740.00119 Control (Germany)/3–3149

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President


Memorandum for the President

Subject: German Policy Papers

I submit herewith for your consideration a paper drafted following consultation between the Department of State and the Department of the Army, which deals with:

U.S. Policy respecting Germany.
Steps already taken by the US pursuant to that Policy protecting French and British Security.
Matters calling for Prompt Decision at Top Level.
United States proposals to be advanced in such discussions.

I have not thought it necessary to include the appendices which represent detailed position papers prepared for the forthcoming discussions with Mr. Bevin and Mr. Schuman.1

Dean Acheson

Paper Prepared in the Department of State 2


I. U.S. Policy Respecting Germany

The objectives of the policy of the United States toward the German people are inextricably interwoven with its interest in, and policy toward, the other peoples of Europe. The basic considerations are the same whether they can extend to all of Germany or must be restricted to Western Germany.
The immediate emphasis of that interest, in the present situation, is (a) on the preservation of a climate of freedom for the free peoples in Europe, (b) on the efforts of such peoples to maintain a common understanding and to create a new common structure which will make possible soundly functioning economic and political relationships among themselves and with the other countries of the world, and (c) on their efforts collectively to maintain a posture of defense of their liberties.
As means to these ends, it is the policy of the United States (a) to give temporary economic assistance to such free peoples to aid in [Page 144] their efforts for recovery and reconstruction and in their efforts to establish a common structure of new economic and political relationships, (b) to participate with them in their and our common defense through the regional Atlantic Pact as well as in the overall activities of the United Nations—all for the effective preservation of peace.
In this setting, it is the ultimate objective of the United States in its policy respecting the German people that they, or as large a part of them as may prove practicable, be integrated into such new common structure of the free peoples of Europe to share in due time as equals in its obligations, its economic benefits and its security. We recognize both that the form and pace of the development of such a structure are predominantly matters for the Europeans themselves and that the ultimate effective integration into that structure of the German people will be dependent upon reciprocal willingness and upon belief in the long range economic benefits and the greater security which would inure to all through mutual participation therein. The United States, through its own security interests and through governmental responsibilities in Germany has a natural interest in the form and development of such a structure.
Even if this closer association of the other European countries were not called for by their other needs, it would be requisite because of their common interest in the handling of the German problem. The most constructive, if not the only method for the solution of that problem, lies in the creation of such a common structure and the ultimate integration of the German people into it on a mutually beneficial basis.
There is a fundamental desirability in setting in motion in Germany a governmental system dedicated to uphold the basic civil and human rights of the individual in which the German people function in accordance with democratic procedures. It is, therefore, the policy of the United States to carry out the determinations arrived at by the three occupying powers in the London Agreement for the development of such a governmental system in Germany. The tempo and method of the further relinquishment of present external governmental authority in Germany must be geared, however, to the development of the common structure of the free peoples of Europe and the objective of the integration of the initial German governmental system with that structure. It would be against the interest and policy of the United States, and an obstacle to this objective, to recreate the prewar completely uncontrolled, segregated and aggressively nationalistic type of political and economic unity of the German people which had existed for seventy-five years, and had twice been used in this century in attempts to dominate Europe and the world. To do so would also create the danger of an attempt through Germany’s central position [Page 145] and potential strength to regain its 1939 frontiers and position of dominance by playing off the East and West against each other.
The United States recognizes from the experience of the past that once such an uncontrolled and segregated political and economic entity were to be recreated, paper limitations on armaments and industry, no matter how necessary it seems now to adopt them, might well once more prove to be ropes of sand and create merely a delusion of security. The only enduring security in the future, so far as the German people are a factor in it, must lie in the renewed vitality of certain of their great cultural traditions prior to the recent period of their economic and political unity, together with a radically new reciprocal approach by the German people and the other peoples of Europe on a meeting ground of the mutual benefits of a strong common structure of free Europeanism.
The United States Government recognizes that the economic needs of Europe, as well as the obligations of the occupying powers as the present final governing authority over the German people, imperatively require measures for economic reconstruction among the German people. But the United States also recognizes that this must not be pursued now or in the future as a wholly independent German program. Instead, it must be in step with, and geared to, the interrelated economic possibilities and programs of the other OEEC countries and to prospective markets within these countries themselves and the world generally. On the other hand, it is essential that there be recognition of the need of the German people for a degree of participation in the overall Western European economic program which will enable them along with others to become self-supporting, with opportunities for initiative and with incentives for them to cast their lot with the common free European effort. A main factor in economic recovery is the will and energy with which a people applies itself to the task. Recovery in Germany must rest primarily on the efforts of the Germans themselves. It would be against the policy of the United States to deny to them the reasonable fruits of such efforts as are of a nature to inure to the benefit of Western Europe as a whole.
The United States recognizes a certain danger to its own security and that of Germany’s neighbors inherent in the industrial potential and facilities of an economically recovered Germany through their possible capture and utilization by another power for the purposes of aggression. The United States was confronted with similar considerations as to all Western European industrial recovery when it decided to make a tremendous outlay of its national resources for the European Recovery Plan. It then recognized that certain of these nations were similarly subject to possible aggression, and, therefore, that their industrial potential, expanded by the European Recovery Program [Page 146] might be turned contrary to their will against the United States. From a very short range viewpoint, the vulnerability of Western Germany to aggression is considered by the United States to be no greater than the vulnerability of other nations of Western Europe, and from the longer range viewpoint, the ultimate establishment of a satisfactory military posture by such nations, coupled with their economic recovery and that of the free part of Germany, will in the opinion of the United States diminish materially the possibilities of aggression throughout all Europe, including Germany.
The United States recognizes that particular economic and political programs of the Western Powers and the U.S. affecting the German people should now and hereafter be influenced by considerations of security, both short and long range. With such considerations European peoples as well as our own are vitally concerned. The United States expects to bear a part in the maintenance of forces in areas in the Western German Zones, so long as necessary to safeguard the decisions arrived at as to Germany, in the interest of its own and Western European security, and also for the security of the German people or such segments of them as it becomes possible to integrate into a free European structure. In this connection the United States Government has given an assurance it will not withdraw its occupation forces without consultation with its major Western Allies and until the peace of Europe is secured.
The United States recognizes that as the German people, or a large part of them, may later become a firm part of such a structure of free European nations, it may become reasonable for them to contribute to the armed security of that structure, but only if there should be a strong prevailing sentiment within the membership of the group that such contribution shall have become necessary and desirable.

