Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria, Volume III

CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 180: Sub-Committee for Germany, National Security Council

Paper Prepared by the Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs ( Beam )¹

secret

[ Washington , February 24, 1949.]

Set of Principles for Treatment of Western Germany in Event It Is Impossible To Repair the Split of Germany (Revised)²

General

1. To press forward with the economic and political rehabilitation of Western Germany so that the latter may serve as a pattern for a free Germany whenever it is possible to re-unify the nation.

2. To press for the closest association of Western Germany, first economically and subsequently politically, with the Western European system and to encourage all steps which will lead to Western Germany’s acceptance as a productive and self-respecting member of the Western European community.

3. To bring about the establishment of a financially self-sustaining Western German economy within the framework of the European Recovery Program, which will enable the German people to enjoy a gradually increasing standard of living.

4. While continuing the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, to treat Western Germany as within the area protected by the North Atlantic Pact under Western auspices.

5. To provide, as far as is possible, for the settlement of those issues which would be dealt with in a peace treaty, so that normal relations may be restored between Western Germany and other countries.

6. In the absence of four-power agreement, to remain in Berlin as long as this suits Western purposes, namely, as long as our commitment to protect the Berlin population continues and as long as Allied occupation of Berlin frustrates Soviet policy.

7. To treat the Eastern area as a lost German territory; to subject it to psychological warfare with a view to encouraging anti-Russian resistance and to inducing the population to look to Western Germany as the image of Germany’s future.

Specific

1. To proceed as soon as possible with the establishment of a West German government under an occupation statute, the restrictive terms of which will be progressively relaxed in order to limit to an increasing degree Allied interference to the absolute minimum required for reasons of security.

2. To conclude a trizonal fusion agreement which will provide the maximum coordination of Allied policy and action respecting Western Germany and which will enable the U.S. financial contribution to be used in the manner most effective to promote German recovery within the framework of Western European recovery, and to achieve a self-supporting position for all ERP countries at the earliest possible date. [The agreement should provide for U.S. influence in the control of economic affairs commensurate with the U.S. financial contribution to German recovery.]³

3. To stabilize the Berlin situation through an emergency economic program for Berlin adapted to the maximum supply by airlift.

4. To establish the Ruhr Authority and influence its activities in a direction which will elicit German cooperation and promote the economic integration of the Western European countries.

5. To complete the reparations program and the settlement of restitution claims as soon as possible.

6. To obtain an agreement on prohibited and restricted industries, pending a peace settlement, which will provide security guarantees which are simple and workable and which will have a minimum impact on the German economy.

7. To establish through the Military Security Board an effective system for enforcing compliance with the security restrictions imposed on Germany.

8. To protect United Nations property in Germany pending the conclusion of a peace settlement and to terminate the present moratorium on foreign investments under conditions which will safeguard German interests.

9. To work out, as far as possible, a final settlement of Allied claims against Germany for application in Western Germany.

10. To establish the policy regarding public ownership which will permit decisions by democratically responsible German authorities, whether at the local or national level.

11. To assist democratic German forces to combat a dangerous revival of ultra-nationalist groups, preferably by constructive support of positive policies.

12. To work out with the British and French Governments, and to a suitable extent with the Benelux and other interested governments, precise statements of requirements on matters of continuing Allied concern, with a view to terminating Allied controls reserved under the Occupation Statute except as necessary to enforce these requirements.

13. To maintain readiness for four-power discussions on all of Germany if and when the Soviet Union should demonstrate a willingness to engage in such talks on acceptable conditions. These conditions would include lifting of the Berlin blockade and terms which would offer hope of re-unifying Germany within the framework of a free and peaceful European community.

1. Attached to the source text was a cover sheet from Bradley Patterson, dated February 24, not printed, which indicated that Beam’s paper was numbered GNSC D–4a.
2. The first draft of this paper (GNSC D–4, February 14, not printed) was approved by Hickerson and Murphy. It was revised to incorporate the suggestions of Jacques J. Reinstein, the Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. Paragraphs 3 and 5 of the General section and paragraphs 7–9 of the Specific section were added to Beam’s original paper, and minor drafting changes were effected in the other paragraphs. A copy of GNSC D–4 is in Lot M–88: Box 180: Sub-Committee for Germany, National Security Council.
3. Brackets in the source text.