740.0011 EW (Peace)/8–2749
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Director
of the Office of German and Austrian Affairs (Murphy)
secret
[Washington,] August 27,
1949.
| Participants: |
Sir Derick Hoyer
Millar, British Embassy |
|
Ambassador Robert
Murphy, GA
|
Sir Derick Hoyer Millar of
the British Embassy called at his request and left with me the
enclosed extract from a telegram from Mr. Bevin, dated August 26, regarding the Austrian
Treaty. We discussed Mr. Bevin’s conversation with Ambassador Douglas, reported in London’s
[Page 1125]
3410 of 26 August.1
Hoyer Millar said that he
would make it quite clear that there was every disposition here to
achieve an early agreement on the Austrian Treaty, if possible, in
London. He well appreciated the danger attached to that agreement
which would risk formidable opposition to ratification in the
Senate, as well as creating an economic and possibly strategic
situation in Austria which would prove unbearable. Hoyer Millar said that he would
try to dissipate any notion that might prevail in London that the
Secretary was eager for a CFM
meeting to discuss the Treaty.
I suggested to my visitor that it might be well at this stage to
propose a prolongation of the London discussions by Deputies for an
additional period of possibly two weeks. He said that he thought
such a proposal would be well received in London and that it might
be well to allow an additional period of time. He would telegraph
London making such a suggestion. I have sent a telegram to Reber asking for his opinion.2
It is noted that in Mr. Bevin’s
message suggestion is made that it was quite possible that if the
Russians are satisfied we are really trying to get a treaty they may
make some further concessions. It seems on the basis of the record,
the Russians can have little doubt that we have manifested an
excessive eagerness to obtain a treaty. Certainly on the basis of
the record, the Russians can have little doubt that we really wish a
treaty since the bulk of the initiative to get a treaty has been
American.
I mentioned also to Hoyer
Millar if the Deputies were given additional time for
the London discussions that would not prevent steps to be taken in
Moscow by the three Ambassadors, if necessary, in connection with
Article 35 should it be found advisable to press for an on-the-spot
examination of the oil exploration fields, refinery equipment, etc.
Hoyer Millar said that
he thought this was a good idea which he would mention to London and
on balance felt that an additional four week period for the Deputies
would be generally advisable.
[Annex]
Extract From Telegram From Mr. Bevin Dated 26th August
The United States Deputy has told the United Kingdom Deputy that
after considering my views, which were explained to him on the
[Page 1126]
19th. August,
the State Department feel unable to modify their attitude that
an Austrian Treaty on the Russian terms or anything closely
approaching them would be unacceptable. They consider, I
understand, that the substance of the agreement and its
long-term effect are more important than the immediate effect
which would be caused by the early conclusion of a treaty. They
attach great importance to the effect which acceptance of the
Russian terms would have on Austria’s need for aid from the
United States, and to the difficulties which would lie in the
way of ratification of a treaty on the Russian terms. They also
fear that a treaty incorporating Russian requirements would
enable the Soviet Government to exercise effective control over
Austria even after the troops had been withdrawn.
2. I appreciate the attitude of the State Department as explained
by Mr. Reber. I have,
however, been giving the matter my personal consideration and
would like you to convey my views to Mr. Acheson.
3. After conversation with Dr. Gruber I cannot convince myself that the effect
of acceptance of Russian terms will so seriously affect the
Austrian economic position as absolutely to rule out a treaty.
Dr. Gruber has officially
informed me that his Government want a treaty now on the best
terms that can be got. I fully recognise the imperfections in
the Russian draft of Article 35, but my feeling is that the
general political advantages of the early conclusion of a treaty
outweigh any objections that may be made to the text of the
treaty. It is not in my view the terms of the treaty which
matter so much as the physical ability of the Russians to put
pressure on Austria. If the conditions are such that Russia can
put pressure on Austria, no treaty, however well phrased, will
protect her: conversely once the Russian forces are out of
Austria she will be in an infinitely better position to protect
her own interests. It is surely worth paying the price and even
taking some risk in order to push the Russians eastward out of
Austria. If we do not get agreement on the treaty now while the
Soviet Union is embarrassed with Tito we might find conditions
much less favourable in some weeks’ time. The effect of the
conclusion of a treaty which was the first step towards the
Russian evacuation of Austria could not fail, in my opinion, to
have a heartening effect in Yugoslavia. I strongly feel that
this is a psychological moment for the conclusion of the treaty
which we cannot afford to miss.
4. There is a further argument which weighs with me and that is
that if we do not reach agreement now we may have to postpone
the conclusion of the Austrian Treaty indefinitely and refer the
treaty to Ministers. The Russians may very well make a meeting
on Austria conditional on discussion of German questions, and I
wish to avoid this if I possibly can. A further postponement of
the conclusion of an
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Austrian treaty cannot fail to have a depressing effect in
Austria in particular and in the European field in general.
5. I recognise the possibility that even if we were to accept
most if not all of the Russian terms there is no guarantee that
the Russians will not hold up the treaty, but I think it could
and should be made the condition of our acceptance of Article 35
that the Russians should meet us on the other outstanding
Articles.
6. I would therefore ask Mr. Acheson to weigh these considerations and let me
know whether, in the light of them, he does not feel that we
ought to try to get agreement on Article 35 on the best terms we
can. We should try to get concessions from the Russians on oil
exploration but should be ready to give up the refineries and
pipelines, accept the best wording we can get for the text of
Article 35 and if necessary leave the question of transportation
equipment for settlement between the Soviet Union and Austria.
It is quite possible that if the Russians are satisfied that we
are really trying to get a treaty they may make some further
concessions. In this connexion it is noteworthy that the Soviet
Ambassador asked the Minister of State to lunch yesterday and
spent most of the time complaining that we did not appear to
want a treaty. The Minister of State got the impression that the
Soviet Government were genuinely anxious to reach agreement now
but that the Ambassador was afraid to go beyond the Soviet
interpretation of the Paris directives to the Deputies.
7. I spoke to the United States Ambassador on these general lines
this morning, but I should be grateful if you would also convey
a personal message from me to Mr. Acheson in the above sense. As the Deputies have
to terminate their discussion by the 1st September there is very
little time.
Washington
, 27th August, 1949.