It is against this general background of policy that the United States has participated with the occupying powers of the Western Zones in steps already in progress with relation to Germany, and will approach the particular matters in the further development of these steps and others which now call for their decision.

II. The United States Has Already Gone Far in Applying its Basic Policy in a Way Which Justifies Full Confidence on the Part of Western European Nations as to Protection of Their Security Vis-à-Vis Germany

The United States has put general security considerations first:
By the Atlantic Pact.
By its proposed action as to assistance with arms.
By maintaining and proposing to continue to maintain indefinitely its armed forces in Germany so long as necessary to effectuate its policy and decisions reached as to Germany.
By the creation of a Military Security Board.
By joining in and maintaining certain fundamental prohibitions, restrictions and controls with respect to German industry, including the security aspects inherent in the proposed Ruhr Control Authority Agreement.
It is also noted that the above statement of policy itself contains a most important specific security provision in the statement that, until the present insecure situation in Europe has been replaced by a satisfactory measure of international confidence and balanced normal relationship, the United States Government does not propose to withdraw from Germany, thus maintaining the protection to Western Europe inherent in the presence of United States occupation troops.
The United States has emphasized that the German economy be integrated into and treated as part of the general Western European economy:
By its ECA contributions and policies.
By the economic aspects of its proposed participation in the Ruhr Authority Agreement.

III. To Carry Out the Above Policies, Decisions at Top-Level and Action on the Following Matters Are Necessary Immediately

1. We must:

Carry into effect the London Agreement to set up a Federal Government in Western Germany.
Set up an effective administration by the Western occupying powers to exercise their reserved powers and their joint responsibilities in Germany under that plan.
Take stock of the Berlin situation and possible proposals for a four zone government, particularly as bearing on the implementation of the London Agreement.

2. The first necessary step is the immediate clearing away of obstacles to keeping our mutual commitments, and our joint commitment to the German people, for the prompt establishment of a German Federal Government in Western Germany.

Such commitments were made between the occupying powers in the London Agreement almost a year ago.

They were made to the Laender authorities and the German people July 1, 1948.

