CFM Flies: Lot M–88: Box 140:
Jessup–Malik Conversations
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of
State1
top secret
[Washington,] May 2,
1949.
| Participants: |
The Secretary |
|
Sir Oliver
Franks, British Ambassador |
|
Dean Rusk,
Assistant Secretary |
Sir Oliver Franks came in to
deliver to me a personal message from Mr. Bevin. The message is contained in the attached
memorandum. Sir Oliver
stated his understanding that this message simply reflected Mr.
Bevin’s present way of
thinking about the matter and that Mr. Bevin would greatly appreciate knowing what I might
be thinking.
After reading the attached paper, I told Sir Oliver that I shared many of the ideas contained
in the paper. I stated that we did not consider that the USSR had
changed its attitude toward us or had changed the basic objectives
of its foreign policy and that we must therefore be alert in
connection with forthcoming negotiations. I indicated that there had
been some earlier concern lest undue optimism might be created,
particularly in Congress, but that we had been reassured in our
recent talks with members of the Congress. We believe that Congress
looks upon the blockade as the first fruits of a policy of firmness
and not as a reason for relaxing our effort and vigilance. I also
told Sir Oliver that these
present negotiations might lead to little more than a lifting of the
blockade. In a Council of Foreign Ministers we may have little real
chance for agreement but we would have a serious propaganda problem
with which to deal. This propaganda would primarily concern German
opinion. We must therefore be bold in our approach in order to deal
adequately with propaganda aspects but in doing so make proposals
which we think would in fact be the basis for a reasonable
settlement. By undue timidity we might be pushed back to the
defensive and seriously damage our propaganda position.
[Page 749]
I then indicated the desirability of careful three-power preparation
for a CFM and stated that we would
be in touch with the British and French informally in Washington
before our proposed three-power talks open up in Paris. I emphasized
that the three of us must work closely together and that we should
make a special effort to keep Mr. Schuman fully in the picture at all stages.
[Annex]
The British Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs (Bevin) to the Secretary of State
top secret
[London, undated.]
I have been watching very carefully the development of the
conversations between Dr. Jessup and M.
Malik and considering in the light of the
situation in Berlin and in Western Germany the course upon which
we are now set. I want to make it clear at the outset that I
have agreed to this course and that you can depend upon me to do
my utmost to see that it is carried through to a successful
conclusion. If we can get the blockade lifted and secure a
reasonable settlement with the Russians on Germany as a whole we
shall have removed one of the most difficult and dangerous
problems confronting us and done much to ensure peace.
Nevertheless I want to tell you frankly that I am disquieted and
uneasy at some aspects of the way things are going. It is quite
possible that the Russians would like to raise the blockade in
order to extricate themselves from their present political and
economic embarrassments; it is also possible that they would
like to reach some accommodation with us about Germany. I am
sure, however, that there is much more that they want and are
aiming to get. The Russians cannot afford at present if they can
possibly avoid it to allow us to establish the sort of political
and economic system at which we are aiming in Western Germany
and then to extend that system over the whole of Germany,
including Western Europe [sic]. At bottom
they remain bitterly hostile to all our plans for Germany, and I
am sure that there are many difficulties and dangers for us
behind their present readiness to lift the blockade and begin
negotiations.
In fact it is when negotiations begin on a Four-Power basis that
our difficulties really arise. It is going to be no easy, and
certainly no short, matter for the Western Powers to reach
agreement on satisfactory terms for Germany with the Russians.
Their ideas and objects are exactly opposed to ours. I do not
want to go into all the details now, but the Russians are
certainly thinking in terms of a heavily centralised
[Page 750]
totalitarian state,
controlled by the Communists by direct or indirect methods,
geared to the economy of the Eastern European States and the
Soviet Union and bitterly hostile to Western Europe and America.
I am not saying that they are likely to achieve this, but that
is what they are aiming at and that is why I am convinced that
the negotiations upon which we may shortly embark will not be
plain-sailing or easy to bring to a successful conclusion
quickly.
It is almost certainly also in the Russian intention that the
meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers will be used to try
to foster opposition in the public mind, especially in France,
to the ratification of the Atlantic Pact. My hope had been that
the Pact would be safely in force before we opened up with the
Russians again.
With these thoughts in mind I would ask you most earnestly to
reflect carefully upon where we are going and to join with me in
preventing the spread of an air of easy optimism about Russian
intentions. I fear there is too much readiness in some quarters
to believe that merely because the Russians have shown some
readiness to raise the blockade the rest will be plain-sailing.
On the contrary, in spite of the advantages which we at present
hold, I think that if we are to avoid serious danger we shall
have to exercise the greatest caution and foresight during the
coming weeks.
I have spoken very frankly and I hope you will accept my message
in that sense. In spite of the anxiety which I feel I assure you
again that you can count upon my full support to bring the
forthcoming negotiations to a successful conclusion.2
