Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria, Volume III

740.00119 Council/2–2349: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy for Austria at the Council of Foreign Ministers (Reber)

secret
us urgent

Washington, February 23, 1949—7 p.m.

611.¹ Ausdel 14. Note from recent messages (Delaus 12 Feb 12, 18 Feb 17, 23 Feb 19; Belgrade’s 145 Feb 11, 173 Feb 19; Moscow’s 419 Feb 19²) fluid and tentative character of Yugo position re Aus Treaty and possible complicating factor Sov tactics in relation to Yugo internal situation.³ It may be necessary take account Sov maneuvers this connection to weaken Tito regime as well as need to pave way for Yugo and Sov retreat from previous strongly asserted positions if solution problem Yugo claims is reached. Nevertheless, we cannot yield in any degree in our stand on two basic principles, no change in 1937 frontiers and no reparations obligations. Room for negotiation compromise settlement therefore appears confined to narrow limits.

Agree concession such as estab autonomous Slovene district, creation new province predominantly Slovene in character, or holding plebiscite is entirely unacceptable since such step would compromise our publicly and frequently affirmed position by recognizing some validity in Yugo territorial claim and inviting future Yugo irredentist activity. These proposals and any scheme involving form reparations through, supply goods on privileged basis (but not precluding any mutually beneficial trade agreement) must be opposed without compromise.

Envisage extent acceptable concessions along fol lines:

1. Incorporation in Treaty code of minority rights for Slovenes covering principles and practices already in effect or otherwise acceptable to Aus Govt. Assume disputes re interpretation or observance such provision would be settled in normal manner as outlined Art. 57.⁴ However, if special procedure such as appeal to International Court of Justice desired by other parties, we would have no objection.

2. Transfer of Aus assets in Yugo to Yugo Govt as proposed in Art. 45.⁵

3. Joint arrangements mutually satisfactory to Aus and Yugo for dealing with Drava River problems of type outlined in first alternative proposal, Vienna’s 125 Feb 16.⁶ You might wish to explore further with Brit, Fr and Aus concrete suggestions on subject including extent to which provisions should be made for these arrangements in Treaty itself and outside Treaty but supplemental thereto in bilateral agreement. This problem is now under study here and we hope to have more specific suggestions later.

Believe bilateral negots should be limited to Drava River problems or other economic matters and should not involve under auspices of Deputies even minor frontier rectifications, Delaus 17 Feb 17.⁷ Admission principle frontier rectification however minor as appropriate subject for bilateral negots based on precedent Deputies’ letters Feb 7, 1947⁷ concerning Aus-Czech frontier problems might well be taken to constitute official acknowledgement by Deputies Yugo territorial claims have some basis in fact. We are apprehensive acceptance such proposal would weaken our general position on frontier issue, strength of which has depended in large part on our firm stand taken on principle frontier established through plebiscite 1920 equitable and internationally recognized determination of boundary. While Aus-Czech negots appear in abeyance we feel this would not be result if comparable letters addressed to Aus and Yugo which latter could always exploit in future to press its territorial demands claiming sanction of Deputies. Onus of resisting demands would then fall entirely on Aus themselves. Such action might also encourage Hung to invent and press similar claims for “rectification”.

Consider on other hand joint utilization Drava River resources as well as other economic problems fitting subject for bilateral settlement. It seems to us if Yugo earnestly desires rapprochement with Aus satisfactory arrangements for operation and development Drava River facilities for mutual benefit both economies might be worked out as part of comprehensive economic settlement. If this possible, joint undertaking developed around Drava River as center might come to serve as tie between two countries.

Acheson

1. Repeated to Vienna as 157 and to Belgrade as 88.
2. None printed.
3. For documentation relating to the United States position with regard to the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute, see volume v .
4. Article 57, which had been agreed during the course of previous discussions by the Deputies, provided for the settlement of disputes by direct negotiations between the disputants. If the two parties could not settle the dispute by direct talks, then a commission composed of one representative from each party and a third, selected by mutual consent, or by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if the parties could not agree, would decide the dispute by majority vote.
5. For the text of this unagreed article, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. ii, p. 1530.
6. Not printed; it suggested the creation of a mixed commission of the two parties with the possible addition of a United Nations or third party mediator to settle disputes. (740.00119 Council/2–1649)
7. Not printed.
7. Not printed.