The present obstacles to keeping these commitments are:

a. Failure of the three occupying powers to reach, in current London conferences, final agreement on one provision of the Occupation Statute as to inclusion of a German in the membership of The Administrative Court of Appeal set up to review observance by the occupying powers of the exercise of their reserved powers.

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The Occupation Statute must be formulated and published by the time the proposed Federal Constitution framed by the Constitutional Convention is submitted for ratification. Further, we have committed ourselves to communicate our draft to the Convention before it completes its labors. Lack of it is now a factor retarding German agreement on the Constitution.

As is set forth in a separate annex some consideration is now being given to a radical simplification of the Occupation Statute and a far less complicated relationship of the Occupying Powers to the new German Authority. If this new approach is accepted by the Conference of Foreign Secretaries, many of the present obstacles to agreement might be removed.3

b. Failure of the occupying powers to reach, in current London conferences, accord on certain major provisions of a trizonal agreement as to:

(1) The method of exercise by the occupying authorities of the reserved powers; i.e., as to which of those powers shall require unanimity in the exercise thereof; as to those in which the U.S. shall have a dominant voice; and as to those which shall be exercised by a majority decision.


Reaching a three power accord on this and certain other underlying provisions of the Trizonal Agreement is a condition precedent to the proclamation of the Occupation Statute. The United States, of course, cannot agree to an Occupation Statute without assurance of a reasonable three power arrangement for the exercise of the rights reserved thereunder. This is also necessary for the information of the Germans as it will affect their understanding and probably their reception of the Occupation Statute.

The United States’ interest in the immediate decision as to these points is fundamental, because as a practical matter it is providing through the Army and ECA appropriations for the German deficit of approximately a billion dollars per year. It is unrealistic to assume that this sum will be appropriated unless the Congress is assured that a workable arrangement exists under which the German Government can function efficiently and the reserved powers can be exercised in a manner which will accomplish the United States’ policy as to Germany above stated without unduly burdening the United States to make up avoidable German deficits. While the German problem has, of course, many [facets] other than the financial deficit, it is still the fact that the success of the military occupation of Western Germany and, more broadly, the success of the European Recovery Program, depends upon such appropriations in order to make possible a balanced and successful effort.

Present divergencies of views on the above points are such that they should be readily resolvable in a top-level discussion.

[Page 149]

(2) Agreement as to the general outline of a tripartite organization which, when decisions to exercise the reserved powers have been reached as above stated, would administer them.


This would require some central staff at Trizonal Headquarters and also small staffs at Land level, but with assistance from the Military Governors in the respective zones in the execution of decisions. Present divergencies of views are not such that they should not be readily resolvable at top level.

c. Certain questions as to the draft of the proposed Federal Constitution by the Convention which have arisen by reason of a comment by the Military Governors and in the consideration of that comment by the Convention, which may require top level consideration of the occupying powers.4


The Military Governors have given to the Convention certain comments on the tentative draft of the Constitution submitted to them by the Convention. These comments would require the exclusion at present of the Western Sectors of Berlin from the membership of the Federation; certain provisions as to the financial powers of the Federal Government and of the Laender; and certain provisions to insure that the Laender would retain substantial governmental powers and that the Federal Government would only exercise the powers that were necessary to deal with matters affecting more than one Land, and so necessary for an effective Federal Government. This comment represents a compromise between the extreme views on centralization among the British and de-centralization among the French. It may prove something of an “apple of discord” among the Germans themselves, and they have presented a counter-proposal, the acceptance of which will require top level reconciliation of views and decision. An authoritative text of the proposal of the Convention is not yet at hand, but top level consideration of the principles involved is important at this time if later delay is not to occur.

d. One or another of the occupying powers have insisted that certain matters be cleared up by prior to [or] coincident intergovernmental agreement before the Occupation Statute can be proclaimed. These are:

(1) Certain alterations in the lists of plants scheduled for removal from the trizonal area as reparations; i.e., the so-called “Humphrey List”.


Negotiations in London as to this matter have resulted in substantial agreement, but this needs to be confirmed at the governmental level.

(2) Revision of the present lists of prohibited and restricted industries and provisions for a date for review and possible extension or modification of such provisions.

[Page 150]


Agreement on this matter has been substantially arrived at in the conferences in London but awaits final joint, top level action. Insofar as any differences have not been ironed out, it seems that they could be readily resolved, but only resolved by top level conferences.

