740.00119 Council/5–1849: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France
1672. Personal for Jessup Eyes Only. At a mtg of Security Council this afternoon presided over by the President, I outlined our position re forthcoming CFM mtg. I first referred to the paper “An approach to the CFM”1 recently approved by the President and then briefly reviewed history of German problem since Potsdam, our efforts looking to a quadripartite solution and the London Agreement re a Western German program. This was followed by a reference to the subsequent Soviet determination to drive us from Berlin, the successful intervention of the airlift and counter-blockade measure, which we feel brought about a Soviet desire for further conversations. I emphasized to the President with his approval that it is not our intention to abandon the advantages gained in Western Ger. It will be our intention to probe the Soviet attitude at Paris, using the device [Page 885] of questions regarding the Eastern frontier, reparations, Soviet acquisition of properties in the Eastern zone in an effort to clarify Soviet intentions. I outlined the difficulties that would lie in the way of an extension of democratic govt to Eastern Ger under present conditions and the lag that wld be incident to a correction of the structure of public admin, police, etc. I also referred to the study made by Joint Chiefs of Staff re question of regrouping and eventual reduction of occupation forces,2 describing the objections which the Mil Estab found to hasty action and the polit and mil considerations developed by analysis of the report prepared by Joint Chiefs. It was made clear to Council that in event it became apparent during course of meeting a solution of the all German problem is not immed possible that effort will be made to develop a modus vivendi between East and West Ger, including an acceptable arrangement which wld maintain our right to be in Berlin and to have access to Berlin.3 There was also a discussion of problem which wld be created shld Soviet Union attempt to re-impose restrictions on trade and communications with Berlin and with latter respect it was understood that NSC would immed undertake an analysis of this purpose so that shld a decision be necessary it wld not have to be improvised.
President expressed his satisfaction with course of action I proposed together with approval of plan to reconcile views of Brit and Fr with ours in order that we may present to Soviets a united front during forthcoming mtg. I thought it best not to request NSC to approve a definitive paper outline of our positions on the several issues involved in order to retain the greatest degree of flexibility in achieving our basic objectives in Ger.
I also outlined to NSC basic factors involved in Aust Treaty negots and obtained President’s approval positions taken by Reber at end of recent discussions in London which are outlined in a memorandum, copy of which is being transmitted you.4 President agreed to inclusion of Aust Treaty on agenda CFM mtg, leaving question of manner in which initiative is to be taken to be worked out by us in collaboration with UK and Fr.
- The text of this paper was transmitted in telegram 1605, May 11, to London (to Paris as 1539), p. 881.↩
- No copy of this study has been found in Department of State files.↩
- A copy of the paper which was used by Secretary Acheson to brief President Truman and the National Security Council is in file 740.00119 Council/5–349.↩
- On May 11 Reber had prepared a memorandum (p. 1093), summarizing the meetings of the Deputies for Austria before their adjournment on May 10 and recommending the United States course of action in future negotiations for the Draft Treaty. Secretary Acheson’s reference is to an abbreviated version of Reber’s report, dated May 17, not printed, that was sent to the National Security Council. (CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 84: Reber File)↩