone Government:
-
a.
- The United States proposes that the London Agreement
commitment for a Western German government not be
postponed or suspended for the purpose of negotiating as
to lifting of the Berlin blockade or the establishment
of a four zone German government.
-
b.
- The United States proposes that the possibilities be
constantly explored of securing a lifting of the Russian
Berlin land blockade and our own counter blockade; also
of the establishment of workable economic and political
relationships between the Western and Eastern Sectors of
Berlin, and more broadly between the Western and Eastern
Zones.
-
c.
- It is the view of the United States that no
practicable arrangement for a four zone German
government can now be envisaged, and that a three zone
government at least has one advantage in that it
presents less difficulties in securing integration into
a new Western European economic and political
structure.
9. The United States also proposes that in the present meeting
the other powers examine with the United States the objectives
set forth in the above statement of policy as to Germany with a
view to determining how far they are in accord therewith.12
[Subannex]
Paper Prepared in the Department of State
secret
[
Washington
,] March 30,
1949.
Outline of New Approach in Military
Government—Western German Government Relationship
The US has consistently pressed for a broad approach in the
negotiation of the occupation statute to the end that the powers
reserved to Military Government be limited to the necessary
minimum and that a workable arrangement for the exercise of such
powers be devised which would obviate the obstructive use of the
single veto. In order to obtain British and particularly French
agreement the US negotiators have been forced to make a number
of concessions leading to the formulation of a restrictive and
complicated occupation statute with confusing lines of
authority. Besides producing a strongly negative reaction on the
Western German authorities, the present draft13 is likely to
frustrate the successful operation of the provisional government
and to lead to interminable disputes not only with the Germans
but also between the Allies.
Mr. Schuman and his
representative in Germany, Mr. François-Poncet, have expressed similar
apprehensions to Mr. Kennan and have stated the need for a radically
different and more liberal basis, thus seemingly reversing the
previous French position.14 Certain
British officials have taken much the same line. In the
forthcoming talks with the British and French Foreign
Secretaries the US will explore the possibility of obtaining
acceptance of a more practical and simpler Military
Government–German relationship conforming to the US original
concept, particularly with respect to an occupation statute and
the exercise of reserved powers to be laid down in the
principles of trizonal fusion.
Occupation Statute. A document
considerably simpler than the present draft occupation statute
is desirable. Its purpose would be to enumerate briefly the
minimum powers which the occupation authorities must reserve for
reasons of security and for safeguarding the basic objectives of
the occupation, such as the completion of reparations,
decartelization, observance of international obligations, etc.
German legislation and constitutional amendments would enter
into effect unless unanimously disapproved within a certain
period and the reserved powers would be exercised by majority
vote of the Allies. The [Page 155] arrangement should be of such a nature as to assure the
German authorities that, apart from the essential controls
retained by the Allies, they would be furnished the
responsibility and authority to undertake the normal functions
of government and administration. If the British and French
agree with this concept, it would be suggested (a) either a shortened and simplified
occupation statute be substituted and be transmitted to the
German Parliamentary Council as called for by the London
Agreement; or (b) in lieu of an
occupation statute and the proposed High Court to be set up
thereunder, which could lead to never-ending litigation between
the Allies and the Germans, the three Military Governors simply
enumerate the reserved powers in their letter of formal approval
of the constitution, stating they will discuss the manner of
application with the competent German representatives.
Principles of Trizonal Fusion. In
accordance with the new approach a revision would be attempted
of the present draft principles of trizonal fusion. This would
aim at a drastic reduction of Military Government personnel in
Western Germany and procedures confining the exercise of
Military Government control to the top German federal and state
levels, on a uniform tripartite basis, again on the majority
vote principle. Since the objective would be to create a
normally functioning German government system with primary
responsibility for the Western German economy, the US could
afford not to insist on a preponderant Military Government
control in German trade and economic questions, but could rely
on customary ERP procedures to
ensure the effective use of its financial assistance.
Approval of the German Constitution. A
consequence of the new approach should be that the three Foreign
Secretaries in their examination of the German constitution
would consider carefully the delicate balance of German
political forces represented in that document and should be
aware that insistence upon changes beyond those now proposed by
the Germans will incur the risk of placing on the Allies
themselves the onus for future difficulties encountered in the
working of the constitution.