(3) The French desire that certain arrangements be made for the Port of Kehl.


Certain informal explorations in this matter have been going on and which indicate that solution at a top level conference should not be too difficult.

(4) The French desire a rearrangement of the borders of the Land of Baden to include North Baden, now in the American Zone, and suggest the union of South Wurttemburg, now in the French Zone, with the Land of Wurttemburg, now in the American Zone.


This question is complicated by the presence of important American military installations in North Baden, but informal conversations indicate that agreement in a top level conference should not be too difficult.

2. [3] While we believe that the above statement of United States policy as to Germany will be reassuring to the other powers, and hope that they will agree with much, if not all of it, we recognize that it is not necessary to ask them at this time to subscribe to it. However, in order to set up a West German Government upon an effective basis, and to exercise the reserved powers in a manner which will make possible the success of the new government, the United States does need assurance that all three powers will join unreservedly in the completion of this effort. Beyond the particular issues lies the need for the spirit and will of each of the powers to make a success of this common enterprise. It would be disastrous to set up a government subject to the extensive reserved powers which the occupation authorities retain under the occupation statute with an aspect of disunity among them.5

[Page 151]

3. [4] It is vital that account of stock be taken of the Berlin situation, including airlift and economic and political position and the relationship of the Western Sectors to the Eastern and to the Western and Eastern Zones. Plans, if possible, with respect to these elements of the situation need to be formulated at top level by the three occupying powers and in any event any decisions that might affect the carrying out of the London Agreement should now be arrived at.

4. [5] This applies also as to the attitude to be taken at forthcoming United Nations Assembly and possible Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) with respect to setting up of a German Government for all four zones or acceptance of present split of governmental and economic activities between Western and Eastern Zones.

IV. Proposals as to the Above Issues 6

The United States proposes that the objective of setting up a democratic Federal government for Western Germany, as agreed to in the London conference, be unreservedly supported by all three powers.7

2. Occupation Statute: The Statute should be formally agreed upon, with the only point now open being resolved as follows:

Court: For reasons of German morale there should be a German member.

3. Trizonal Agreement: This should be finally agreed to coincident with the Occupation Statute, with the points remaining open being resolved as follows:

Method of determination as to exercise of reserved powers: This should be:

Unanimity on exercise of approval of amendments to the Federal Constitution.

Comment: This is not controversal as far as it goes, but Mr. Schuman has raised the question of unanimity for approval of any Land Constitution or its amendment. The United States’ position is against this because such protection is adequately supplied in the general provisions of the Federal Constitution.

The United States, as under the Bizonal Agreement, should have, in view of its contributions, a weighted vote and resultant dominant voice in matters of and affecting foreign trade and foreign exchange. (The detail of a U.S. proposal and present status of the negotiations is set forth in Appendix A.)8
In the exercise of all other reserved powers the decisions of the Military Governors should be by majority vote. There should be certain appeals to the three governments, but the majority decision of the Military Governors should stand unless there is unanimous reversal or unless, as to matters affecting demilitarization and disarmament, two governments agree on further consideration. The text of the U.S. proposals is in footnote.*
Tripartite organization for administration of the decisions for exercising the reserved powers. This should be:
By the Military Governors acting jointly through a central tripartite staff and agencies selected by them, with a minor central tripartite staff and agencies, as found necessary, in the Laender, and with the carrying out of strictly local functions and field observers under the direction of the individual Military Governors in their respective zones.

4. Reparations—Humphrey Report: The United States proposes the final approval of the results of the London negotiations with the decision of any points which have been left open. (We have not as yet the final results of these negotiations.)

5. Prohibited and Restricted Industries: The United States proposes the final approval of the result of the London negotiations on this subject with the decision of any points which have been left open. (We have not as yet the final results of these negotiations.)

6. Port of Kehl: The United States proposes that a plan for the Port Authority for Kehl, with German participation, be worked out, as set forth in Appendix B.9 But the Occupation Statute, the Trizonal Agreement [Page 153] and the establishment of the Federal German Government should not be delayed to await the working out of such a plan.

