740.00119 Control (Germany)/8–2049: Telegram
The United States Deputy for Austria at the Council of Foreign Ministers (Reber) to the Secretary of State
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3309. Delau 252. From Reber. In my conversation with Zarubin this morning, he outlined unagreed issues which Soviet Union felt represented main obstacles to full agreement on treaty. These were (a) transportation equipment, (b) oil exploration areas, (c) refineries, and (d) payments to Soviet Union for supplies delivered to Austria (Article 48 bis). If satisfactory adjustment of these issues could be made, Zarubin said that other outstanding points would not create any serious difficulties. I then asked him whether he would be prepared to agree to treaty provision which could ensure that Austria would retain sufficient rolling stock to cover peacetime needs and which [Page 1122] would be separate from Article 35. He stated categorically that subject of railway equipment was outside the competence of deputies and that he could not even discuss it. I emphasized importance which US Government attaches to satisfactory adjustment of this problem as part of treaty settlement, to which he replied it could only be dealt with either through bilateral negotiations or some other means since Soviet Union could not agree to its discussion by deputies. As to oil exploration areas and refineries, he said differences in regard thereto were so great he felt they could only be regulated by Foreign Ministers themselves. He deliberately evaded my questions upon Article 27 but said as regards Article 42 that Soviet Union was prepared to make considerable concessions to meet Western point of view when Articles 35 and 48 bis were settled. We agreed that few remaining days at our disposal should be devoted to attempts to clear up other problems. He said we would also have to prepare report on unagreed issues for submission to our respective Ministers. As to any subsequent discussions of these unagreed issues Soviet view is that Foreign Ministers will be required to deal with them.
It is clear to me that Zarubin is now not authorized to accept any compromise on major issues which will make agreement possible by September 1 but that Soviet Union is anticipating subsequent discussions at ministerial leved.
In discussing Zarubin’s position with Mallet and Berthelot subsequently, Mallet repeated arguments he had used yesterday (see Delau 2511) adding that despite Zarubin’s attitude British are convinced that acceptance of Soviet terms for Article 35 will make treaty possible but that postponement for consideration through diplomatic channels or by a meeting of Ministers would either mean indefinite delay or lead to Soviet insistence upon CFM consideration of German question. Both British and French most anxious to avoid any CFM discussions of Germany, until new German Government has had opportunity to consolidate its position and to start functioning.2 Berthelot has as yet received no definitive instructions from Paris and is requesting them in the light of British position as outlined by Mallet and the Department’s views which I set forth in accordance with Audel 148.3 His preliminary views were that Quai d’Orsay most anxious to avoid long delay in conclusion Austrian treaty because of depressing international effect and deterioration of both political and economic situation of Austria but that if it could be agreed Ministers discuss Austria alone on an informal basis while in New York for GA [Page 1123] or in CFM with limited agenda, this would give better opportunity for agreement than diplomatic exchanges which would be impractical and unavoidably prolonged. Berthelot suggested therefore attempt should be made to agree upon tripartite approach to Moscow suggesting discussions be held in US without delay on Austrian treaty alone.
Sent Department; repeated Vienna 241.