740.00119 Council/3–3149: Telegram

The United States Deputy for Austria at the Council of Foreign Ministers (Reber) to the Secretary of State

secret

1301. Delau 78. From Reber. Paris,1 who is in London in connection with Council of Europe discussions, asked me to call today for general discussion present situation and tactics be followed re Austrian treaty. He is fearful lest present stalemate continue indefinitely and current discussions become ridiculous but had no suggestions how overcome such difficulties. Given present uncertainty Soviet tactics and possibility broad diplomatic action on their part, he agreed it was important avoid either giving Soviets pretext for retaliatory action or taking any abrupt move pending clarification Soviet intentions.

It has become increasingly clear since discussions moved away from frontiers and reparations Soviets are utilizing every pretext gain time and there is little prospect for substantive discussions or any agreement prior Zarubin’s departure,2 time for which is not yet fixed. It is not yet clear for French and British colleagues or to myself for what purpose Soviets are seeking delay except possibly in connection with timing of some planned initiative looking forward CFM meeting.

Despite our effort to conclude discussion of Article 16, Zarubin has prolonged it for at least three sessions.3 He may follow similar line in connection with military clauses, discussion of which begins tomorrow, [Page 1087] or cut these short in effort to obtain preliminary review Article 35 prior his departure. In these circumstances I have discussed with British and French possibility of agreeing shortly after Zarubin’s departure, if it takes place within next ten days, to recess for period of ten days to two weeks or even few days longer, using Easter holidays as occasion and thus bringing us closer to time when Zarubin returns to give us better opportunity than can be afforded by a substitute to test Soviet intentions. A further advantage of Easter recess which would not be construed as a break would, in opinion of both French and British, give useful time to estimate current trends Soviet policy, its attitude in forthcoming GA and its response to such events as conclusion Atlantic Pact. Such suspension would be for a fixed date and talks could be resumed without undue political significance.

I found Paris today more inclined than previously has been French opinion to believe settlement of Austrian treaty is closely linked with German settlement and that Soviets are now using negotiations not for purpose of agreement but for exercising pressure on Yugoslavia or giving excuse for CFM meeting.4

Sent Department, repeated Vienna 75.

[
Reber
]
  1. Presumably a reference to Jacques-Camille Paris, former Counsellor, French Embassy in the United Kingdom.
  2. Zarubin had been named as a member of the Soviet Delegation to the U.N. General Assembly, but no date had been announced for his departure. Subsequently he told the other Deputies that he was not going to New York.
  3. The Deputies discussed Article 16 from the 141st meeting March 24 to the 146th meeting March 31.
  4. Telegram 1142 (Ausdel 39), April 2, to London, not printed (740.00119 Council/4–249), reported that the Department of State had no objection to this plan. Legation Vienna had no objection to an Easter recess either, but did hope there would be no indefinite adjournment or breakdown until all the unagreed articles had been thoroughly discussed and it had become evident that no agreement could be reached on the treaty at this time (Telegram 370, April 5, from Vienna, not printed, 740.00119 Council/4–549.) Reber then discussed the plan with the British and French Deputies who were prepared to recess for Easter for reasons similar to those set forth in this telegram. (Telegram 1383 (Delaus 86), April 5, from London, not printed, 740.00119 Council/4–549.) On April 8 at their 152nd meeting the Deputies agreed to adjourn until April 25.