7. Wurttemburg-Baden Boundary Revision: The United States proposes that this question be handled as follows:

That the Minister Presidents be authorized to conduct a plebiscite on unification of Wurttemburg-Baden and Hohenzollern as originally proposed.
That, if the proposed unification is approved, a bipartite or tripartite military government be established for the whole of the combined areas.
That, if the proposed unification is rejected, a further plebiscite regarding the reestablishment of the former states of Baden and Wurttemburg be conducted as proposed by the majority report of the Minister Presidents.10
That, if the latter proposal is approved, a bipartite or tripartite military government be established for each of the reunited areas.11

8. The Berlin situation and the Four Zone Government:

The United States proposes that the London Agreement commitment for a Western German government not be postponed or suspended for the purpose of negotiating as to lifting of the Berlin blockade or the establishment of a four zone German government.
The United States proposes that the possibilities be constantly explored of securing a lifting of the Russian Berlin land blockade and our own counter blockade; also of the establishment of workable economic and political relationships between the Western and Eastern Sectors of Berlin, and more broadly between the Western and Eastern Zones.
It is the view of the United States that no practicable arrangement for a four zone German government can now be envisaged, and that a three zone government at least has one advantage in that it presents less difficulties in securing integration into a new Western European economic and political structure.

9. The United States also proposes that in the present meeting the other powers examine with the United States the objectives set forth in the above statement of policy as to Germany with a view to determining how far they are in accord therewith.12

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Paper Prepared in the Department of State


Outline of New Approach in Military Government—Western German Government Relationship

The US has consistently pressed for a broad approach in the negotiation of the occupation statute to the end that the powers reserved to Military Government be limited to the necessary minimum and that a workable arrangement for the exercise of such powers be devised which would obviate the obstructive use of the single veto. In order to obtain British and particularly French agreement the US negotiators have been forced to make a number of concessions leading to the formulation of a restrictive and complicated occupation statute with confusing lines of authority. Besides producing a strongly negative reaction on the Western German authorities, the present draft13 is likely to frustrate the successful operation of the provisional government and to lead to interminable disputes not only with the Germans but also between the Allies.

Mr. Schuman and his representative in Germany, Mr. François-Poncet, have expressed similar apprehensions to Mr. Kennan and have stated the need for a radically different and more liberal basis, thus seemingly reversing the previous French position.14 Certain British officials have taken much the same line. In the forthcoming talks with the British and French Foreign Secretaries the US will explore the possibility of obtaining acceptance of a more practical and simpler Military Government–German relationship conforming to the US original concept, particularly with respect to an occupation statute and the exercise of reserved powers to be laid down in the principles of trizonal fusion.

Occupation Statute. A document considerably simpler than the present draft occupation statute is desirable. Its purpose would be to enumerate briefly the minimum powers which the occupation authorities must reserve for reasons of security and for safeguarding the basic objectives of the occupation, such as the completion of reparations, decartelization, observance of international obligations, etc. German legislation and constitutional amendments would enter into effect unless unanimously disapproved within a certain period and the reserved powers would be exercised by majority vote of the Allies. The [Page 155] arrangement should be of such a nature as to assure the German authorities that, apart from the essential controls retained by the Allies, they would be furnished the responsibility and authority to undertake the normal functions of government and administration. If the British and French agree with this concept, it would be suggested (a) either a shortened and simplified occupation statute be substituted and be transmitted to the German Parliamentary Council as called for by the London Agreement; or (b) in lieu of an occupation statute and the proposed High Court to be set up thereunder, which could lead to never-ending litigation between the Allies and the Germans, the three Military Governors simply enumerate the reserved powers in their letter of formal approval of the constitution, stating they will discuss the manner of application with the competent German representatives.

Principles of Trizonal Fusion. In accordance with the new approach a revision would be attempted of the present draft principles of trizonal fusion. This would aim at a drastic reduction of Military Government personnel in Western Germany and procedures confining the exercise of Military Government control to the top German federal and state levels, on a uniform tripartite basis, again on the majority vote principle. Since the objective would be to create a normally functioning German government system with primary responsibility for the Western German economy, the US could afford not to insist on a preponderant Military Government control in German trade and economic questions, but could rely on customary ERP procedures to ensure the effective use of its financial assistance.

Approval of the German Constitution. A consequence of the new approach should be that the three Foreign Secretaries in their examination of the German constitution would consider carefully the delicate balance of German political forces represented in that document and should be aware that insistence upon changes beyond those now proposed by the Germans will incur the risk of placing on the Allies themselves the onus for future difficulties encountered in the working of the constitution.

  1. None printed; the Department of State prepared twenty-three position papers for the discussions with Bevin and Schuman, dealing with the matters under discussion in London, the Berlin situation, and various economic questions. Also included among the position papers were Murphy’s paper on United States policy toward Germany (p. 118 ff.) and another of the German policy papers under reference in this memorandum. The position papers and the two additional documents are in CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 140: Position Papers.
  2. The source text is a revision of a similar paper, not printed, submitted to the Steering Group of the National Security Council Subcommittee on Germany on March 28 by Voorhees. The differences between the two papers are indicated in the footnotes. In his cover memorandum Voorhees stated that his paper was intended to summarize information on the London negotiations and various papers prepared by the Departments of State and Army, and could be submitted to other governments, unlike Murphy’s paper of March 23 (p. 118) which was designed for briefing United States officials on Germany. (740.00119 Control (Germany)/3–2849) At the meeting with President Truman, March 31, Acheson left Part I of the source text for the President’s approval, and went over the tentative outline (supra). (Memorandum of conversation with the President, March 31, not printed, 811.001 Truman, H.S./3–3149.)
  3. This paragraph and the separate annex (printed as sub-annex below) were not in the draft submitted by Voorhees.
  4. For documentation relating to the drafting of the West German constitution, including the text of the Military Governors comments on March 2, see pp. 187 ff.
  5. This paragraph read as follows in the draft submitted by Voorhees:

    “2. The intelligent exercise of reserve powers over the German Government in the trizonal area requires agreement among the occupying powers at this time as to the objectives to be borne in mind in the exercise of these powers. Are the objectives of the United States, as outlined in the statement of policy above, also objectives of the other two occupying powers? If not, in what respect are there differences and how should they be reconciled so that unified, firm and far sighted exercise of those reserve powers can be made?


    It would seem that it would be disastrous to set up a trizonal government with reserve powers, with the occupying powers having no common objective in their exercise, and affording the aspect of disunity or lack of any clear conception of what they are aiming at.”

  6. Part IV of the paper was dated March 30, 1949.
  7. This paragraph was not in the draft submitted by Voorhees.
  8. There was no Appendix A attached to the source text or to the draft submitted by Voorhees. However, a paper entitled “Principles of Trizonal Fusion,” (not printed) which reflected the situation as of March 29, was one of the position papers prepared for the discussions with Bevin and Schuman. A copy of this proposal, which seems to be the paper under reference here, is in the CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 140: Position Papers.
  9. United States proposals to date:

    A Military Governor who considers that a majority decision concerning demilitarization and disarmament modifies or is not in conformity with intergovernmental agreements regarding Germany, may appeal to his government. Such an appeal shall serve to suspend action for not more than 30 days from date on which decision is made unless two governments indicate that grounds justify further consideration. In such cases, three governments will instruct their respective Military Governors further to suspend action pending agreement among governments.

    A Military Governor who considers that a majority decision involving any other matter reserved by Article II, paragraph 2, of Occupation Statute is not in conformity with basic tripartite policy regarding Germany or on grounds that amendment to Land Constitution violates basic law may require suspension of action while he makes appeal to his government. An appeal in this case shall serve to suspend action only for a limited period of time, which shall not exceed 30 days from date on which majority decision of Military Governors is made, and shall not prevent action in case government agreement is not reached. [Footnote in the source text.]

  10. There was no Appendix B attached to the source text or to the draft submitted by Voorhees. However, a paper entitled “Kehl,” not printed, was one of the papers prepared for the discussions with Bevin and Schuman. A copy of this proposal, which seems to be the paper under reference here, is in the CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 140: Position Papers.
  11. Presumably a reference to the recommendations of the Ministers President on October 1, 1948, the text of which is printed in Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. ii, p. 427.
  12. Following subparagraph d in the draft submitted by Voorhees was a paragraph which read:

    “7. Basic objectives in the light of which the reserved powers should be exercised: The United States proposes that the objectives set out in its policy statement respecting Germany be considered with a view to determining whether they could be made a fundamental guide in the exercise of the reserved powers.”

  13. This paragraph was not in the draft submitted by Voorhees.
  14. The text of the draft occupation statute was transmitted in telegram 1338, April 2, p. 62.
  15. Regarding Kennan’s discussions in Germany with the French, see Kennan notes, March 21, p. 113.